Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Officer David Meinhardt failed to timely appeal a trial court ruling that denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety, completely resolved all of the issues in the matter, and contemplated no further judicial action. Although the ruling was denominated an “order,” it was, under case law, a final judgment. Instead, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from a document that the trial court subsequently entered, which was styled as a “judgment,” but merely restated the prior judgment. In light of a line of cases relating to the issue presented here, the Court of Appeal solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the timeliness of Officer Meinhardt’s appeal. In his supplemental brief, Meinhardt contended that to dismiss his appeal would contravene applicable statutory language, conflict with certain case law, and be “patently inequitable.” Furthermore, Meinhardt contended Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 98 Cal.App.4th 579 (2002) and City of Calexico v. Bergeson, 64 Cal.App.5th 180 (2021) were distinguishable, and the Court of Appeal “should resist the impulse to extend Laraway’s questionable logic further.” The Court found Laraway and City of Calexico were directly on point and mandated dismissal of his appeal. The Court published this opinion to explain how Dhillon v. John Muir Health, 2 Cal.5th 1109 (2017) supported the conclusion that Laraway and City of Calexico were correctly decided, and to reiterate "the critical importance of determining whether a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment in seeking appellate review of such a ruling." View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

Appellants Monterey Coastkeeper (Coastkeeper) and others were dissatisfied with how the respondent State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) and the regional water boards, including respondent Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (Central Coast Board), controlled water pollution resulting from agricultural runoff through the permitting process. Appellants filed an action seeking, among other things a declaratory judgment and writ of traditional mandamus regarding the water permits governed under Water Code section 13300. Specifically, the third cause of action in their first amended complaint sought traditional mandamus and declaratory relief regarding respondents’ alleged failure to comply with the State Board’s Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Policy (NPS Policy) in the permitting process, while the fourth cause of action sought traditional mandamus directing the State Board to comply with the public trust doctrine. They appealed when the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend their third and fourth causes of action, contending the trial court erred regarding both the NPS Policy and public trust doctrine, and erred in denying them leave to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeal determined declaratory relief was not available because appellants failed to present a controversy susceptible to definitive and conclusive relief by declaratory judgment, and they did not identify a clear rule that was ignored or improperly applied. "Mandamus is likewise unauthorized as appellants attack respondents’ exercise of discretion rather than a failure to perform a ministerial duty or a quasi-legislative action. Since appellants assert no more than an abstract right to amend, it was within the trial court’s discretion to dismiss without leave to amend." View "Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Reg. Wat. Quality Control Bd." on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann served the Operator with a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” Alternatively, Operator contended several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of California Civil Code section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. "[T]he structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis." The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. View "Von Herrmann v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a watermaster appointed by the trial court to implement and administer a water rights decree had the right to appeal the trial court’s orders interpreting the decree on the grounds the watermaster disagrees with the trial court’s interpretation and the orders would increase the watermaster’s administrative burdens and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the watermaster did not have the right to appeal because the watermaster was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interpretation of the water users’ rights under the decree. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

Appellant Save the El Dorado Canal sought reversal of a judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenged certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The challenged project, the Upper Main Ditch piping project, was approved by the El Dorado Irrigation District and the El Dorado Irrigation District Board of Directors (collectively, respondents). On appeal, appellant contended respondents’ approval of the challenged project violated CEQA because: (1) the EIR failed to provide an adequate project description because it omitted “a crucial fact about the ditch the District proposes to ‘abandon,’ ” i.e., “the Main Ditch system is the only drainage system” for the watershed; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of abandonment to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding respondents did not abuse their discretion in approving the Blair Road alternative. The draft and final EIR’s adequately apprised respondents and the public about both the nature of the watershed and the fact that the District would no longer maintain the abandoned portion of the Upper Main Ditch. These environmental documents also adequately analyzed the Blair Road alternative’s impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. View "Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Two appeals consolidated for review centered on Placer County’s approval of a land use specific plan and rezoning to permit residential and commercial development and preserve forest land near Truckee and Lake Tahoe. The plaintiffs-appellants contended the County’s environmental review of the project did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act on numerous grounds, and the rezoning did not comply with the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982. The trial court rejected each of plaintiffs’ claims except one, involving analysis of the project's impact on Lake Tahoe's water quality and greenhouse case emission mitigation measures. The Court of Appeal affirmed both judgments in part, finding measure 12-2 did not comply with CEQA, and the EIR’s analysis of the project’s impact on evacuation plans was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found substantial evidence did not support the County’s finding that no additional feasible mitigation measures existed to mitigate the project’s traffic impacts on state route 267, and the EIR’s discussion of the project’s energy impacts did not comply with CEQA. View "League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain Area v. City of Placer" on Justia Law

Joseph alleged that Atwater terminated his employment as chief of police in violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) Gov. Code 3304(c): no chief of police may be removed from office without being provided written notice of the reasons “and an opportunity for administrative appeal.” Joseph claims the hearing offered by Atwater was not mutually scheduled, was not before a mutually selected neutral hearing officer, did not require the city to bear the burden of proof as to just cause for his termination, and did not require Atwater to present witnesses and allow them to be cross-examined. The trial court denied Joseph’s petition, concluding he was an at-will employee. Joseph’s employment agreement stated he could be removed as police chief for any reason; if the removal was not for willful misconduct, he had the option of continuing his employment by returning to the position of police lieutenant.The court of appeal reversed. Joseph was an at-will employee only as police chief and had rights to employment as a lieutenant that could be terminated only for cause. Before Atwater could terminate his right to employment as a lieutenant, it was required by POBRA to provide him with the type of administrative appeal afforded public safety officers who are terminable only for cause, including a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral fact-finder. View "Joseph v. City of Atwater" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law