Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, the Legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the Budget Act, appropriating $500 million, and authorizing additional disbursements for any purpose related to the state of emergency upon order of the Director of Finance, with notice to the Legislature, but without requiring statutory approval of each individual project. On April 15, Governor Newsom announced a $75 million Disaster Relief Fund to “support undocumented Californians impacted by COVID-19 who are ineligible for unemployment insurance and disaster relief, including the CARES Act, due to their immigration status.” Approximately 150,000 undocumented adult Californians would receive a one-time cash benefit of $500 per adult with a cap of $1,000 per household to deal with specific needs arising from the pandemic.On April 29, the plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Project as an unlawful expenditure of public funds (Code Civ. Proc. 526a.), reasoning that federal law provides that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state public benefits, with exceptions, 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), including the enactment of a state law after the date of the enactment of the federal act. Plaintiffs alleged that the Project was not enacted by a state law and sought a temporary restraining order. The court of appeal dismissed, as moot, an appeal from the denial of a TRO. The spending has already occurred; there is no indication it will be reauthorized. View "Cerletti v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

The People filed suit against Venice Suites for violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) and for public nuisance, among other causes of action, alleging that Venice Suites illegally operates a hotel or transient occupancy residential structure (TORS).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary adjudication in favor of Venice Suites. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the People did not raise the issue of permissive zoning in their briefing but the court exercised its discretion to consider the issue on its merits. On the merits, the court concluded that the LAMC did not prohibit the length of occupancy of an apartment house in an R3 zone. Furthermore, the court concluded that the permissive zoning scheme does not apply to the length of occupancy, and the Rent Stabilization Ordinance and Transient Occupancy Tax Ordinance do not regulate the use of an apartment house. View "People v. Venice Suites, LLC" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether imposing sales tax on in-state lessors of business equipment to a title insurer violated Article XIII, section 28(f) of the California Constitution. The California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (Department) contended it did not because the lessor, not the title insurer/lessee, was the taxpayer. In the Department’s view, whether the lessee reimburses the lessor for its sales tax obligation was strictly a matter of contract and did not implicate the constitutional limit on taxing insurers. Conversely, First American Title Insurance Company (First American) pointed out that in equipment leases not involving an insurer, the state assesses a use tax, not a sales tax. But where, as here, the lessee is constitutionally exempt from paying use tax, Regulation 1660(c)(1) solved that problem by providing that the sales tax applied instead. First American argued that as a result, Regulation 1660(c)(1) imposed a de facto use tax on title insurers in violation of Article XIII, section 28(f). The trial court agreed with First American and ordered the Department to “remove, strike out and otherwise give no force or effect to that portion of Regulation 1660(c)” providing that when the lessee is not subject to use tax, the sales tax applies. The Court of Appeal reversed: “Article XIII, section 28(f) does not prohibit a sales tax whose legal incidence is on a lessor, even though the economic burden of the tax is ultimately borne by the title insurer/lessee.” View "First American Title Insurance Co. v. Cal. Dept. of Tax and Fee Admin." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, plaintiffs Michael and Crystal Haytasingh appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of San Diego and Ashley Marino, a City lifeguard. Plaintiffs sued the City after an incident at Mission Beach in 2013: Michael was surfing and defendant Marino was operating a City-owned personal watercraft. Although the parties offered different versions of what occurred that day, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Marino was operating her personal watercraft parallel to Haytasingh, inside the surf line, when she made an abrupt left turn in front of him. In order to avoid an imminent collision with Marino, Haytasingh dove off of his surfboard and struck his head on the ocean floor. Haytasingh suffered serious injuries, including a neck fracture. Plaintiffs alleged that Marino was negligent in her operation of the personal watercraft. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action, determining that Government Code section 831.7 provided complete immunity to the defendants on plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action. After the trial court granted summary adjudication as to plaintiffs’ claim of ordinary negligence, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege they were entitled to relief pursuant to two statutory exceptions to the statutory immunity provided for in section 831.7: (1) that Marino’s conduct constituted an “act of gross negligence” that was “the proximate cause of injury;” and (2) that the City failed to “guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity…that is not reasonable assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.” A jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. While the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in finding section 831.7 provided defendants with complete immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claim, the trial court did err, however, in determining that Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2’s five mile per hour speed limit did not apply to City lifeguards, and in instructing the jury that all employees of governmental agencies acting within their official capacities were exempt from the City’s five mile per hour speed limit for water vessels that are within 1,000 feet of a beach under San Diego Municipal Code section 63.20.15. The Court concluded this error was prejudicial. Judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Haytasingh v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Martinez regularly crosses a Beverly Hills alley to get to her satellite office. The alley, paved with asphalt, has a concrete drainage channel (swale) running down its center. Martinez was walking through the alley when the front edge of her flip-flop hit the swale; the asphalt, normally flush against the swale, had worn away, creating a divot, 1.75 inches deep. The divot had been there since “at least 2014.” The city is aware that people sometimes walk in its alleys, but alleys are used by heavy commercial trucks and equipment, which degrades asphalt. Every two years, the city inspects streets and alleys for purposes of prioritizing resurfacing; it will inspect potential hazards in response to user calls. The city had not inspected the alley at issue since 2009 and received no complaints with respect to the divot.The court of appeal affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Martinez’s suit. Under Government Code 835.2, a public entity is charged with constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if that condition was sufficiently obvious that the entity acted negligently in not discovering and repairing it. Because alleys, unlike sidewalks, are primarily used for purposes other than walking, and because the cost of inspecting alleys with the same vigilance as inspecting sidewalks would be astronomical relative to the benefit of doing so, what is an obvious defect in the condition of an alley is not the same as for a sidewalk. The divot was not an obvious defect. View "Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

Defendants Yolo County and its board of supervisors (collectively, the County) adopted a revised mitigated negative declaration and issued a conditional use permit to real parties in interest to operate a bed and breakfast and commercial event facility supported by onsite crop production intended to provide visitors with an education in agricultural operations (project). A trial court found merit in three of several arguments presented to challenge the decision, specifically finding substantial evidence supported a fair argument under the California Environmental Quality Act that the project may have had a significant impact on the tricolored blackbird, the valley elderberry longhorn beetle (beetle), and the golden eagle. The trial court ordered the County to prepare an environmental impact report limited to addressing only the project’s impacts on those three species. Further, the Court ordered the project approval and related mitigation measures would remain in effect, and the project could continue to operate. Plaintiffs-appellants Farmland Protection Alliance and Yolo County Farm Bureau appealed, contending the trial court violated the Act by: (1) ordering the preparation of a limited environmental impact report, rather than a full one, despite finding substantial evidence with respect to the three species; (2) finding the fair argument test was not met as to agricultural resource impacts; and (3) allowing the project to continue to operate during the period of further environmental review. Real parties in interest cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding substantial evidence supported the significant impacts on the three species. They requested an order vacating the judgment requiring the preparation of the limited environmental impact report (even though the limited environmental impact report was already certified by the County). The Court of Appeal concluded Public Resources Code section 21168.9 did not authorize a trial court to split a project’s environmental review across two types of environmental review documents. The trial court thus erred in ordering the County to prepare a limited environmental impact report after finding the fair argument test had been met as to the three species. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in: (1) upholding the County’s determination that the project was consistent with the Code and the Williamson Act; and (2) finding substantial evidence supported the projects effects on the beetle. Judgment was reversed requiring the preparation of a limited impact report, and the case remanded with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision to adopt the revised mitigated negative declaration and to prepare a full environmental impact report for the project. View "Farmland Protection Alliance v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

State Farm General Insurance Company (SFG) appealed an order awarding attorney fees to intervenor Consumer Watchdog (CW), in a dispute over documents SFG designated as confidential in a rate hearing under Proposition 103. After the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied SFG’s motion to seal, SFG sought writ relief from the superior court, which CW and the Insurance Commissioner successfully opposed. CW then moved for fees under section 1861.10, which provided for reasonable advocacy fees to a consumer representative that makes a substantial contribution to the adoption of an order. The court awarded CW’s requested fees, and SFG appealed, contending the fee motion was untimely, and the fee award was inconsistent with the statutory requirements and an abuse of discretion. Rejecting these arguments, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "State Farm General Insurance Company v. Lara" on Justia Law

As part of a request to receive a higher reimbursement rate, plaintiff Family Health Centers of San Diego (Family Health) submitted a cost report detailing the reimbursable costs incurred by its clinics in providing covered services to Medi-Cal patients. Because the costs were not allowable Medi-Cal costs, Family Health eliminated them from its cost report. As part of an audit, however, defendant State Department of Health Care Services (the Department) determined the costs should not have been eliminated from the cost report. Instead, the Department reclassified the costs to a nonreimbursable cost center, which had the effect of disallowing a proportionate share of the clinics’ administrative overhead costs. Family Health filed an administrative appeal to dispute the audit adjustments, but, after a formal hearing, its appeal was denied. Family Health then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the administrative decision, which also was denied. On appeal, Family Health contended the Department did not establish a proper basis for reclassifying the costs to a nonreimbursable cost center, and that the decision to reclassify the costs was not supported by substantial evidence. Family Health separately argued that a significant subset of the costs should not have been included in the nonreimbursable cost center because they were not costs at all. After review, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment denying the petition. View "Family Health Centers of San Diego v. State Dept. of Health Care Service" on Justia Law

Petitioner the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (department) revoked the liquor license of real party in interest IBPOE Elks of the World Arrowhead Lodge 896 (Arrowhead Elks). The revocation was based on findings that, among other things, Arrowhead Elks had knowingly allowed cannabis sales events to be held on its licensed premises. Respondent Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (the appeals board) reversed, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support the department’s decision. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the department that there was substantial evidence in the record to support its factual findings regarding the cannabis sales events and that, given those factual findings, it was statutorily required to revoke Arrowhead Elks’s license. Accordingly, the Court annulled the appeals board’s decision and reinstated the department’s decision. View "Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Alcoholic Bev. Control App. Bd." on Justia Law