Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Super. Ct.
Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were discharged for alleged misconduct and subsequently appealed their terminations to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. While their appeals were pending, each entered into a settlement agreement with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to employment. The County of Los Angeles refused to honor these settlements, asserting that they lacked proper approval. The deputies, along with their union, sought enforcement of the settlements through claims for mandamus, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief, arguing that the department had longstanding authority to settle such appeals without further county approval.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the county’s demurrers to these claims without leave to amend, finding the settlements void for lack of county counsel approval and insufficient authority for department chiefs to bind the county. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously reversed in part, directing the trial court to grant leave to amend so petitioners could specify the legal basis for the department’s alleged authority. Petitioners filed several amended complaints, but the trial court again sustained demurrers, ultimately dismissing the action when petitioners failed to allege adequate legal authority for the chiefs to settle commission appeals on the county’s behalf.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, treated petitioners’ arguably untimely appeal as a writ petition under the unusual procedural circumstances. On the merits, the court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate that the sheriff and his subordinates had authority to bind the county to settlements of civil service commission appeals without approval from the Board of Supervisors or authority conferred by law. The court denied the writ petition, upholding dismissal of all claims. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com.
TC Telephone, a provider participating in California’s Universal LifeLine Telephone Service Program, offered measured-rate phone service to low-income customers by purchasing service from other carriers and reselling it. Under the program’s measured-rate plan, customers received 60 untimed local calls monthly, while TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from its suppliers. The company sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) for these per-minute charges, believing this practice was permitted under the Commission’s rules, which allowed for recovery of “lost revenues” caused by providing untimed calls. Commission staff initially approved these claims for years.After a 2019 inquiry into rising reimbursement claims, Commission staff expressed uncertainty about whether per-minute reimbursement was correct but instructed TC Telephone to continue its submissions until further clarification. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution explicitly forbidding per-minute reimbursement, stating that only per-call reimbursement would be allowed on a prospective basis. Following this, the Commission investigated TC Telephone’s past claims, concluded that its prior per-minute reimbursements violated program rules, and ordered repayment of over $8 million plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied by the Commission.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, prior to the 2020 resolution, the Commission’s rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. The court found that neither the program’s regulations nor staff communications made this prohibition clear, and even Commission staff lacked certainty. As a result, the court annulled the Commission’s decisions ordering repayment and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
K.S. v. County of Alameda
K.S., the plaintiff, was placed in a group home by the County of Alameda when he was a minor in foster care. Between 2006 and 2007, while he was twelve to thirteen years old, he was sexually abused by an adult staff member at the facility. K.S. reported the abuse to a supervisor, an agent of the County, but no investigation or protective action was taken. Instead, K.S. alleges he was penalized, and the abuse continued. He contends that, beyond the failure to respond to his report, the County and its employees failed to implement adequate policies, procedures, and supervision to prevent foreseeable abuse of children in their care, and that systemic deficiencies contributed to his injuries.After K.S. filed a negligence action against the County in the Alameda County Superior Court, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was immune from liability under California Government Code section 820.2, which grants immunity for discretionary acts by public employees. The trial court granted the County’s motion, concluding the complaint’s allegations demonstrated that the relevant acts or omissions were discretionary decisions entitled to immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that at the pleading stage, it could not be determined that all of the acts or omissions alleged by K.S. were necessarily discretionary within the meaning of section 820.2, nor that they resulted from a conscious, considered exercise of discretion by County employees. The court explained that some alleged conduct, such as failure to notice abuse or take reasonable protective measures, might be ministerial rather than discretionary, and that immunity under section 820.2 could not be resolved solely on the pleadings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "K.S. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law
Shi v. City of Palos Verdes Estates
A homeowner applied for a permit to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) on his property in the City of Palos Verdes Estates. He alleged that, despite statutes requiring ministerial approval of such permits within a specific time, the City unlawfully delayed the process for over three years by imposing discretionary reviews and additional requirements. As a result of these delays, the homeowner claimed to have suffered significant financial damages, including increased construction costs and diminished property value.The matter was first heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The City demurred, arguing that the statutes governing ADU permitting were not intended to protect the private financial interests of individual homeowners, but rather to address the public’s general interest in increasing housing supply. The trial court agreed, finding that the relevant statutes aimed to facilitate housing construction generally, not to protect homeowners from financial losses due to permitting delays. The court sustained the City’s demurrer, and judgment was entered in favor of the City.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory duty to ministerially and promptly approve ADU permits was designed to confer a direct benefit on permit applicants, such as the homeowner in this case. The court reasoned that preventing delays for ADU applicants is not incidental but central to the statutory scheme. Consequently, the homeowner stated a valid cause of action under Government Code section 815.6 for damages resulting from the City’s failure to comply with its mandatory duty. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, allowing the claim to proceed. View "Shi v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law
Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist.
A taxpayer challenged a California school district’s use of a “lease-leaseback” arrangement with a contractor for constructing a new middle school. The plaintiff alleged the $36 million construction contract violated California’s competitive bidding statutes and conflict of interest laws. The district had selected the contractor from a prequalified pool and entered into preconstruction agreements, then executed lease-leaseback contracts for the project. The project was funded entirely by the proceeds of bonds approved by local voters, not by contractor-provided financing.Previously, the Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed the complaint, but on the first appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that the plaintiff had stated claims for both competitive bidding and conflict of interest violations. After further proceedings and another appeal, the California Supreme Court confirmed that the validation statutes did not bar the action, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found the lease-leaseback arrangement qualified for the statutory exception to competitive bidding and rejected the conflict of interest claim, concluding the contractor was not an “officer” or “employee” for purposes of the conflict of interest statute.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that the conflict of interest claim was properly rejected because the contractor did not act as an officer or employee of the district. However, the court concluded that the competitive bidding exception did not apply because the project was financed by public bonds, not by the contractor. The court held that the proper remedy under Education Code section 17406(d)—enacted after the initial appeal—was to require the contractor to disgorge its net profit ($236,129), not the full contract amount. The judgment was reversed in part, and the trial court was directed to enter judgment requiring the contractor to refund its profit to the district. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist." on Justia Law
Seiwald v. Irias
The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law
Holtz v. Moreles
Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law
San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. v. Dept. of Conservation
A private corporation operating oil and water injection wells in the Fruitvale Oil Field sought permission from the California Department of Conservation, Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) to drill and use up to twelve new water injection wells. These wells would dispose of “produced water,” a byproduct of oil production, by pumping it into a deep aquifer. CalGEM concluded that the proposed project was not exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and denied the required Project Approval Letter (PAL). The operator argued that the project qualified for various CEQA exemptions, including a statutory exemption for ongoing pre-CEQA private projects, as well as categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the operator’s petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the ongoing project exemption applied and ordering CalGEM to find the project exempt from CEQA and issue the PAL. The court also found that class 1 and class 4 categorical exemptions did not apply. The operator’s request for attorneys’ fees was struck down, as the court found it was not eligible under the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported CalGEM’s determination that none of the claimed exemptions applied. The court found the regulatory provision relied on for the ongoing project exemption to be invalid and, even if valid, held that CalGEM’s current approval process involved a greater degree of responsibility and control than existed before 1973, so the exemption could not apply. It further concluded that the categorical exemptions for existing facilities and minor alterations to land were inapplicable because the project involved drilling new wells to significant depths. The appellate court reversed the judgment granting the writ and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "San Joaquin Facilities Management, Inc. v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law
Phillip v. Baass
A Medi-Cal recipient resided in a nursing care facility from 2010 until her death in 2015. During her enrollment, the Department of Health Care Services paid $261,957.40 in capitation payments to her managed care plan, while the plan paid $106,672.71 to health care providers for services she actually received. The Department sought estate recovery totaling $407,774.41, which included the full amount of capitation payments, Medicare Part B premiums, and accrued interest. Her trustee and beneficiaries challenged the Department’s claim, contending that only payments for health care services actually received should be recovered.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County certified a class of Medi-Cal recipients and estates subject to similar estate recovery claims. After hearings on stipulated issues, the trial court determined that seeking recovery for capitation payments exceeding the actual cost of health care services received violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 and federal law. The trial court entered judgment for the Department for the portion attributable to services actually received, and issued a declaratory judgment and writ of mandate in favor of the beneficiaries and the class, requiring the Department to reform its estate recovery practices and reprocess certain claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 does not permit recovery of capitation payments in excess of the amounts paid for actual health care services received. The court also ruled that the Department’s regulation permitting recovery of excess capitation is void for conflict with the statute. The judgment by the trial court was affirmed. The Department cannot recover excess capitation from estates under section 14009.5. View "Phillip v. Baass" on Justia Law
Seeboth v. State Dept. of State Hospitals
A patient at Coalinga State Hospital challenged a policy and regulation that permitted hospital staff to x-ray and open all incoming mail outside the presence of patients. He argued that this policy conflicted with certain provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code and regulations, which he claimed guaranteed patients the right to receive unopened correspondence. The patient, who is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP), alleged his mail had been opened and contents withheld without his permission, and he sought a judicial declaration concerning his rights under state law.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained a demurrer filed by the Department of State Hospitals Coalinga and its Hospital Police Chief. The court concluded that the statutory rights cited by the patient, specifically those in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325, applied only to individuals committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, not to SVPs. The court also found that the regulation authorizing inspection of mail for non-LPS patients did not conflict with the statute, as they applied to different populations. The patient's amended petition was dismissed without leave to amend.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 confers mail rights only to LPS patients and that sexually violent predators, as non-LPS patients, are governed by separate regulations under title 9, section 884, which specifically allows for the inspection of their mail. The court found no irreconcilable conflict between the statute and the regulation and concluded that the Department of State Hospitals has authority to adopt regulations necessary for institutional security. The judgment dismissing the patient’s amended petition was affirmed. View "Seeboth v. State Dept. of State Hospitals" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law