Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man named Johnathon Lerke, who was under a Murphy conservatorship, challenged his confinement in a county jail while awaiting transfer to a state hospital. Murphy conservatorships are for individuals found incompetent to stand trial and deemed a danger to others. Despite being ordered to a state hospital, Lerke was held in county jail for months due to a lack of space at the hospital. He argued that his confinement in jail was unauthorized and violated his rights.The Superior Court initially found Lerke incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to a state hospital for competency restoration. After nearly two years, the hospital reported that Lerke had not regained competence. Subsequently, a Murphy conservatorship was established, requiring his placement in a state hospital. However, due to the unavailability of space, he remained in county jail. Lerke's counsel requested his release or transfer to a local psychiatric hospital, but the court denied the request, stating that he would remain in jail until a state hospital bed became available.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that no legal authority permitted Lerke’s indefinite detention in county jail pending his transfer to the state hospital. The statutory framework requires conservatees to be placed in treatment facilities that promote their treatment and protect the public, and county jails do not meet these requirements. Although the court found Lerke’s confinement in jail unlawful, it denied habeas relief because he had already been transferred to an authorized treatment facility during the proceedings. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied as moot. View "In re Lerke" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was struck by a vehicle while crossing a marked, non-signalized crosswalk on an onramp from Jeffrey Road in Irvine, leading to the I-405 freeway northbound. The bicyclist’s parents sued the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the City of Irvine, claiming the crosswalk was dangerous due to the lack of a signal, inadequate signage, and a high speed limit. They alleged these factors contributed to their daughter's death and that the public entities failed to warn of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Caltrans and the City. The court found no triable issue of material fact regarding design immunity, which shields public entities from liability for creating a dangerous condition if the design was approved by a discretionary authority. The court also ruled that the lack of a traffic control signal did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show the alleged dangerous condition was a concealed trap or that there was a failure to warn.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Caltrans had established design immunity and that the plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of material fact. The appellate court also found that Caltrans had no notice of the alleged dangerous condition, as there were no similar accidents in the area in the decade prior. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Caltrans had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, which is necessary for a failure-to-warn claim. View "Kabat v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Aleksia Lindsay filed an amended class action complaint against Patenaude & Felix, APC, and Transworld Systems Inc., alleging unfair debt collection practices. Lindsay had defaulted on $60,000 in student loans, and after receiving incomplete and inaccurate information from Transworld, Patenaude initiated two debt collection lawsuits against her. Lindsay later discovered that both entities had a history of unethical collection practices, leading to actions by various regulatory bodies. After the lawsuits against her were dismissed, Lindsay received another demand for payment and subsequently filed the class action complaint.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County struck Lindsay's complaint, relying on the anti-SLAPP law, and ruled that the public interest exception did not apply. Lindsay argued that the trial court erred in this decision. The trial court concluded that although the three conditions of the public interest exception were met, the action was not brought solely in the public interest because Lindsay sought damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the action was brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public, as the relief sought by Lindsay was identical to that sought for the plaintiff class. The court also found that seeking damages did not preclude the application of the public interest exception. The court concluded that the action met all three conditions of the public interest exception: it did not seek greater or different relief, it would enforce an important right affecting the public interest and confer a significant benefit, and private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate financial burden on Lindsay.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, exempting Lindsay's action from the anti-SLAPP law and entitling her to costs on appeal. View "Lindsay v. Patenaude & Felix" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child, Noah C., was repeatedly removed from and returned to his abusive parents' custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Tragically, Noah died in July 2019 due to abuse by his parents. His great-grandmother, Evangelina Hernandez, acting personally and on behalf of Noah's estate and his siblings, sued the County of Los Angeles and Hathaway-Sycamores Child and Family Services for negligence. The case at issue concerns the second cause of action for negligence against the County, alleging that DCFS failed to notify Hernandez about a removal warrant for Noah that was obtained but not executed.The trial court overruled the County's demurrer to the negligence claim, holding that the County had a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to notify Hernandez about the removal warrant. The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn this ruling. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ directing the trial court to either vacate its order and sustain the demurrer or show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue. The trial court declined to vacate its order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 361.3 does not impose a mandatory duty on the County to notify a relative about an application for a protective custody warrant or a court order granting such a warrant before the minor's removal from parental custody. The court also concluded that other provisions cited by Hernandez, including the California Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures, Civil Code section 1714, and the special relationship doctrine, do not establish such a duty. Consequently, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the trial court's order overruling the demurrer, and directed the trial court to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. View "County of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State" on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members who voted for the agreements, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant over Burton's opposition. SDG&E, joined by the City defendants, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to cure or correct the alleged violation. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that Burton did not meet the demand requirement and lacked standing for her other claims.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that Burton did not comply with the demand requirement of section 54960.1 of the Brown Act, which mandates that an interested person must make a written demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the action before filing a lawsuit. The court found that the letters sent by attorney Maria Severson did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf, as Burton had not retained Severson at the time the letters were sent. The court rejected Burton's arguments of statutory interpretation, ratification, and substantial compliance.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Burton's failure to comply with the demand requirement justified the summary judgment. The court also deemed Burton's challenge to the order granting SDG&E leave to intervene as moot, given the affirmation of the judgment. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding the application of the class 32 exemption and ruling that no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former officers of the City of Perris Police Department or their surviving spouses, claimed that the closure of the Perris PD and their subsequent hiring by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department resulted in a merger of the two departments under Government Code section 20508. They argued that this merger required Riverside County and the Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) to credit their service with the Perris PD as service with the Sheriff’s Department, entitling them to a more generous pension.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court concluded that no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any of the City’s municipal functions. Consequently, the service pensions for the Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated and paid out by CalPERS under separate contracts with the City and County, respectively. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, Riverside County and CalPERS.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of the contracting agencies’ CalPERS contracts before the succeeding agency assumes any statutory obligations. The court found that the County did not assume the City’s municipal obligations but merely contracted to provide law enforcement services. Therefore, the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former police officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. View "Petree v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that an investigating officer had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the police department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the release of the dishonesty records but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The trial court's protective order restricted the defense from sharing the records outside the defense team. The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate this protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The Court of Appeal initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the records of the officer's sustained finding of dishonesty were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for these records, as they were not confidential. Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer's dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law