Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region (Regional Board) renewed permits allowing four publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) to discharge millions of gallons of treated wastewater daily into the Los Angeles River and Pacific Ocean. The Regional Board issued the permits over the objections of Los Angeles Waterkeeper (Waterkeeper), an environmental advocacy organization. Waterkeeper sought a review of the permits before the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board), and the State Board declined to review. Waterkeeper then filed petitions for writs of mandate against the State and Regional Boards (collectively, the Boards), naming the cities that owned the four POTWs as real parties in interest.   The Second Appellate District affirmed judgments of dismissal in favor of the Regional Board. The court dismissed the judgments and writs of mandate. Finally, the court reversed the order granting Los Angeles Waterkeeper attorney fees. The court wrote that Waterkeeper has failed adequately to plead causes of action under Article C, section 2 and Water Code Sections 100 and 275. Further, the court explained that the Regional Board does not have a duty to evaluate whether discharges of treated wastewater are an unreasonable use of water. Moreover, Waterkeeper has not adequately pleaded a cause of action against the State Board. Additionally, the court found that Public Resources Code Section 21002 does not apply to wastewater discharge permits. View "L.A. Waterkeeper v. State Wat. Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law

Securus Technologies, LLC (Securus), is one of six telecommunications companies providing incarcerated persons calling services (IPCS) in California. In this original proceeding, Securus challenges the decision of the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) adopting interim rate relief for IPCS in the first phase of a two-phase rulemaking proceeding. Among other things, the PUC’s decision: (1) found IPCS providers operate as locational monopolies within the incarceration facilities they serve and exercise market power; (2) adopted an interim cap on intrastate IPCS rates of $0.07 per minute for all debit, prepaid, and collect calls; and (3) prohibited providers from charging various ancillary fees associated with intrastate and jurisdictionally mixed IPCS.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the PUC’s decision. The court concluded Securus has not shown the PUC erred by finding providers operate locational monopolies and exercise market power. The court held that facts do not—as Securus contends—demonstrate Securus “cannot recover its costs (including a reasonable rate of return)” under the interim rate cap and do not amount to a “clear showing” that a rate of $0.07 per minute “is so unreasonably low” that “it will threaten Securus’s financial integrity.” Thus, Securus has failed to satisfy its “burden of proving . . . prejudicial error” on constitutional grounds. View "Securus Technologies v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a qui tam case on behalf of the State of California alleging Defendants and Respondents engaged in medical insurance fraud. Plaintiff asserted the alleged fraud victimized the state workers’ compensation system, including the State Compensation Insurance Fund, as well as Medi-Cal, and brought her action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) and the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). Plaintiff filed her qui tam complaint under seal and in camera as statutorily required. Before the matter reached trial, however, the trial court dismissed the action pursuant to the “five-year rule” set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment of dismissal, reinstated the action, and remanded it. The court held that the 962 days the action was kept under seal should have been excluded from the five-year period pursuant to Section 583.340(b). Further, the five-year period had not expired at the time the court dismissed the action. A five-year period totals 1,825 days. Adding to that period, the 962 days during which the action was under seal, the 712 days of the first stay and the 236 days of the second stay total 3,735 days. The date 3,735 days from the date Plaintiff filed her complaint (July 13, 2012) is October 3, 2022. Adding six months due to the COVID-19 emergency rule extends the period to April 3, 2023. Therefore, the trial court erred in prematurely dismissing Plaintiff’s action on February 24, 2021. View "State of Cal. ex. rel. Sills v. Gharib-Danesh" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Decedent was employed by Jones as a construction worker. Jones was under contract with DOT to perform construction work on I-580 in Oakland. Much of this work was performed at night because it required lane closures. A car operated by a drunk driver entered the closed lanes of the project site and struck Decedent, who died on the scene. A wrongful death lawsuit against DOT asserted vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees; failure to discharge a mandatory duty; and dangerous condition on public property. The court dismissed the mandatory duty claim. DOT offered evidence that it did not instruct or control Jones as to how to comply with its safety obligations but that Jones complied with its safety plan on the night in question and that the contract between DOT and Jones delegated to Jones the responsibility for selecting the means for performing, including ensuring worker safety.The trial court concluded DOT was not liable for Decedent’s death as a matter of law because DOT delegated to Jones its duty to provide a safe work environment and the conduct of the drunk driver was not reasonably foreseeable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that admissible evidence was wrongfully excluded. Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that DOT retained control over the construction site and actually exercised that control in such a way as to affirmatively contribute to Decedent's injuries, as required under California law. View "Marin v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statute of limitations in the California Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. One of these protections was described in Government Code section 3304 (d)(1): a public agency cannot discipline a peace officer “for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct” unless the agency completes its investigation and notifies the officer of its proposed discipline “within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.” Under the interpretation offered by appellant Luis Garcia, section 3304(d)(1)’s one-year limitations period begins to run on all acts of misconduct once the agency initiates an investigation into any one of these acts. But under the second interpretation, offered by Garcia’s employer, the limitations period begins to run on an act of misconduct only once the agency discovers that particular act. The Court of Appeal determined the latter interpretation was the correct one: Section 3304(d)(1)’s text was "clear" that the limitations period for an act of misconduct begins to run on the date the agency discovers the misconduct, not the date it initiates an investigation into unrelated misconduct. Under this rule, as under similar discovery rules, each act of misconduct must be considered separately in determining the date the agency discovered the misconduct. Because the trial court here interpreted section 3304(d)(1) consistent with the Court of Appeal's interpretation, the judgment was affirmed. View "Garcia v. State Dept. of Developmental Services" on Justia Law

C.G. (Mother) and R.A. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to three of their minor children. Father’s parents repeatedly denied any Indian ancestry, but Mother reported she was affiliated with the Jemez Pueblo tribe in New Mexico. Father eventually denied having any Indian ancestry or tribal affiliation. The juvenile court found the children might be Indian children and ordered notice to be reported to the Jemez Pueblo tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The Jemez Pueblo tribe required individuals to have a 1/4 Jemez Pueblo blood quantum. Mother provided verification of her tribal registration status with the tribe, which confirmed her Jemez Pueblo blood quantum was over 1/4. A social worker from the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) contacted the Jemez Pueblo and was told that none of the children were registered members of the tribe. The social worker reported she contacted Annette Gachupin, a Child Advocate for the Jemez Pueblo and the tribe’s ICWA Representative. Gachupin confirmed that Mother was an enrolled member of the Jemez Pueblo tribe, but the children were not eligible to become registered members because their blood quantum was too low to meet requirements for tribal membership. Instead, the children were eligible for “naturalization,” which would only qualify them for tribal health services while excluding them from receiving federal funds that Jemez Pueblo members receive. Mother never completed the paperwork to have the children naturalized. The Department asked the juvenile court to find that ICWA did not apply because the children were not Indian children. The parents did not object, nor did the children’s attorney. The juvenile court found that the children were not Indian children and therefore ICWA did not apply. The lack of objections notwithstanding, the parents appealed the termination and the ICWA ruling. The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court did not err: Indian tribes determine whether a child is a member of the tribe or eligible for membership. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that N., H., and A. were not “Indian children” for ICWA purposes. View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

After the Arcadia City Council approved J.W.’s application to expand the first story of her single-family home and add a second story (“the project”), Arcadians for Environmental Preservation (AEP), a grassroots organization led by J.W.’s next-door neighbor, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City’s decision. AEP’s petition primarily alleged the city council had erred in finding the project categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and CEQA’s implementing guidelines. The superior court denied the petition, ruling as a threshold matter that AEP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that AEP failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the question of whether the project fell within the scope of the class 1 exemption. Further, the court found that AEP’s general objections to project approval did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, the court wrote that AEP has not demonstrated the City failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it impliedly found no exception to the exemption applied. Finally, the court held that AEP has not demonstrated the City erred in concluding the cumulative effects exception did not apply. View "Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia" on Justia Law

Petitioner D.S. (Mother) was the adoptive mother of A.S. In 2021, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) petitioned on behalf of A.S. in response to allegations of physical abuse. During the pendency of the proceedings, Mother petitioned to have A.S. placed back in her home. She appealed the summary denial of her petition. However, on appeal, Mother did not address any issue encompassed by her petition, nor did she seek reversal of the order denying her petition or reversal of any prior jurisdictional or dispositional orders. Instead, Mother’s opening brief was entirely devoted to seeking review of the adequacy of the juvenile court and CFS’s efforts to fulfill their obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) seeking only to have the matter “remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to order full compliance with the inquiry provisions of the ICWA.” Consequently, the Court of Appeal construed Mother's appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ seeking an order directing the juvenile court and CFS to comply with their statutory duties under ICWA and the related California statutes. Upon consideration of the matter on the merits, the Court granted the requested relief. View "D.S. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law