Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

James J. and Sarah J. appealed the denial of their petition to declare Sarah's three children free from the custody and control of the children's father, Christopher M. James and Sarah also contended that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue a temporary visitation order allowing Christopher to have supervised visitation with the children during the pendency, or upon dismissal, of the petition to terminate parental rights. Finally, they contested the order directing them to pay Christopher's attorney fees. Christopher requested that the Court of Appeal dismiss this appeal as frivolous and impose sanctions. The Court affirmed the findings and orders of the trial court after review of the record, and denied Christopher's request for sanctions. View "In re E.M." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order removing his three-year-old daughter from his custody for a single occasion of disciplining her by spanking her with a belt on her legs and buttocks. The court concluded that, given all the circumstances, the evidence with respect to the risk of harm to the child if Father were allowed back to the home, does not satisfy the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Further, there may be less drastic alternatives than an order requiring Father to leave the home. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to the extent it requires Father to remain outside the home and otherwise affirmed the remaining findings. View "In re A.E." on Justia Law

In 2007, husband and the parties’ then 8-year-old son came to the U.S. Wife joined the family in 2011 when her immigrant visa was approved. In 2012, wife filed a judicial council form, ex parte, requesting a Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Fam. Code, 6200, order in favor of herself and the then 13-year-old child. In her attached declaration, wife described in detail three incidents of past abuse allegedly perpetrated by husband. A social worker had arranged for wife and the child to relocate to a domestic violence shelter outside of Alameda County. The trial court issued a temporary DVRO, which was continued to allow additional time to submit additional documentary evidence. The court later concluded it had no statutory authority to consider the DVRO request brought solely in wife’s name as “she is not apparently the victim of domestic violence.” The court of appeal remanded, stating that the facial adequacy of wife’s allegations showing that she was abused within the meaning of the DVPA divested the court of discretion to summarily deny her application. View "Gou v. Xiao" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile dependency court's jurisdictional orders based on its findings that Mother has a history of substance abuse which renders her incapable of providing her teenage daughter with regular care and supervision. The dependency court further found that Mother's drug abuse endangered her daughter's health and safety, and places her daughter at risk of physical harm. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the dependency court's finding that Mother suffers from a substance problem. The court concluded, however, that the evidence does not support the dependency court's finding that her substance abuse has caused or is causing a substantial risk of harm to the daughter. Accordingly, the court reversed the dependency court's orders. View "In re Rebecca C." on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution action, David Oyster appealed from a limited judgment on a reserved issue. The court rejected Oyster's contention that the 2006 stipulated judgment could not be admitted into evidence in the 2011 dissolution proceedings because it resulted from mediation, and was thus confidential under Evidence Code section 1116; by providing that the court would enforce the agreement and they would be bound by it, the parties clearly demonstrated that they did not intend that it remain confidential; and the court rejected Oyster's contention that a stipulated judgment created only for one case could not become the basis for a judgment in a subsequent case where Oyster cited no authority for his contention and, at any rate, nothing in the record suggested that the stipulated judgment here was intended to be limited to the original divorce proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Daly and Oyster" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered at the last contested section 364 of the Welfare and Institutions Code hearing at which the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over her 17-month-old son despite the recommendation of the Department to terminate jurisdiction. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence submitted by the Department and in the record that supports the juvenile court's determination not to terminate jurisdiction. Among other things, Mother still struggled with providing the son with everything he needed; a counselor reported that Mother will benefit from continued treatment; the parenting and mental concerns that brought Mother to the attention of the Department and Children's court remain a work in progress; and there is no evidence concerning mother's capacity to live independently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

Seven years after appellant Marjorie L. was appointed guardian of her two granddaughters, A.L. and E.L., the trial court granted a petition to terminate the guardianship filed by the minors’ parents, respondents Jennifer L. and Richard L., after a hearing that took only minutes at which no evidence was introduced, no witness testimony was taken, and no arguments from counsel were heard. The Court of Appeal concluded that this truncated process deprived the guardian of any meaningful hearing or opportunity to object to the petition, and prevented the court from fully considering whether termination was in the best interests of the minors. The Court therefore reversed the order terminating the guardianship and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing before a different judge to consider whether termination is in the minors’ best interests. View "Guardianship of A.L." on Justia Law

Mother Y.Z. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her children, G.P. and A. P., and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Mother contended the court erroneously found that the children should have been removed from their relative caregiver and placed in a foster home under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 387 deprived her of the ability to raise an exception to the adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception to the adoption preference was inapplicable. "Jose P.," the presumed father of G.P. and A.P., joined Mother's arguments and argued his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without having made a detriment finding as to him. Upon review of the juvenile court order, the Court of Appeal concluded the court's findings under section 387 as well as its determination that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that Father invited the error he appealed, and even if he did not do so, the juvenile court's findings were sufficient to support termination of Father's rights. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

Without holding a hearing, the juvenile court denied two requests by a mother (Karen) to modify an order denying her services to reunify with her three-year-old son and seven-month-old daughter, who had 13 fractures. Later, after holding a hearing, the court terminated her parental rights. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the failure to hold a hearing on the modification requests did not amount to reversible error. On the first request, Karen failed to allege a prima facie case. On the second request, Karen was given an opportunity to be heard, and the court made findings negating the appropriateness of reunification services. Her parental rights were properly terminated because substantial evidence supports showed that the potential benefit to the children from a continuing relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

Tonna and Nevarez were in a dating relationship for five years. They lived together from 2008 to 2010. Following their 2011 breakup, Tonna continued to try to persuade Nevarez to get back together with him, and went Nevarez’s workplace, a Safeway supermarket, almost daily. Nevarez sometimes responded to his communications and sometimes met with Tonna. Nevarez claims that at one point, Tonna pushed Nevarez against a wall and tried to take her clothes off; another time, he grabbed her arm. Tonna contacted Nevarez’s mother. Nevarez obtained a work transfer and changed her phone number before seeking a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Fam. Code, 6200. The restraining order contained personal conduct orders and stay-away orders Tonna claimed that there was insufficient evidence that he committed “abuse” and insufficient evidence that Nevarez feared future abuse. The appeals court affirmed.View "Nevarez v. Tonna" on Justia Law