Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Medical Center seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) in connection with Medical Center’s emergency room billing practices. Briefly summarized, Plaintiff alleged Medical Center’s practice of charging him (and other similarly situated patients) an undisclosed “Evaluation and Management Services Fee” (EMS Fee) was an “unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.” The trial entered judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff sought a declaration of the parties' rights and duties under the COA and their legal rights in connection with EMS Fee disclosures. An actual controversy is alleged and appears to exist. Plaintiff is entitled to seek declaratory relief in regard to each controversy stated. The court concluded he has adequately stated a cause of action for declaratory relief. The court wrote that on remand, the trial court will have the discretion to consider a motion by Plaintiff to amend the FAC to state a cause of action for breach of contract should Plaintiff choose to file one. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Manuel Hernandez appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Stockton (City) based on his failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff sued for damages arising out of an allegedly defective public sidewalk. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City, alleging that it negligently maintained public property by failing to correct a dangerous condition along a sidewalk. Plaintiff claimed that he sustained severe injuries when he tripped and fell due to a “dangerous condition” on the City-owned “sidewalk surface” that he identified only as an “uplifted sidewalk.” After his government claim was rejected, plaintiff filed this personal injury action, complaining broadly that the “sidewalk surface” harbored a “dangerous condition” that created an unspecified hazard. He later disclosed during his deposition that he tripped and fell when he stepped into a hole, specifically a tree well with no tree in it. When specifically asked whether it was “fair to say that [his] fall was not caused by an uplifted sidewalk,” he responded: “Correct.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that this action was barred because the factual basis for recovery was not “fairly reflected” in plaintiff’s government claim. View "Hernandez v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from litigation involving a public construction project to build the Central Region 9th Street Span K-8 school in downtown Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or District) and Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), entered into a development and construction agreement (contract), for the development and building of the school. Suffolk later entered into subcontracts with various subcontractors, including R.J. Daum Construction Company (Daum) and Fisk Electric Company (Fisk). Throughout the project, various problems arose, which caused delay and disruption and resulted in increased costs to Suffolk, Daum and Fisk. Suffolk sued LAUSD, alleging breach of the contract, implied contractual indemnity, and seeking declaratory relief. The jury found that Suffolk substantially performed its contract and that LAUSD breached the implied warranty of correctness by providing plans and/or specifications for the concrete footing design that was not correct. Further, the jury determined Suffolk’s damages for the concrete issue decided in phase 1 (TIA 5).   The Second Appellate District found that the phase 1 verdict must be reversed and remanded for retrial on the ground that the special jury instruction based on Public Contract Code section 1104 was improper. The reversal of the phase 1 liability verdict requires that the phase 2 trial of damages for TIA 5 (related to the concrete cracking issue) must also be reversed and remanded for retrial. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in granting JNOV on the phase 2 jury verdict. Thus, the decision granting the JNOV is reversed with direction to reinstate the jury verdict on that issue. View "Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Venetian Condominiums Maintenance Corporation was a condominium project with 368 condominium units in the University Town Center area of San Diego. It was a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation governed by the California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation Law. Ali Ghorbanzadeh owned 18 units at the Venetian. He was elected to Venetian’s board of directors in 2008. In 2009, Ghorbanzadeh appointed his son Sean Gorban to the board. They controlled the three-member board continuously from 2009 through at least 2021. Guy Takiguchi was elected as the third director in 2015. From 2009 to 2021, the board repeatedly failed to hold annual elections, either due to the absence of a quorum or for other reasons. Ghorbanzadeh’s seat was up for re-election at the 2020 annual meeting, and there were two other candidates for the seat, including Nishime. The Ballot Box, Inc. contracted as the Venetian's inspector of elections, declaring there was no quorum for the meeting because Ballot Box had only received 166 ballots, and the quorum was 188. Nishime participated in the January 20, 2021 meeting remotely by computer and took multiple screenshots of the participants. Nishime was able to identify eight members who were present (representing 37 units). Had those units been counted with written ballots, there would have been a quorum of 203 present at the meeting. The eight participating members who represented units for which no ballot had been submitted included Ghorbanzadeh (representing 18 units), his son Sean Gorban (representing one unit), his other son Brian Gorban (representing three units), and an ally of Ghorbanzadeh’s who was also running for the director’s seat (representing one unit). An allegation asserted Ghorbanzadeh and his allies did not submit their ballots “in a deliberate and tactical effort to not reach quorum so they could remain in power another year or two.” Venetian submitted no evidence refuting this accusation. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly ordered Venetian to hold a meeting for the purpose of counting the 166 written ballots cast for its January 20, 2021 annual member meeting and election. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was a quorum present for that meeting. By adjourning the meeting based on the purported absence of a quorum, Venetian failed to conduct the scheduled meeting or cover the noticed agenda items, which included counting the ballots and determining the results. View "Takiguchi v. Venetian Condominiums Maintenance Corp." on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Thompson and Simon Cole were professors at the University of California, Irvine, and taxpaying residents of Orange County. They filed a taxpayer lawsuit under California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a against Todd Spitzer, in his capacity as the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA), and the County of Orange (County; collectively, County defendants). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin County defendants from operating an allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection program (the OCDNA program) that authorized County prosecutors to obtain DNA samples from persons charged with misdemeanors. Specifically, County prosecutors offered to drop or reduce charges or punishments in exchange for alleged misdemeanants’ DNA, which the OCDA stored indefinitely in its own databank. Plaintiffs claimed the OCDNA program violates alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process and violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The trial court sustained County defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend, characterizing plaintiffs’ claims as facial challenges to the OCDNA program. It also noted that alleged misdemeanants were required to sign waivers to participate in the program, in which they waived their rights to privacy and counsel. These waivers, the court concluded, barred any facial challenges to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer as to the claims based on the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process: these claims asserted both facial and as-applied challenges to the OCDNA program, and Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the OCDNA program, as implemented by the OCDA, was unconstitutional. The Court determined Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that including a DNA provision as part of a plea deal or negotiated dismissal was facially unconstitutional. The Court also concluded plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring their claims. On remand, the trial court was instructed to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process, and sustaining it as to the remaining claims. View "Thompson v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

Tax assessors sometimes appraise commercial property using the income method: they forecast yearly income the property will yield and discount the future stream to present value. This method requires assessors to subtract income fairly ascribed to intangible assets, including those directly necessary to the productive use of the property. (Roehm v. Orange County (1948) 32 Cal.2d 280, 285 (Roehm); Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 614–615, 617–619 (Elk Hills). Defendant County of Los Angeles assessed a hotel owned by the protesting taxpayer, Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC (Olympic). The County’s assessor included income from three intangibles: a subsidy, a discount; and some hotel enterprise assets.The Second Appellate District reversed the portion of the judgment concerning the subsidy and the discount. Regarding the hotel enterprise assets, the court affirmed the trial court’s remand of the case to the County’s Assessment Appeals Board (Board) for re-evaluation. The court explained that Defendant violated the Roehm and Elk Hills rules. The court explained that the County argued there is no agreement the subsidy is an intangible asset. But the Board did find it was an intangible asset. The County does not argue the subsidy is something tangible you can touch. Accordingly, the court found that this argument is ineffective. View "Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law