Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

The Medi-Cal program, California’s enactment of the federal Medicaid program, was administered by the California Department of Health Care Services (the department) administers the Medi-Cal program. In this case, the department sought reimbursement from a revocable inter vivos trust for the Medi-Cal benefits provided on behalf of Joseph Snukst during his lifetime. Following his death, the probate court ordered the assets in the revocable inter vivos trust to be distributed to the sole beneficiary, Shawna Snukst, rather than to the department. The Court of Appeal concluded federal and state law governing revocable inter vivos trusts, as well as public policy, required that the department be reimbursed from the trust before any distribution to its beneficiary. Judgment was therefore reversed and remanded. View "Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst" on Justia Law

As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Lozano and Mitchell, former Los Angeles police officers, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the city’s decision to terminate their employment. A board of rights found the two guilty on multiple counts of misconduct, based in part on a digital in-car video system (DICVS) recording that captured them willfully abdicating their duty to assist a commanding officer’s response to a robbery in progress and playing a Pokémon mobile phone game while on duty.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting arguments that the city proceeded in a manner contrary to the law by using the DICVS recording in their disciplinary proceeding and by denying them the protections of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA, Gov. Code 3300). While Department personnel are not subject to discipline for minor infractions or purely private communications unrelated to their police work, commanding officers are not required to ignore egregious misconduct that is unintentionally captured on a DICVS recording. POBRA did not apply because when the sergeant called the officers in to discuss the radio calls, he did not have evidence that the officers had committed a crime or egregious misconduct. View "Lozano v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Oakland citizens submitted a petition for a ballot initiative to approve a parcel tax to fund programs for early childhood education and college readiness. Measure AA appeared on the November 2018 ballot. The official ballot materials prepared by the City Attorney stated that a two-thirds vote was necessary for it to pass. The City Auditor’s analysis likewise stated the measure would go into effect “if adopted by two-thirds of voters”; 62.47 percent voted in favor of Measure AA. The City Council declared that the measure had passed (Elec. Code, 15400), indicating that uncertainty had arisen whether a majority or two-thirds vote was necessary. Opponents filed a reverse-validation action (Code Civ. Proc. 863), arguing that Measure AA had not received two-thirds of the vote required by Propositions 13 and 218. The trial court ruled in favor of the objectors.The court of appeal reversed. A citizen initiative imposing a special parcel tax is enacted when it receives a majority of the vote. Measure AA cannot be invalidated on the basis of the ballot materials’ voting-threshold statements because the statements did not concern the measure’s substantive features, were not alleged to be intentionally misleading, and cannot override the law governing the applicable voting threshold. View "Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

California law sets up a presumptive safe harbor for notaries if, as pertinent here, the notary is presented with a driver's license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that is current or issued within the preceding five years, and if there is an absence of information, evidence, or other circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person appearing before the notary is not the individual he or she claims to be. This appeal requires the Court of Appeal to define the scope of this statutory safe harbor.In the published portion of the opinion, the court ultimately concluded that the safe harbor (1) applies when a notary relies upon a driver's license that looks like one the DMV would issue (and thus does not require a notary to verify with the DMV that the driver's license is, in fact, a legitimately issued license), (2) applies even if an expert opines that industry custom requires a notary to do more than the statutory safe harbor requires, and (3) is not overcome by the simple fact that the person who appeared before the notary was an imposter. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on negligence-based claims against the two notaries in this case as well as the surety that insured them. View "North American Title Co. v. Gugasyan" on Justia Law

M.A. (mother) and A.O. (father) appealed the termination of their parental rights to their three children. In January 2019, Children and Family Services (Agency) received a report that the home was filthy. It received a separate report that the maternal grandparents hit the children and the parents were methamphetamine addicts. Both parents had prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance. The parents and grandparents actively avoided detention warrants executed to the home. In June 2019, a police officer on an unrelated call found the family at the home and detained the children. The next month, two children were placed in foster care; the parents had a third child, L.A.-O (L) in May 2020, whom the the Agency detained and filed a dependency petition. In July 2020, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing as to L., the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction based on failure to protect, failure to support, and abuse of a sibling, and formally removed L. from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that there was no applicable exception to termination of parental rights. It therefore terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal addressed two novel issues raised by the parents' appeal: (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 (2021) overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parental-benefit exception must show that he or she occupied a “parental role;” and (2) the juvenile court erred by “ignor[ing]” evidence in social worker’s reports filed in connection with earlier hearings and that these reports established that the parental-benefit exception applied. The trial court found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.” Because the trial court used this terminology, the Court of Appeal could not tell whether its ruling conformed with Caden C. Hence, judgment was remanded for reconsideration of the parental-benefit exception. With regard to the second issue, the appellate court disagreed: the reports were not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing; hence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the juvenile court could consider them. "The parents will be free to introduce them on remand." View "In re L.A.-O." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the denial of his application for appointment to the medical staff of a dialysis clinic. The superior court denied plaintiff's request for a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In this case, the hearing officer, applying burdens specified in the bylaws, concluded that (1) the clinic sustained its initial burden of presenting evidence to support the denial of staff privileges and (2) plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving that the denial "lacks any substantial factual basis, or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious."The Court of Appeal reversed and concluded that plaintiff is entitled to a writ of administrative mandamus vacating the hearing officer's decision. The court concluded that the burden of proof contained in the medical staff bylaws is not consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard required by Business and Professions Code section 809.3, subdivision (b)(2). The court also concluded that the statute controls in the event of an inconsistency, the application of the bylaws' more demanding burden of proof constituted procedural error, the error deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing and, therefore, was prejudicial. View "Bichai v. DaVita, Inc." on Justia Law

The Water Rights Permitting Reform Act of 1988 provides a streamlined process for acquiring a right to appropriate up to 10 acre-feet of water per year from a stream into a storage facility, such as a pond or tank, by registering the use with the State Water Resources Control Board, paying a fee, and subsequently putting the water to “reasonable and beneficial use.” Given its lack of discretion over individual permits, the board has designated the registration process generally to be exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code 21000) as a ministerial decision.Mission Peak sued the board, alleging CEQA violations by granting a small domestic use registration to the Georges without first conducting an environmental review. The Georges’ registration form, on its face, met the program requirements. Mission Peak alleged that the form was replete with false information, of which the board was or should have been aware. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The registration was exempt from CEQA as a ministerial act. Conducting an environmental review would be a meaningless exercise because there is no discretion to reduce a project’s environmental damage by requiring changes. View "Mission Peak Conservancy v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

Nina’s was a residential care facility for the elderly (RCFE) licensed by the Community Care Licensing Division (CCL) of the State Department of Social Services. Plaintiff, an RN-certified legal nurse consultant, was hired to assist with the closure of Nina’s and agreed to assess each of the residents and recommend a new facility, as required by RCFE closing procedures, Health and Safety Code 1569.682(a)(1)(A).Caregivers from the new RCFE, Frye’s, came to transfer J.N. They immediately noticed that J.N. was in significant pain; multiple bandages “stuck to [J.N.’s] skin and her wounds,” which “all smelled really bad.” J.N.’s toes were black. Frye’s caregivers called 911. J.N. died weeks later. A CCL investigator contacted plaintiff, who confirmed that he had performed J.N.’s assessment. Plaintiff later denied performing J.N.’s physical assessment, stating that Mia “was the one in charge.” He denied guiding or instructing Mia during the assessment, stating he only acted as a “scribe.” The ALJ found clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff committed gross negligence in connection with J.N.'s appraisal, unprofessional conduct in carrying out nursing functions in connection with the appraisal, and unprofessional conduct by not being truthful with the Board investigator regarding J.N.'s care provided.The court of appeal upheld the revocation of plaintiff’s nursing license. Substantial evidence supports the finding that plaintiff engaged in a “usual nursing function” when he performed J.N.’s resident appraisal. Plaintiff’s dishonesty during the investigation constitutes unprofessional conduct. View "Clawson v. Board of Registered Nursing" on Justia Law