Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants-appellants City of Huntington Beach (Huntington) and the City Council of Huntington Beach (City Council; collectively, the City) appealed the grant of attorney fees in favor of plaintiff and respondent The Kennedy Commission (Kennedy) for litigation pertaining to the City’s housing element plan under California’s Housing Element Law. Prior to 2015, the City had adopted its 2013-2021 housing element (Housing Element), which identified sufficient sites to accommodate the City’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) of lower-income housing mandated by California. This Housing Element was consistent with the general plan of the City. A majority of the units for low-income housing were set aside in an area known as the Beach Edinger Corridors Specific Plan (BECSP). The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) approved the Housing Element. In 2015, after complaints from residents about the density in the BECSP, the City passed an amendment that significantly reduced the number of housing units that could be developed in the BECSP (Amended BECSP), thereby effectively eliminating sites for low-income housing in Huntington. Kennedy advised the City that the Amended BECSP did not meet Huntington’s requirement for their RHNA and it violated state law. Kennedy then petitioned for alternative writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Amended BECSP was inconsistent with the Housing Element in violation of Government Code sections 65454, 65580, 65583, 65587 and 65860. Kennedy argued that the Amended BESCSP was void as it was not consistent with the Housing Element. The Petition included five other causes of action, including, in the second cause of action, that the City must implement the Housing Element. The trial court applied Government Code section 65454 and declared the Amended BECSP was void because it conflicted with the general plan. The trial court refused to order that the City had to implement the Housing Element as it was written. Kennedy voluntarily dismissed all the other causes of action without prejudice. The trial court also awarded Kennedy attorney fees as the prevailing party. Finding no reversible error in the attorney fee award, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

The Lifeline Program provides discounted telecommunications services to low-income Californians. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) administers the program under Pub. Util. Code 871. A “third-party administrator,” qualifies applicants, and there are procedures for service providers to seek reimbursement from CPUC for “LifeLine-related costs and lost revenues.” TruConnect provides free wireless telephone service through LifeLine. CPUC changed the third-party administrator to Maximus. TruConnect claimed Maximus was “woefully unequipped” and asked CPUC to delay the rollout of new software. The launch nonetheless went forward. Maximus recruited TruConnect to assist. TruConnect allegedly invested hundreds of thousands of man-hours. Maximus subsequently subcontracted work to Solix. TruConnect claims it incurred losses of more than $14 million in connection with the launch. TruConnect sought reimbursement from CPUC, which paid some claims but denied compensation for “lost opportunities,” customers who wanted TruConnect’s services but were unable to enroll because of the flawed rollout.TruConnect sued Maximus and Solix. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for determination of whether the lawsuit is nonetheless barred because CPUC is an indispensable party or for other reasons. Section 1759 does not bar the lawsuit since recovery would not conflict with a CPUC order or interfere with its oversight of LifeLine. View "TruConnect Communications, Inc. v. Maximus, Inc." on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of 2011 legislation that dissolved California’s redevelopment agencies and created a process for winding down their affairs. The Department of Finance (Department) determined that certain reimbursement agreements between the City of Chula Vista (City) and its former redevelopment agency (Agency) were not “enforceable obligations” under the redevelopment dissolution laws. Thus, despite having approved payment under the agreements on prior “recognized obligation payment schedules” (ROPS), the Department denied payment authorization on the fiscal year 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 ROPS. The City and the Chula Vista Redevelopment Successor Agency (together, plaintiffs) filed this action seeking to compel the Department to recognize the reimbursement agreements as enforceable obligations and approve the use of property tax revenues for such items on all current and future ROPS. The trial court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the Department. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the Department erred in rejecting the items as enforceable obligations under Health and Safety Code section 34171(d)(2). Alternatively, plaintiffs contended the Department should have been estopped from denying the items based on its prior approvals. The Court of Appeal concluded some of the disputed items were enforceable obligations, and reversed the trial court's judgment in part. View "City of Chula Vista v. Stephenshaw" on Justia Law

In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

After years of what the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) viewed as unsatisfactory teaching performance by a certificated teacher, LAUSD served the teacher with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and a Statement of Charges, which included notice that the employee was suspended without pay. The teacher brought and prevailed on a motion for immediate reversal of suspension (MIRS) and thus received pay during the pendency of the dismissal proceedings. LAUSD ultimately prevailed in those proceedings. LAUSD then sought a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the order granting the MIRS and to recoup the salary payments it had made to the teacher during the pendency of the proceedings. The trial court denied the writ, holding that the MIRS order is not reviewable. The court also ruled (1) LAUSD cannot recover the payments to the teacher under its cause of action for money had and received and (2) LAUSD’s cause of action for declaratory judgment is derivative of its other claims. The trial court entered judgment against LAUSD in favor of the teacher.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that LAUSD has failed to show that in adding the MIRS procedure, the Legislature intended school districts to be able to recover payments to subsequently dismissed employees. The court wrote that if LAUSD believed such recovery should be permitted through judicial review of MIRS orders or otherwise, it should address the Legislature. View "L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

The City of Lemoore (City) appealed following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, who was injured when he tripped over an uneven portion of a City sidewalk. The City asks us to declare the offending portion of the sidewalk not a “dangerous condition” under the Government Claims Act as a matter of law. The City argued the present sidewalk condition must be deemed trivial as a matter of law because of its open and obvious nature, Plaintiff’s admitted familiarity with the condition, and the absence of prior accidents there.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed. On balance, the factors do not combine to create a risk so trivial, minor, or insignificant that the sidewalk condition must be held not dangerous as a matter of law. Although the condition was visible on approach on an inferably clear, dry day and had not harmed others or Plaintiff in his many prior jogs, reasonable minds could still differ as to its dangerousness based on the evidence of the first defect’s relatively large height and rough edge, the presence of back-to-back defects, and the partial obstruction of the pine needles and debris. The determination of the condition’s dangerousness was properly left to the jury, whose verdict we will not overturn. View "Stack v. City of Lemoore" on Justia Law

Appellants Crestwood Behavior Health, Inc. (Crestwood), West Anaheim Extended Care and Extended Care Hospital of Westminster (West Anaheim), and Royale Health Care Center dba South Coast Post Acute (South Coast) (together, appellants) operated skilled nursing facilities serving beneficiaries of the California Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal). Respondent Department of Health Care Services (the Department) administered Medi-Cal. As relevant here, the Department also administered the “Skilled Nursing Facility Quality and Accountability Supplemental Payment System” (QASP), which authorized supplemental payments, over and above Medi-Cal reimbursement rates, to skilled nursing facilities meeting certain performance standards. Consolidated appeals challenged the Department’s method for calculating QASP payments. Appellants argued they did not receive all the QASP payments to which they were entitled and blame the alleged underpayment to the Department’s practice of excluding certain Medi-Cal days—known as “special treatment program days” or “STP days”—from its calculations. They sought writs of mandate directing the Department to include STP days in the calculation of QASP payments. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that appellants failed to identify an appropriate basis for writ relief. Appellants sued under Welf. & Inst. Code Section 14170 (a)(1), which did not impose a mandatory or ministerial duty on the Department that could support the issuance of a writ of mandate. And the Court found appellants did not show any abuse of discretion by the Department. Accordingly, the trial court judgment was affirmed. View "Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Baass" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Medical Center seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) in connection with Medical Center’s emergency room billing practices. Briefly summarized, Plaintiff alleged Medical Center’s practice of charging him (and other similarly situated patients) an undisclosed “Evaluation and Management Services Fee” (EMS Fee) was an “unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.” The trial entered judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff sought a declaration of the parties' rights and duties under the COA and their legal rights in connection with EMS Fee disclosures. An actual controversy is alleged and appears to exist. Plaintiff is entitled to seek declaratory relief in regard to each controversy stated. The court concluded he has adequately stated a cause of action for declaratory relief. The court wrote that on remand, the trial court will have the discretion to consider a motion by Plaintiff to amend the FAC to state a cause of action for breach of contract should Plaintiff choose to file one. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Manuel Hernandez appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Stockton (City) based on his failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff sued for damages arising out of an allegedly defective public sidewalk. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City, alleging that it negligently maintained public property by failing to correct a dangerous condition along a sidewalk. Plaintiff claimed that he sustained severe injuries when he tripped and fell due to a “dangerous condition” on the City-owned “sidewalk surface” that he identified only as an “uplifted sidewalk.” After his government claim was rejected, plaintiff filed this personal injury action, complaining broadly that the “sidewalk surface” harbored a “dangerous condition” that created an unspecified hazard. He later disclosed during his deposition that he tripped and fell when he stepped into a hole, specifically a tree well with no tree in it. When specifically asked whether it was “fair to say that [his] fall was not caused by an uplifted sidewalk,” he responded: “Correct.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that this action was barred because the factual basis for recovery was not “fairly reflected” in plaintiff’s government claim. View "Hernandez v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from litigation involving a public construction project to build the Central Region 9th Street Span K-8 school in downtown Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or District) and Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), entered into a development and construction agreement (contract), for the development and building of the school. Suffolk later entered into subcontracts with various subcontractors, including R.J. Daum Construction Company (Daum) and Fisk Electric Company (Fisk). Throughout the project, various problems arose, which caused delay and disruption and resulted in increased costs to Suffolk, Daum and Fisk. Suffolk sued LAUSD, alleging breach of the contract, implied contractual indemnity, and seeking declaratory relief. The jury found that Suffolk substantially performed its contract and that LAUSD breached the implied warranty of correctness by providing plans and/or specifications for the concrete footing design that was not correct. Further, the jury determined Suffolk’s damages for the concrete issue decided in phase 1 (TIA 5).   The Second Appellate District found that the phase 1 verdict must be reversed and remanded for retrial on the ground that the special jury instruction based on Public Contract Code section 1104 was improper. The reversal of the phase 1 liability verdict requires that the phase 2 trial of damages for TIA 5 (related to the concrete cracking issue) must also be reversed and remanded for retrial. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in granting JNOV on the phase 2 jury verdict. Thus, the decision granting the JNOV is reversed with direction to reinstate the jury verdict on that issue. View "Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law