Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) serves defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). Chunn was found incompetent to stand trial. After being ordered admitted to Napa State Hospital, he waited 75 days for admission. Chunn argued that DHS’s failure to promptly commence competency assessment and treatment violated his state and federal due process rights. Other defendants, also found incompetent to stand trial, sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against DSH. The trial court consolidated the cases and ordered DSH to implement specific steps within specific timeframes to meet its obligations to IST defendants in Solano County. DSH appealed. Four months later, another court of appeal (Stiavetti) concluded that the DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of all California IST defendants, holding that 28 days is the maximum constitutional limit for commencing substantive services to restore IST defendants to competency.The court of appeal remanded the Chunn order. The trial court’s ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. The court did not abuse its discretion. The problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space and the many efforts by DSH do not relieve DSH of its responsibilities. Some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered, due to changes in the law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 now allows DSH to conduct “reevaluations” of IST defendants after the initial commitment order. View "In re Chunn" on Justia Law

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Teachers taught within the Salinas District before retiring and becoming members of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) Defined Benefit (DB) Program. Part of Teachers’ compensation was reported by the District as being deferred to Teachers’ respective DB accounts for their postretirement benefits. The Teachers challenged reductions that CalSTRS had made and continued to make to their monthly retirement benefits after determining that the District had erred in its reporting to CalSTRS; those errors resulted in the overstatement of Teachers’ monthly benefits. In 2019, the court of appeal held that CalSTRS’s claims were not time-barred, applying the continuous accrual theory. The court remanded for consideration of the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of Teachers and directed that CalSTRS refrain from reducing Teachers’ monthly pension benefits or from seeking recovery of claimed overpayments.The court of appeal reversed. While equitable estoppel may be asserted in a proper case against a governmental entity, it “may not be invoked to directly contravene statutory limitations.” Applying equitable estoppel required CalSTRS to continue to miscalculate Teachers’ monthly pension benefits in contravention of the Education Code. Laches was unavailable to defeat the claims of law at issue and may not be asserted to negate the prior determination. View "Blaser v. California State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

In 2003, JCJIC proposed a 312-unit apartment complex on 15.45 acres of vacant land along the Petaluma River. In 2008, after starting a draft environmental impact report (DEIR), for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), Petaluma adopted General Plan 2025. In response, JCJIC submitted an application for a 278-unit complex. After conducting site visits, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service identified the issues the EIR should address. A “Habitat Mitigation Monitoring Plan” was incorporated. In 2018, the DEIR was published. JCJIC provided consultant studies regarding environmental impacts, including on “Special Status Species.” The Planning Commission considered traffic impacts, floodplain impacts, and decreased quality of neighborhood life. City Council members requested supplemental documentation and authorized the preparation of a final EIR. JCJIC further reduced the proposal to 205 units; reduced the height of buildings; increased setbacks from the River; and implement a “Traffic Calming Plan.” The Final EIR concluded the revisions eliminated or reduced several potential significant impacts. In 2020, JCJIC submitted another plan with 180 units.Objectors disputed the adequacy of the EIR’s special status species analysis and failure to analyze emergency evacuations. The City Council certified the EIR and approved zoning amendments. The trial court and court of appeal upheld the approvals. View "Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal and cross-appeal following the trial court’s determination that the Department of Toxic Substances Control (the Department) acted within its authority and properly complied with the California Administrative Procedure Act (APA; Gov. Code, Section 11340 et seq.) but violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, Section 21000 et seq.) when it enacted a regulation listing spray polyurethane foam systems containing unreacted methylene diphenyl diisocyanates (spray foam systems) as a priority product under California’s “Green Chemistry” law. Appellants, in this case, American Chemistry Council (ACC) and General Coatings Manufacturing Corp. (General Coatings) challenge the Department’s actions on two grounds. First, listing spray foam systems as a priority product was in excess of the Department’s authority under the Green Chemistry law. Second, the Department violated the APA in multiple ways when enacting the listing regulation.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s finding of a CEQA violation on the ground that the claim was untimely under the statute of limitations. The court held that the judgment is affirmed with respect to the first, second, and third causes of action seeking relief based on allegations the Department exceeded its authority through the listing determination and allegations the Department violated the APA. The judgment is reversed with respect to the fourth cause of action, under CEQA, and remanded with instructions that the trial court dismiss the claim as untimely. View "Am. Chemistry Council v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

Defendant Department of General Services and real party Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS) prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) to determine the environmental effects of a project they proposed that would "significantly" affect the California State Capitol Building in Sacramento (Historic Capitol). Plaintiffs Save Our Capitol! and Save the Capitol, Save the Trees filed petitions for writ of mandate contending the EIR did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) the EIR lacked a stable project description; (2) the EIR did not adequately analyze and mitigate the project’s impacts on cultural resources, biological resources, aesthetics, traffic, and utilities and service systems; (3) the EIR’s analysis of alternatives to the project was legally deficient; and (4) DGS violated CEQA by not recirculating the EIR a second time before certifying it. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court found the EIR’s project description, analyses of historical resources and aesthetics, and analysis of alternatives did not comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Capitol v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

The California Legislature has required school children to be vaccinated for 10 diseases; COVID-19 was not yet among them. The issue here was whether a school district could require students to be vaccinated for COVID-19 as a condition for both: (1) attending in-person class; and (2) participating in extracurricular activities. The superior court determined there was a “statewide standard for school vaccination,” leaving “no room for each of the over 1,000 individual school districts to impose a patchwork of additional vaccine mandates.” On independent review, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion and affirmed the judgment. View "Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

This appeal centered whether Section 6 of the California Constitution required the state to reimburse the defendant local governments (collectively permittees or copermittees) for costs they incurred to satisfy conditions which the state imposed on their stormwater discharge permit. Defendant-respondent Commission on State Mandates (the Commission) determined that six of the eight permit conditions challenged in this action were reimbursable state mandates. They required permittees to provide a new program. Permittees also did not have sufficient legal authority to levy a fee for those conditions because doing so required preapproval by the voters. The Commission also determined that the other two conditions requiring the development and implementation of environmental mitigation plans for certain new development were not reimbursable state mandates. Permittees had authority to levy a fee for those conditions. On petitions for writ of administrative mandate, the trial court upheld the Commission’s decision in its entirety and denied the petitions. Plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants State Department of Finance, the State Water Resources Board, and the Regional Water Quality Board, San Diego Region (collectively the State) appealed, contending the six permit conditions found to be reimbursable state mandates were not mandates because the permit did not require permittees to provide a new program and permittees had authority to levy fees for those conditions without obtaining voter approval. Except to hold that the street sweeping condition was not a reimburseable mandate, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Dept. of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law

A qui tam plaintiff alleged that two banks violated the California False Claims Act (CFCA) by failing to report and deliver millions of dollars owing on unclaimed cashier’s checks to the State of California as escheated property. The trial court denied the banks’ motions to dismiss. The banks sought writ relief.The court of appeal denied relief, upholding the denial of the motions to dismiss. The court rejected the banks’ argument that a qui tam plaintiff may not pursue a CFCA action predicated on a failure to report and deliver escheated property unless the California State Controller first provides appropriate notice to the banks under Code of Civil Procedure section 1576. For pleading purposes, the complaints adequately allege the existence of an obligation as required under the CFCA: the plaintiff adequately alleged that the banks were obligated to report and deliver to California the money owed on unredeemed cashier’s checks, Allowing this action to proceed does not violate the banks’ due process rights. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellants Bull Field, LLC, Barley, LLC and Colburn Hills Ranch, LLC (Appellants) appeal from a judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandate (Petition). Appellants sought an order compelling respondent Merced Irrigation District (District) to sell them surplus surface water for the 2019 water year. Appellants’ farmland is outside the District, but within the same groundwater basin as the District’s service area. The District authorized the sale of surplus water to out-of-district users for 2019 but denied Appellants’ application to purchase such water. The District claimed, and the trial court found, that the District’s general manager denied Appellants’ applications to purchase surplus surface water because the District had a history of difficult dealings with Appellants’ manager. Substantial evidence supports that finding.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that District acted within its discretion in making its decision on this ground. The court explained that the court may not interfere with the District’s discretionary decision that denying Appellants’ applications to purchase surplus water was in its best interest. The court may not substitute its judgment for the District about how its interests would best be served. So long as the District actually exercised such discretion, this court may not issue a writ contravening the District’s decision. View "Bull Field, LLC v. Merced Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law