Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

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The case centers around Laurie Smith, a former sheriff of Santa Clara County, who was investigated for bribery and other crimes related to the processing of concealed firearms licenses. Although she was not criminally charged, a civil grand jury presented an accusation charging her with misconduct in office. A month-long trial ensued, following which Smith retired and moved to dismiss the removal proceedings on the grounds of mootness. However, the trial court denied her motion, and Smith was found guilty on six counts, leading to a judgment of removal.Smith appealed, arguing that the removal proceedings were moot as she had already retired. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed. Despite her retirement, the judgment of removal had consequential implications: it barred Smith from jury service under section 203, subdivision (a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which excludes individuals convicted of malfeasance in office. In her removal trial, the jury found Smith guilty of perjury, a form of malfeasance in office.Smith contended that the literal language of these statutes should be disregarded because removal proceedings are not criminal cases. However, the court concluded that Smith's retirement did not render the removal proceedings moot because her conviction in those proceedings barred her from serving on a jury. The judgment of removal was thus affirmed. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

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This case involves the Temple of 1001 Buddhas and others, who own a property in Fremont, California. They appealed against the City of Fremont's decision to uphold nuisance orders relating to their property based on alleged violations of the local building code. The plaintiffs argued that the appeals process used by the City of Fremont was preempted by section 1.8.8 of the California Building Code, which requires appeals to be heard by an independent agency or board, or the city's governing body. They also raised issues about the fairness of their administrative appeal hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four concluded that the City of Fremont's appeals process did conflict with the state law in relation to enforcement determinations based on violations of Fremont’s Building Standards Code. However, it rejected the plaintiffs' claims about procedural unfairness and zoning violations.The court reversed part of the judgment and directed the trial court to issue appropriate mandamus relief. This included compelling Fremont to establish an appeals board or authorized agency to hear appeals, or provide for an appeal to its governing body as required by section 1.8.8 of the Building Code. Furthermore, Fremont was compelled to set aside the administrative hearing decision sustaining the nuisance determinations in NOA 3 that are premised on violations of the Fremont Building Standards Code and to provide for an appeal for those nuisance determinations. View "Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

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Safety-Kleen of California, Inc. appealed against the denial of its petitions for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department of Toxic Substances Control (the Department) to set aside final inspection violation scores concerning Safety-Kleen’s oil and hazardous waste treatment facility. The Department had classified certain violations at Safety-Kleen’s facility as Class I violations, which Safety-Kleen argued was an abuse of discretion under the Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL), as these violations did not pose a “significant threat to human health or safety or the environment.”The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with Safety-Kleen, interpreting the HWCL to permit classification of a violation as Class I under independent statutory bases, including those that do not pose a significant threat to human health or safety or the environment. The court held that the Department did not abuse its discretion in determining Safety-Kleen’s final inspection violation scores. It also rejected Safety-Kleen’s argument that a Class II violation can only be reclassified as a Class I violation if the violation is chronic or the violator is recalcitrant. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Safety-Kleen of Cal., Inc. v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

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The case involves the California Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) and TRC Operating Company, an oil operator. CalGEM, tasked with overseeing the state's drilling operations, enacted new regulations requiring oil operators to cease operations when a "surface expression" exists, or when there is reason to believe a specific operation is causing a surface expression. The operations must remain dormant until CalGEM authorizes their resumption in writing.TRC, having been issued a regulatory notice to cease operations, complied but never received authorization to resume. TRC sought an administrative appeal, which went unheard. Consequently, TRC sought judicial review, arguing that the regulations were invalid and CalGEM's actions were arbitrary and capricious.The trial court agreed with TRC, ruling the regulations were invalid, and granted declaratory relief. CalGEM appealed, arguing the regulations were valid and did not abuse its discretion in issuing the notice to TRC. The court concluded that the regulations were valid as they were consistent with the overall statutory scheme and were supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated the trial court's writ, and remanded the matter to the trial court to consider in the first instance whether CalGEM's actions in this case were arbitrary or capricious. View "TRC Operating Co. v. Shabazian" on Justia Law

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In this case, the California Board of Psychology revoked the license of Dr. Robert Geffner after it found that he had violated the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. The violations were based on his evaluation of two children for suicide risk without their father’s consent, failure to consult their existing therapist, making recommendations beyond the scope of an emergency risk assessment, and delegating the duty to warn the father of one child's thoughts about killing him. Dr. Geffner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to vacate the Board’s decision, but the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusions. The appellate court clarified that the father's consent was not necessary in cases of emergency, as the circumstances suggested, and that Dr. Geffner did not make any custody recommendations. Moreover, the court found no evidence to suggest that Dr. Geffner had a duty to personally warn the father of his son's threat, and thus did not violate any ethical standards. The court directed the trial court to grant Dr. Geffner's petition and reverse the Board's findings. View "Geffner v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law

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The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment. View "Persiani v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, a woman, T.B., was found to be gravely disabled and was appointed a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. T.B. appealed, arguing that her trial did not commence within 10 days of her demanding one, violating section 5350, subdivision (d)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and denying her due process. This statute was amended in January 1, 2023, to state that the failure to commence the trial within the time period is grounds for dismissal. The court concluded that the time limit for commencing trials is directory, not mandatory, and that dismissal for the failure to comply with the time limit is discretionary. The court found that the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying T.B.’s motions to dismiss the proceedings, but no reversal was required because T.B. did not demonstrate prejudice. The court also found that T.B. did not demonstrate a violation of her due process rights by the delay. Therefore, the court affirmed the conservatorship order. View "Conservatorship of T.B." on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the taxation of cell phones sold in California as part of a "bundled transaction," in which a consumer purchases the phone at a reduced price from a wireless service provider in exchange for signing a contract for future wireless service. The plaintiffs challenged a state regulation that calculates sales tax on the full, unbundled price of the phone, rather than the discounted price paid by the consumer. They argued that this regulation violated the Revenue and Taxation Code and was not properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, rejected these arguments. It concluded that the Department of Tax and Fee Administration could allocate a portion of the contract price in a bundled transaction to the cell phone and tax it accordingly. It also found that the regulation was properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.The court noted that, while services are not taxable under California law, the sale of a cell phone as part of a bundled transaction is not a true discount because the wireless service provider recoups the cost of the phone through the service contract. Therefore, the Department could reasonably allocate a portion of the contract price to the phone and tax it accordingly. The court also concluded that the regulation had been properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the Department had failed to properly assess the regulation's economic impact and provide adequate notice to the public.As a result, the court reversed the portion of the lower court judgment that invalidated the regulation and prohibited the Department from applying it to bundled transactions. It remanded the case with instructions to deny the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Bekkerman v. California Department Of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

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In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law