Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

Tax assessors sometimes appraise commercial property using the income method: they forecast yearly income the property will yield and discount the future stream to present value. This method requires assessors to subtract income fairly ascribed to intangible assets, including those directly necessary to the productive use of the property. (Roehm v. Orange County (1948) 32 Cal.2d 280, 285 (Roehm); Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 614–615, 617–619 (Elk Hills). Defendant County of Los Angeles assessed a hotel owned by the protesting taxpayer, Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC (Olympic). The County’s assessor included income from three intangibles: a subsidy, a discount; and some hotel enterprise assets.The Second Appellate District reversed the portion of the judgment concerning the subsidy and the discount. Regarding the hotel enterprise assets, the court affirmed the trial court’s remand of the case to the County’s Assessment Appeals Board (Board) for re-evaluation. The court explained that Defendant violated the Roehm and Elk Hills rules. The court explained that the County argued there is no agreement the subsidy is an intangible asset. But the Board did find it was an intangible asset. The County does not argue the subsidy is something tangible you can touch. Accordingly, the court found that this argument is ineffective. View "Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case concerned California’s efforts to relicense its hydropower facilities at Oroville Dam. Before the license expired, California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR) began the process for relicensing these facilities. It also, in connection with this effort, prepared a statement of potential environmental impacts, known as an environmental impact report or EIR, under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Three local governments - Butte County, Plumas County, and Plumas County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (together, the Counties) - filed writ petitions challenging the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. The trial court found none of the Counties' arguments persuasive and entered judgment in DWR’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered this case for the third time. In its first decision, the Court found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted by the Federal Power Act, but the California Supreme Court vacated that decision and asked the appellate court to reconsider in light of one of its precedents. In the appeals court's second decision, it again found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted. But the Supreme Court, taking up the case a second time, reversed the appellate court's decision in part. While the Supreme Court agreed that some of the remedies the Counties sought were preempted, it found they could still challenge the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. It thus remanded the matter to the appeals court for further consideration. Turning to the merits for the first time since this appeal was filed over a decade ago, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "County of Butte, et al. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

This case involves the City of Clovis’s (City) housing element and related zoning ordinances and whether they comply with specific statutory requirements designed to assure affordable housing opportunities to lower-income families in California. These requirements for a municipality’s housing element have statewide importance because the housing elements of all cities and counties must include compliant zoning that accommodates the municipality’s need for lower-income housing. Adequacy of Housing Element. Plaintiff, a Clovis resident, sued the City, alleging its housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period, including amendments and zoning changes adopted in March 2019, did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.The Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment issuing the peremptory writ of mandate to the extent the writ is based on the trial court’s finding the amended housing element does not satisfy the requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g) because it does not include the required analysis for sites within the P-F Zone. The court otherwise  affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the City to (1) adopt “a housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period that substantially complies with Government Code section 65754”; and (2) implement Program 4 “by zoning or rezoning an adequate number of sites, compliant with Government Code Section 65583.2(h), to accommodate the City’s unmet share of the RHNA from the 2008-2013 planning period, pursuant to Government Code section 65584.09.” View "Martinez v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

The California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Division) debarred the following from acting as public works contractors: (1) GRFCO, Inc. (GRFCO), a contractor; (2) George Rogers Frost, the principal in GRFCO; (3) Garcia Juarez Construction (GJC), a contractor and apparent alter ego of GRFCO; and (4) James Craig Jackson, the principal in GJC and an employee of GRFCO. The Division found that, in six instances, the contractors violated apprenticeship requirements, and in two instances, Frost and Jackson had made false certifications under penalty of perjury. The trial court denied the contractors’ petition for administrative mandate. On appeal, the contractors contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the apprenticeship violations were knowing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the false certification findings; (3) the contractors were debarred because they refused to join a union, in violation of the First Amendment; (5) the Division, hearing officer, and/or the investigator were biased; and (5) the hearing officer erred by denying the contractors' request to reopen, which was based on new evidence of bias. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "GRFCO, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In the 1970s-1980s, the County approved maps for two subdivisions bordered by a tributary of “Murderer’s Creek.” The creek is a natural watercourse that is the main receptacle for storm runoff emanating from the watershed above the properties and is the only reasonable means of collecting and conveying that runoff. Pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act, the County required the developers to make drainage improvements to collect and convey water from the subdivisions to the creek. Contributing to runoff were two private roads serving as ingress and egress to the subdivisions and one county-owned road. adjacent to one subdivision. As provided by the Map Act, the County required the developers to dedicate drainage easements to the County. When it approved the subdivision maps, however, the County did not accept the offers of dedication. The drainage improvements remained in the ownership of the developers and later the homeowners.The owners bought lots in those subdivisions in 2010 and 2016. They sued the County and a flood control district for inverse condemnation and tort claims after drainage improvements constructed more than 40 years earlier failed and serious erosion and subsidence damaged their properties. The superior court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. As a matter of law, a public entity must either own or exercise actual control over a waterway or drainage improvements to render them public works for which the public entity is responsible. View "Shenson v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

In 2018, the California Legislature passed a law titled the “Keep Groceries Affordable Act of 2018” (the Groceries Act). The Act sought prohibit charter cities, counties, and other local governments from imposing taxes, fees, or assessments on certain grocery items, including, most relevant here, on sodas and other sugar-sweetened drinks. The act also imposes a penalty—the loss of all revenue from sales and use taxes—for violations of its terms. But it imposes its penalty only on charter cities and only if the city’s “tax, fee, or other assessment is a valid exercise of [the] city’s authority under Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution with respect to the municipal affairs of that city.” A nonprofit health advocacy organization and a city council member appearing in her individual capacity filed suit to challenge the act’s penalty provision, arguing the provision wrongly served to penalize charter cities that lawfully exercised their constitutional rights under the home rule doctrine. The trial court ultimately agreed the Groceries Act’s penalty provision was unlawful and deemed it unenforceable. On appeal, the State of California, the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, and the department’s director (collectively, the Department) challenged the trial court’s decision, arguing: (1) the Groceries Act’s penalty provision did not penalize a charter city only when its tax on groceries “is a valid exercise” of the city’s constitutional powers; and (2) even if the trial court properly construed the act’s penalty provision, the trial court should have severed certain words from the penalty provision rather than deem the provision unenforceable in its entirety. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Cultiva La Salud v. State of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of Defendant City of Los Angeles (the City), in a lawsuit alleging the City knowingly failed to remedy a dangerous condition on public property adjacent to Plaintiff’s place of work, as a result of which Plaintiff contracted typhus. The trial court entered this judgment after sustaining a demurrer on the basis that, under Government Code section 855.4, the City was immune from liability.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding that the City’s demurrer did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The court explained that Plaintiff has not proffered any facts she could allege, based on which her complaint would no longer describe injury “resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community” that was “the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee.” Rather, her arguments that no exercise of discretion occurred are grounded in a definition of “exercise of discretion,” which the court concluded is inapplicable here. Further, the court reasoned that because it concluded that the SAC sufficiently alleges immunity under section 855.4, subdivision (a), additional allegations Plaintiff represents she could add establishing that the City acted without due care as required by section 855.4, subdivision (b) would not defeat such immunity. View "Greenwood v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law