Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a jury found petitioner Larry Bailey guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and leaving the scene of an accident and found true various enhancements. Petitioner was sentenced to 28 years in prison. In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. It also authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of early parole consideration. In 2017 and 2018, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) considered petitioner for Proposition 57 parole. In each of the parole consideration proceedings, the Board allowed petitioner to submit a written statement explaining why he should be granted parole. The Board, through written decisions by a deputy commissioner, both times denied petitioner parole. Petitioner requested administrative review of each of the parole decisions; both decisions were upheld. Petitioner thereafter filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus; the trial court denied petitioner’s claims challenging the evidentiary sufficiency of the parole denials, but granted petitioner habeas relief after finding he was entitled to “a live parole hearing at which [he] could attend.” The trial court interpreted Penal Code section 3041.5 “ ‘as providing for a hearing for all inmates eligible for parole consideration, at the very least to comply with federal and state due process concerns as well as equal protection.’ ” The trial court further ordered the Department to, within 60 days of the finality of the decision, promulgate new parole regulations to reflect the right to an in-person hearing under Proposition 57. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Proposition 57 neither required nor impliedly incorporated an in-person hearing requirement, and the Department acted within its delegated authority under Penal Code section 32(b) when it adopted the parole regulations at issue in this appeal. The Court further concluded the absence of an in-person hearing did not violate equal protection principles, nor did it violate a prisoner’s right to procedural due process. View "In re Bailey" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

In 1988, Pacifica voters approved Measure F, entitled “Firefighter Dispute Resolution Process Impasse Resolution Procedures: Minimum Wages and Benefits For Firefighters,” which prescribes procedures to be followed in the event of an impasse in labor disputes with Pacifica firefighters. Under this measure, absent other agreement, the top step salaries of fire captains in the city are to be set at an amount not less than the average for top step salaries of fire captains in five neighboring cities. After an impasse in negotiations occurred in 2019, the Pacifica Firefighters Association (PFFA) sought declaratory relief requiring the City to follow Measure F.The trial court denied the petition, finding Measure F preempted by state law, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500, and an unlawful delegation of power. The court of appeal affirmed. Measure F is unenforceable as a usurpation of authority the Legislature granted exclusively to the city council in section 3505.7. View "Pacifica Firefighters Association v. City of Pacifica" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding that KWBA's environmental impact report (EIR) was inadequate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court agreed with KWBA that the Kern Water Bank Authority Conservation and Storage Project descriptions of Project water and existing water rights satisfied CEQA requirements; a complete quantification of existing Kern River water rights was not required; and the EIR properly evaluated the environmental impacts of long-term recovery operations on existing rights and groundwater levels. View "Buena Vista Water Storage District v. Kern Water Bank Authority" on Justia Law

Nancy Michaels worked for more than one year as a Data Processing Manager II (DPM II) before her employer, California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), voided her appointment at the direction of the State Personnel Board (SPB). After the SPB issued a decision rejecting Michaels’s appeal of the voiding of her appointment, she filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. The superior court found that Michaels had served more than one year in her position and directed the SPB to vacate its decision. CalPERS appealed, contending: (1) because Government Code section 19257.5 did not define the date of “appointment,” that term had to refer to when a new hire starts working in a new position for a state employer; (2) interpreting Government Code section 18525 to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance of a employment offer “undermines California’s civil-service law;” (3) the trial court’s definition of “appointment” date yielded an “absurd result” that conflicted with the SPB’s constitutional mandate to ensure uniform application of state civil service law; (4) the application of offer-and-acceptance principles derived from contract law “introduces uncertainty” into the state civil service hiring process; and (5) Michaels was not prejudiced by having her DPM II position voided. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the express language of section 18525 defined the term “appointment” to refer to the dates of offer and acceptance. As to CalPERS’s contentions regarding the wisdom of using the dates of offer and acceptance for determining the start of the one-year limitations period for voiding an appointment, the arguments concerned considerations of policy that were better addressed to the Legislature. As to CalPERS’s prejudice argument, the Court concluded its two contentions lack merit: (1) even if Michaels had notice of the possibility that her position would be voided, that notice did not allow CalPERS to act in an untimely manner; and (2) CalPERS’s assertion that Michaels could not avail herself of the statutes governing the limitations period for voiding an appointment would render the governing statutes a mere nullity. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Michaels v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Officer David Meinhardt failed to timely appeal a trial court ruling that denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety, completely resolved all of the issues in the matter, and contemplated no further judicial action. Although the ruling was denominated an “order,” it was, under case law, a final judgment. Instead, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal from a document that the trial court subsequently entered, which was styled as a “judgment,” but merely restated the prior judgment. In light of a line of cases relating to the issue presented here, the Court of Appeal solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the timeliness of Officer Meinhardt’s appeal. In his supplemental brief, Meinhardt contended that to dismiss his appeal would contravene applicable statutory language, conflict with certain case law, and be “patently inequitable.” Furthermore, Meinhardt contended Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 98 Cal.App.4th 579 (2002) and City of Calexico v. Bergeson, 64 Cal.App.5th 180 (2021) were distinguishable, and the Court of Appeal “should resist the impulse to extend Laraway’s questionable logic further.” The Court found Laraway and City of Calexico were directly on point and mandated dismissal of his appeal. The Court published this opinion to explain how Dhillon v. John Muir Health, 2 Cal.5th 1109 (2017) supported the conclusion that Laraway and City of Calexico were correctly decided, and to reiterate "the critical importance of determining whether a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment in seeking appellate review of such a ruling." View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

Appellants Monterey Coastkeeper (Coastkeeper) and others were dissatisfied with how the respondent State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) and the regional water boards, including respondent Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (Central Coast Board), controlled water pollution resulting from agricultural runoff through the permitting process. Appellants filed an action seeking, among other things a declaratory judgment and writ of traditional mandamus regarding the water permits governed under Water Code section 13300. Specifically, the third cause of action in their first amended complaint sought traditional mandamus and declaratory relief regarding respondents’ alleged failure to comply with the State Board’s Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Policy (NPS Policy) in the permitting process, while the fourth cause of action sought traditional mandamus directing the State Board to comply with the public trust doctrine. They appealed when the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend their third and fourth causes of action, contending the trial court erred regarding both the NPS Policy and public trust doctrine, and erred in denying them leave to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeal determined declaratory relief was not available because appellants failed to present a controversy susceptible to definitive and conclusive relief by declaratory judgment, and they did not identify a clear rule that was ignored or improperly applied. "Mandamus is likewise unauthorized as appellants attack respondents’ exercise of discretion rather than a failure to perform a ministerial duty or a quasi-legislative action. Since appellants assert no more than an abstract right to amend, it was within the trial court’s discretion to dismiss without leave to amend." View "Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Reg. Wat. Quality Control Bd." on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law