Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (the Act) is among the measures that the California Legislature has adopted to address the state’s housing shortage. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 66300 prohibits affected cities from (1) enacting any policy that changes the zoning of parcels to “a less intensive use” or (2) “reducing the intensity of land use” within a zoning district to below what was allowed under zoning ordinances in effect on January 1, 2018. Defendants the City of Culver City and the City Council of the City of Culver City (City Council) (collectively, the City) adopted Ordinance No. 2020-010, changing development standards in its single-family residential, or R-1, zone. The Ordinance reduced the allowable floor area ratio (FAR) for primary residences from .60 to .45, decreasing the square footage of a house that could be built on a lot. Plaintiffs Yes In My Back Yard (collectively, YIMBY) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order declaring the Ordinance void. The trial court determined the Ordinance violated section 66300 because the FAR reduction impermissibly reduced the intensity of land use.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is no published authority addressing the proper interpretation of section 66300, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the novelty of the questions presented. In calculating the lodestar amount, the court accepted the hourly rates of YIMBY’s counsel, noting that “[the City] ma[d]e no argument to the contrary.” There is no showing that the trial court applied the multiplier to punish the City. View "Yes In My Back Yard v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

The Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a civil liability complaint against SLR and, after a hearing, imposed more than $6,000,000 in penalties for SLR’s pollution of protected waterways during its construction of a Healdsburg residential resort. SLR unsuccessfully asked the State Water Resources Control Board to review the decision. SLR sought administrative mandamus against both Boards, missing the 30-day filing deadline by three weeks. On that ground, the trial courts dismissed, also noting that the State Board’s declination to review the Regional decision is not subject to judicial review.SLR claimed the Regional Board “divested itself” of jurisdiction by conducting the hearing by videoconference over SLR’s objection, as authorized by Executive Order during the pandemic. SLR argued that the Order violated the separation of powers; the Regional Board unlawfully extended it to “non-emergency” hearings; the hearing was “quasi-criminal” so that the Order denied SLR’s Due Process and Sixth Amendment rights; the Board “committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion” by applying the Order rather than the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rule; and the Order did not apply without evidence that the Board satisfied the ADA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.The court of appeal upheld the dismissals, rejecting an argument that a plaintiff challenging an agency’s adjudicative decision may avoid the statute of limitations if the plaintiff contends that the agency acted without subject matter jurisdiction. Water Code section 133301 prohibits all judicial review of the decision except in accordance with the statute. View "Sonoma Luxury Resort v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board North Coast Region" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC. View "Summerfield v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Orange (the City) appealed an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion. The underlying lawsuit alleged a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act). Plaintiff Mary’s Kitchen provided homeless services in the City of Orange. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the city manager for the City terminated Mary’s Kitchen’s license, citing safety concerns. Subsequently, the city council held an executive (i.e., closed) session to discuss potential unspecified litigation. Afterward, the city attorney exited the meeting and declared that the council had “unanimously confirmed” the termination of Mary’s Kitchen’s license. The Brown Act required that any contemplated action or topic of discussion be posted in an agenda at least 72 hours prior to the meeting; the meeting agenda pertinent here did not mention anything about Mary’s Kitchen’s license. Plaintiffs Mary’s Kitchen and Gloria Suess (chief executive officer and president of Mary’s Kitchen) filed a verified complaint/petition for writ of mandate against the City. The City filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that because the agenda described the meeting as discussing legal matters, the complaint/petition arose out of protected activity. The City took the position that no action was taken at the meeting, and that the unanimous approval described in the minutes simply reflected inaction—i.e., that the city council chose to do nothing to override the city manager’s decision to terminate the license. The court denied the motion, concluding the complaint targeted the City’s failure to provide adequate notice of the confirmation of the license termination rather than anything that was said at the meeting. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with this assessment and further concluded that the “unanimous confirm[ation]” was evidence of an action: ratification. View "Mary's Kitchen v. City of Orange" on Justia Law

Proposition 39 established a program to promote the creation of clean energy jobs. Under Proposition 39, a multistate business must apportion its tax based on a single factor—in-state sales. The proposition further provided for cable companies spending $250 million or more in California on certain expenditures to exclude half of their in-state sales when apportioning, thus lowering their tax burden under the single factor tax regime. Paintiff One Technologies, LLC, a Texas-based provider of credit score and credit reporting services, paid tax to California calculated under the single-factor method. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for refund against Defendant Franchise Tax Board (the Board). Plaintiff alleged Proposition 39 was invalid under the single-subject rule for ballot initiatives. The trial court disagreed and sustained the Board’s demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Proposition 39 did not violate the single-subject rule. The purpose of the proposition was to fund a clean energy job creation program by raising taxes on some multistate businesses. The provisions of the proposition were both reasonably germane and functionally related to that purpose because those provisions established a funding mechanism and the means of directing that funding to clean energy job creation. The special rules for cable companies reflect a determination by the proposition’s drafters that some businesses should bear the funding burden more than others, but that is still within the scope of the proposition’s purpose. View "One Technologies, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Gilroy Police Department (GPD) receives complaints about homeless encampments, including on the property of the Santa Clara Valley Water District. When requested by the Water District, GPD assists with the cleanup of homeless encampments (sweeps) on Water District property. The Water District is responsible for collecting belongings left at the site. GPD collects and stores some items, such as identification cards. GPD officers assisting with homeless encampment cleanups have body-worn cameras, which they activate during “criminal investigation or enforcement" actions. Bodycam video footage is retained for one year, then automatically deleted by a computer system unless flagged for preservation.After receiving complaints from homeless persons that their personal property was being destroyed during sweeps, Law Foundation made numerous public record requests and sought declaratory relief under the California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code, 7920.000).The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief on the basis that Gilroy’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records requests violated the CPRA. The trial court did not err by denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration that Gilroy violated the CPRA by failing to preserve responsive records it claimed were exempt while the records requests were pending. CPRA is not a records retention statute. View "City of Gilroy v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation to Granite Construction Company/Granite Industrial, Inc. (Granite Construction) for allegedly violating three regulations relevant here. One was that the company required its employees to wear masks without first providing a medical evaluation to determine their fitness to wear them. And the Division alleged the company violated two other regulations because it exposed its employees to dust containing a harmful fungus— namely, Coccidioides, the fungus that causes Valley fever—and failed to implement adequate measures to limit this exposure. After Granite Construction disputed these allegations, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the Division’s claims. The ALJ reasoned that no credible evidence showed that Granite Construction required its employees to wear masks and no reliable evidence showed that Coccidioides was present at the worksite. But after the Division petitioned for reconsideration, the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Board) reversed on these issues and ruled for the Division. The trial court later denied Granite Construction’s petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Court agreed insufficient evidence showed its employees were exposed to Coccidioides. But the Court rejected its additional claim that it allowed (rather than required) its employees to wear masks, finding sufficient evidence supported the Board’s contrary ruling on this point. View "Granite Construction Co. v. CalOSHA" on Justia Law

At a dispositional hearing, a juvenile court placed R.Q. (minor) with her biological father, C.H. On appeal, defendant-appellant, K.Q. (presumed father), contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. Plaintiff-respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the department), received a referral alleging physical abuse to R.Q. by A.P. (stepmother). Minor disclosed stepmother had choked her and pulled her hair. The family had an open, voluntary family maintenance plan due to stepmother hitting minor. The department had also received a previous referral alleging physical abuse to minor by stepmother. A.H., minor’s biological mother (mother), did not live in the home. The social worker spoke to minor and R.Q.2, the biological daughter of presumed father and mother, who both reported incidents of physical abuse by stepmother. Despite stepmother and presumed father both denying the allegations, the department took minor into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. The department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition alleging mother and presumed father failed to protect minor from physical abuse; that mother and presumed father had substance abuse problems; and that mother had an untreated mental illness. C.H. indicated he had not found out about minor's birth until she was two years old. After paternity testing, supervised visits and ultimately a social worker review, at a dispositional hearing, it was recommended the minor be placed with C.H. Presumed father contended the court abused its discretion in placing minor with C.H. The department agreed that a juvenile court did not have authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2 to place a child with a “mere biological parent”; however, the department maintained that a juvenile court has discretion to order such a placement under its broad authority to act in a child’s best interest. Thus, the department argued the court acted within its discretion in placing minor with C.H. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with the department and affirmed the court order placing the child with her biological father. View "In re R.Q." on Justia Law

Western requested records “about or related to” the “Strada Verde Project.” including: “all Public Records Act requests sent by anyone concerning” the Project; “[a]ll writings received by the County concerning the Project”; “[a]ll writings sent by the County to anyone” concerning the Project; “[a]ll writings concerning” two individuals; “[a]ll text messages sent or received by” two individuals relating to the Project; “[a]ll writings" concerning procedures relating to the consideration of general plan amendments; and “[a]ll writings concerning potential offsite consequences.” Western later requested documents “concerning or discussing” a presentation titled “San Benito Public Records Reveal Deception and Misconduct” and investigations into said deception and misconduct.Western sued to compel the County to produce the documents for both requests and sought a declaration that the County’s policies and procedures were unlawful. In the litigation, Western’s requests for production of documents included a request for “[a]ll documents responsive to the [public records] request.”The court of appeal modified the discovery order, citing the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 7921.000) the "court must determine whether the discovery sought is necessary to resolve whether the agency has a duty to disclose, and … consider whether the request is justified given the need for an expeditious resolution.” Although most of Western’s discovery requests were proper, the request to produce the same documents ultimately at issue in the proceeding and the interrogatories seeking a new narrative justification for the County’s past decisions were improper. View "County of San Benito v. Superior Court of San Benito County" on Justia Law