Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case was the second appeal arising out of a dispute over the operation of a commercial self-storage facility (Treelake Storage) within a planned unit development in Granite Bay (Treelake Village). Silversword Properties, LLC (Silversword) owned the property upon which K.H. Moss Company and Moss Equity (collectively, Moss) operated Treelake Storage. In a separate but related lawsuit filed in 2017, Parkford Owners for a Better Community (Parkford) challenged Placer County’s (County) issuance of a building permit for the construction of an expansion of Treelake Storage, arguing that the County failed to comply with both the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Planning and Zoning Law. The trial court concluded: (1) the County’s issuance of the building permit was ministerial rather than discretionary, and therefore CEQA did not apply; and (2) Parkford’s challenge under the Planning and Zoning Law was barred by the statute of limitations. Parkford appealed. In August 2020, a different panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that completion of the challenged expansion of Treelake Storage prior to entry of judgment rendered moot Parkford’s challenge to the County’s issuance of a building permit authorizing construction of the expansion. In June 2021, the trial court concluded that the lawsuit here, filed by Parkford in 2018 and challenged the County’s issuance of a business license for the operation of Treelake Storage, was barred by both aspects of the doctrine of res judicata--claim and issue preclusion. The Court of Appeal concluded “Parkford I” was not a final judgment “on the merits,” therefore res judicata did not operate to bar this suit. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen" on Justia Law

At issue is whether certain records maintained by appellant Kern High School District (“KHSD”) and pertaining to Plaintiff, a police officer formerly employed by KHSD, are subject to disclosure in response to requests made in 2019, pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, Section 6250 et seq.) (“CPRA”).   Plaintiff petitioned the Kern County Superior Court for a writ of mandate, temporary restraining order, and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin KHSD from disclosing the subject records in response to the CPRA requests. Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the subject records did not relate to “sustained” findings as defined in subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 832.8 because Plaintiff was never notified of the findings or afforded an “opportunity for an administrative appeal pursuant to Sections 3304 and 3304.5 of the Government Code.” KHSD appealed from the order granting the writ of mandate and injunction and denying KHSD’s motion for reconsideration, and from the judgment entered pursuant to said order.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, trial court’s order and subsequent judgment granting Plaintiff’s injunctive relief. The court held that KHSD has a right to appellate review of the judgment and has standing to appeal. Further, the subject records do not relate to sustained findings under the 2018 amendments to penal code sections 832.7 and 832, thus KHSD has forfeited the argument that there was some other process available to Plaintiff to challenge the internal investigation findings. Thus, the court held that the peremptory writ should be recalled, and both the writ and the judgment should be modified to limit the injunction. View "Wyatt v. Kern High School" on Justia Law

G.V. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to his newborn daughter (E.V.) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. He argued the court and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately inquire into the child’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 SSA conceded there were two errors with respect to duties under ICWA, but they were harmless. Alternatively, SSA moved the Court of Appeal to receive additional new evidence (that was not previously presented to the juvenile court) that allegedly rendered the appeal moot, or at least demonstrated any inquiry errors as to ICWA had to be deemed harmless. The Court denied the motion, and found that under In re A.R., 77 Cal.App.5th 197 (2022), all cases where the ICWA inquiry rules were not followed mandated reversal. Judgment was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with ICWA. View "In re E.V." on Justia Law

In 2020, while wildfires swept through portions of Sonoma County, close to many homes, Sheriff Essick met with the County Board of Supervisors, fire officials, and members of the public in a streamed town hall meeting. Essick provided updates on an evacuation strategy and fielded questions from the public. When asked whether evacuated residents might be permitted to reenter mandatory evacuation zones to feed pets and animals left behind, Sheriff Essick refused to grant such permission, citing safety concerns. Sheriff Essick’s subsequent communications led to a harassment complaint. An independent investigator, Oppenheimer, conducted an inquiry and prepared a written report. A newspaper requested that the county release the complaint, the report, and various related documents) California Public Records Act (CPRA), Gov. Code 6250). The trial court denied Essick's request for a preliminary injunction barring the report's release. The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected arguments that the Oppenheimer Report should be classified as confidential under CPRA exemptions for “peace officers” “personnel records,” or reports or findings relating to a complaint by a member of the public against a peace officer The county is not estopped from releasing the Oppenheimer Report nor bound to keep the results of the investigation confidential. Nothing in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights explicitly grants or mentions confidentiality from CPRA requests, Sonoma County is not Essick's “employing agency.” View "Essick v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff C. Achay was a student on a high school track team, which usually practiced after school until 5:30 p.m. One day practice ended early, so Achay and her friend walked to Starbucks and returned about 45 minutes later. On the way back to the open campus, they encountered a stranger who Achay thought was “suspicious.” Someone identified him as A. Meer, a former student who was “kind of weird.” Achay retrieved her schoolbooks from the girls’ locker room, which was to be locked at 6:00 p.m. While Achay was walking from the girls’ locker room to the school parking lot she was stabbed by Meer, suffering serious injuries. Achay sued defendant Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) for negligence. The District moved for summary judgment on the grounds of duty and causation. The trial court granted the motion, finding the District owed Achay no duty of care because at the time of the stabbing, she “was no longer on campus during school hours during a school-related activity.” To this the Court of Appeal disagreed: at the time of the stabbing, Achay was on campus to retrieve her books from an open locker room after her track practice and another sports team was still practicing nearby. “Achay’s brief departure from school is a red herring.” Alternatively, the trial court stated it “cannot assume that more security would have prevented the incident from occurring.” But the Court found that was “plainly a triable issue of material fact: whether the District used reasonable security measures to protect Achay from an arguably preventable injury at the hands of Meer.” Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order, which granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. View "Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; Gov. Code 3500) requires public agencies to meet and confer (bargain) in good faith with recognized employee organizations regarding changes to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. The Associations filed unfair practice complaints alleging the County violated the MMBA when its board of supervisors placed Measure P on the November 2020 ballot. The measure, which the voters ultimately approved, amends the Sonoma County Code to enhance the investigative and oversight authority of the County’s Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach (IOLERO) over the Sonoma County Sheriff-Coroner's office.The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), which has jurisdiction over MMBA claims, agreed, finding that, before placing the measure on the ballot, the County was required to bargain with the Associations. The court of appeal reversed in part and remanded. PERB failed to consider whether the decision to place certain Measure P provisions on the ballot significantly and adversely affected the working conditions of the Associations’ members and exceeded its authority by issuing a remedial order declaring voter-approved Measure P provisions void and unenforceable. View "County of Sonoma v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendants AWi Builders, Inc. (AWi), Construction Contractors Corporation, Zhirayr Robert Mekikyan, Anna Mekikyan, and Tigran Oganesian (collectively, the AWI defendants) were under criminal investigation by the Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA) and the Riverside County District Attorney's Office (RCDA) in connection with AWi's involvement in certain public works projects. Pursuant to search warrants jointly obtained by OCDA and RCDA, a large amount of AWI' s property was taken into OCDA's custody. In 2017, OCDA decided not to pursue criminal charges against the AWI defendants and reassigned the matter to Orange County Deputy District Attorney Kelly Ernby for civil prosecution. In 2018, Ernby filed a civil complaint, on behalf of the State and against the AWI defendants, for violations of the unfair competition law. The AWI defendants were provided with a copy of OCDA's full investigative file, minus privileged documents, and returned documents seized during the criminal investigation to the AWI defendants. In 2020, the AWI defendants filed a motion seeking an order recusing and disqualifying from this case Ernby and the entire OCDA, arguing OCDA had engaged in misconduct by, amongst other things, improperly handling property seized during the criminal investigation that was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The AWI defendants also argued that in the UCL action, Ernby had wrongfully threatened one of the AWI defendants, their counsel, and a paralegal with criminal prosecution, a claim Ernby categorically denied. The motion to recuse was denied, and the Court of Appeal affirmed denial: he AWI defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. The Court found the trial court did not err by denying the motion to recuse because the evidence showed that no conflict of interest existed that would render it unlikely that the AWI defendants would receive a fair trial. View "California v. AWI Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Coronado, City of Imperial Beach, City of Lemon Grove, and City of Solana Beach (collectively “the Cities”) filed a combined petition for writ of administrate mandate and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against the San Diego Association of Governments and its board of directors (The Board) (collectively SANDAG). In their petition/complaint, the Cities maintained that SANDAG denied them a fair hearing when deciding the Cities’ administrative appeals of SANDAG’s regional housing needs assessment (RHNA): (1) by unfairly using a “weighted vote” procedure in which member jurisdictions cast votes based on their respective populations rather than a “tally vote” in which each member jurisdiction has a single, evenly-weighted vote; and (2) certain members of the Board were biased against the Cities and that their decision to deny the Cities’ administrative appeals was “predetermined,” thereby “rendering the decision on the [a]ppeals invalid.” In their prayer for relief, the Cities requested that the trial court enter a judgment “rescind[ing],” the “Final RHNA allocation.” The trial court sustained SANDAG’s demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment in its favor. On appeal, the Cities contend that the trial court erred in concluding that City of Irvine v. Southern California Assn. of Governments, 175 Cal.App.4th 506 (2009) precluded their action. The Cities also argued the Legislature’s 2004 deletion of the prior provision authorizing judicial review of an RHNA allocation was “not determinative” as to the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Cities’ challenge to the fairness of the RHNA process in this case. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that City of Irvine controlled, and barred the Cities' action. View "City of Coronado v. San Diego Assn. of Governments" on Justia Law

Petitioner made Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code 6251) requests seeking “all communications between” California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) President Batjer and the Governor’s staff, including “all documents, emails, or texts.” CPUC determined that the requested records were statutorily exempt from disclosure under the Governor’s correspondence exemption. Petitioner argued that “correspondence” must be narrowly confined to communications by letter. CPUC acknowledged receipt of his appeal. The next step in the appeals process required a draft “Resolution.” Petitioner notified CPUC that if a draft was not before it on April 22, he would seek judicial review. A CPUC attorney responded twice, apologizing and setting target dates,Petitioner filed a mandamus proceeding. After remand, the court of appeal issued CPUC an order to show cause. In the meantime, CPUC denied the administrative appeal. Petitioner sent an e-mail, attaching an “Application for Rehearing.” This apparent filing effort was not in accordance with CPUC procedural rules. CPUC filed a return to the show-cause order with a memorandum requesting dismissal of the writ petition.The court of appeal dismissed. Petitioner was not required to fully exhaust the administrative remedies set forth in the Public Utilities Code and in CPUC General Order to judicially challenge the denials. CPUC’s action on his administrative appeal did not render his writ proceeding moot. However, CPUC properly denied the PRA requests on the basis of the “Governor’s correspondence” exemption and/or the “deliberative process” privilege. View "Rittiman v. a Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered as to Defendants State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and CHP Sergeant (together, the CHP defendants), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the CHP defendants’ demurrers to the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Plaintiffs asserted on behalf of their deceased son claims for negligence and wrongful death after CHP Sergeant’s patrol car struck and killed Plaintiffs’ son while Langford was responding to an emergency call concerning an altercation on the freeway. The trial court found the claims against the CHP defendants were barred by investigative immunity conferred under California Government Code section 821.6 (section 821.6).The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s sustaining the Sergeant’s demurrer based on Plaintiffs’ concession at oral argument that the Sergeant is entitled to immunity as an emergency responder under California Vehicle Code section 17004. However, because California Vehicle Code section 17001 provides an independent statutory basis for CHP’s liability based on the Sergeant’s alleged negligence, the court did not reach the scope and application of section 821.6 immunity, and the court reversed the judgment as to CHP and remand for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Langford" on Justia Law