Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Munir, a police officer, confronted Eman, his wife of six months, with his suspicion that she was unfaithful, and stated he intended to seek a divorce. On January 19, Munir discussed this intention with his sister but uncharacteristically failed to respond to multiple voice and text messages over the next 36 hours. On January 21, Eman called 911 to report Munir had hanged himself at home. A forensic audio analysis of the 911 call indicates a third person may have been present. After an autopsy, the Coroner’s Office classified Munir’s death as suicide. His parents arranged for a forensic autopsy review and served California Public Records Act (CPRA) Gov. Code, 7920.000 requests, seeking “all DOCUMENTS received or generated by, or currently in the possession of, the [Coroner’s] Office in connection with the death of Munir Edais,” defining “DOCUMENTS”, to include photographs, video recordings, “and all other electronically stored information.” The Coroner’s Office declined to provide photographs or the full Report because the widow had not consented.The Superior Court denied Munir's parents relief under the CPRA, but on its “own motion” required the production of the requested photographs and Report, citing Code of Civil Procedure 129(a), The court of appeal reversed. The Superior Court erred in finding that the CPRA request was limited to certain photographs and the Investigation Report and that the records sought are not public records and/or are exempt from CPRA disclosure. View "Edais v. Superior Court of San Mateo County" on Justia Law

The original proceedings involve efforts by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC or the Commission) to discover whether the political activities of Southern California Gas Company (SCG) are funded by SCG’s shareholders, which is permissible, or ratepayers, which is not. The Commission propounded several discovery requests (called “Data Requests”) on SCG, and when SCG failed fully to comply, moved to compel further responses that ultimately resulted in an order to comply or face substantial penalties. SCG seeks a writ of mandate directing the Commission to rescind its order on the ground that the discovery requests infringe on SCG’s First Amendment rights.   The Second Appellate District granted the petition. The court held that SCG has shown that disclosure of the requested information will impact its First Amendment rights, and the Commission failed to show that its interest in determining whether SCG’s political efforts are impermissibly funded outweighs that impact. The court explained that the Commission argues that sometimes SCG misclassifies expenditures, and has at times moved expenditures from ratepayer to shareholder accounts. But this just shows that a less invasive discovery process is working, and the PAO can confirm that no funds have been misclassified to ratepayer accounts by reviewing above-the-line accounts. Further, because the court will vacate Resolution ALJ-391 insofar as it compels disclosure of shareholder expenditures, no basis for sanctions exists. View "So. Cal. Gas Co. v. P.U.C." on Justia Law

C.K. (Father) and I.B. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their infant child, D.B. They argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry into Father’s Indian ancestry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, and related California law (ICWA), and thus the juvenile court erroneously found that ICWA did not apply. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and found that the error was prejudicial. It therefore conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department to fully comply with ICWA. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The City of Industry sued Cordoba Corporation, among others, after uncovering allegedly fraudulent billings for a solar energy development. Cordoba filed a cross-complaint, but the trial court granted the City’s special motion to strike it as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., Section 425.16), or anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order. The court explained that Cordoba does not deny filing a lawsuit is protected activity. Instead, it argues its three causes of action arise not from the City’s petitioning activity, but from the City’s noncompliance with its contractual obligations. The court wrote that this is a distinction without a difference. Further, the court explained that the court properly struck Cordoba’s breach of contract claim because the conduct Cordoba attacked was protected petitioning activity. Moreover, the court held that Cordoba cannot satisfy its burden because each of its three causes of action fails to state a valid claim. View "Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry" on Justia Law

Freedom Foundation filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the California Public Records Act (PRA) to compel the Department of Human Resources (CalHR) to disclose records regarding collective bargaining units and state employees. The trial court denied the petition and complaint. In seeking extraordinary relief, Freedom Foundation argued: (1) the collective bargaining exemption under Government Code section 6254 (p)(1) was limited to information that revealed an agency’s deliberative processes; and (2) CalHR was obligated to search the database maintained by the State Controller’s Office for responsive documents. “To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” Freedom Foundation failed to persuade the Court of Appeal that the California Legislature could not have intended the Government Code provision to apply as the trial court explained. Because the Court rejected Freedom Foundation’s construction of the collective bargaining exemption, it also found Freedom Foundation's assertion that CalHR should have produced redacted records that revealed only the “aggregate information” it sought unpersuasive. "At a minimum, the evidence demonstrated, even if other information could be redacted from the document over which CalHR asserted the collective bargaining privilege, disclosing the information requested by Freedom Foundation would reveal CalHR’s research and evaluations conducted pursuant to the Dills Act. As such, the court did not err in concluding CalHR was not required to produce this document at all." View "Freedom Foundation v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Monterey is an independent public agency responsible for analyzing Monterey County's water resources. Cal-Am is an investor-owned water utility providing water to over 100,000 residents on the Monterey Peninsula. Marina, a public agency, provides water for the City of Marina and neighboring Monterey Peninsula communities. In 1995 the State Water Resources Control Board ordered Cal-Am to stop drawing water from the Carmel River and develop an alternate water supply. In 2009 Marina, Monterey, and Cal-Am agreed to develop and construct a regional desalinization project to extract brackish water from beneath Monterey Bay, purify it, and deliver it to consumers. In 2010-2011, the parties entered into several agreements. The project was never built. The parties engaged in negotiation and mediation, ending in January 2012 without resolution.In September 2012, Cal-Am submitted a claim under the California Government Claims Act. Litigation followed. In 2019, the trial court entered summary adjudication against Monterey, finding that a negligence cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations and against Cal-Am under the Government Claims Act. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding that the “harm” accrued in 2010. There were triable issues of fact as to express waiver and as to the applicability of alternatives to the Claims Act. View "California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Districtw" on Justia Law

Casey N. sued the County of Orange (the County) and two employees of the County’s Social Services Agency (the Agency) for violating her civil rights in connection with a dependency proceeding involving Casey’s minor child. A jury found in Casey’s favor and awarded her damages. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: (1) the trial court did not err by failing to determine the materiality of allegedly fabricated or misrepresented evidence or omitted exculpatory evidence before giving the case to the jury for deliberation; (2) the jury’s verdict against the employees was supported by substantial evidence; (3) the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the jury’s verdict against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) was supported by substantial evidence. View "Casey N. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Natomas Unified School District (the District) expelled a student, I.O., under its discretionary authority. At an expulsion hearing, the District heard evidence that I.O. brought two unloaded BB guns and a sealed bag of plastic BBs to his middle school, showed the guns to two friends, and fired one of the unloaded guns at the ground. The District also heard evidence that one of the friends who saw the guns feared testifying at the expulsion hearing because I.O. and his mother had asked the student’s family to speak about I.O.’s character. Based on this evidence, the District found I.O. unlawfully intimidated a witness. It further found he should be expelled. It reasoned that he committed an expellable offense in possessing the BB guns and posed a continuing danger to himself or others—a conclusion it reached after preventing I.O. from presenting character witnesses and excluding his evidence tending to show his classmates did not believe he posed a danger. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment in the District’s favor, finding (1) the District’s “continuing danger” finding was flawed; and (2) the District’s witness intimidation finding was flawed. View "Natomas Unified School etc. v. Sacramento County Bd. etc." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence, and not intentional wrongdoing, and denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal in the Court of Appeal's original jurisdiction, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district had the duty to preserve the video before it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). After considering real parties in interest's opposition to the petition and the district's reply, the Court of Appeal found the extant record did not support the trial court’s ruling that, at the time the video was erased, the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable. The Court granted the district's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its sanctions order and reconsider its ruling. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Rocklin (City) filed an action against defendants Legacy Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC, (LFA) and David Busch asserting 12 causes of action related to their joint undertaking involving the construction and operation of a theme park, Quarry Park Adventures. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the first four causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The parties did not actively dispute that the speech at issue in those causes of action was commercial speech, to which section 425.16 did not apply. Instead, the primary issue the parties litigated was whether the speech concerning the theme park qualified under the “artistic work” exception to the commercial speech exemption. In opposing defendants’ special motion to strike, the City requested attorney fees, asserting the motion was frivolous. The trial court denied defendants’ special motion to strike, and, concluding the motion was indeed frivolous, granted the City’s request for attorney fees. Defendants appealed the fees order, arguing: (1) their special motion to strike was not frivolous because, even if the Court of Appeal concluded a theme park was not an artistic work, reasonable attorneys could differ on the matter; (2) the trial court erred in failing to follow the mandatory procedures set forth section 128.5 in sanctioning them; and (3) certain rulings and the “arbitrary rotation of trial judges” deprived them of their due process rights. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed and remanded for a determination and award of the City's attorney fees on this appeal. View "City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family Adventures etc." on Justia Law