Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) and the County of Los Angeles. LACERA, a public employee retirement system, sued the County over the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for its employees. LACERA argued that under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL) and the California Constitution, it had the authority to create employment classifications and set salaries for its employees. The County disagreed, asserting that it had the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for all county employees, including those of LACERA.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sided with the County, following a 2003 decision, Westly v. Board of Administration, which held that the broad authority granted to retirement boards was not broad enough to give them the power to establish employment classifications and set salaries for their employees.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the Westly decision was inconsistent with the language, purpose, and intent of Proposition 162, a 1992 voter initiative that gave governing boards of public employee retirement systems “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” The court concluded that this plenary authority included the power to create employment classifications and set salaries for employees of the retirement system. The court also found that section 31522.1 of the CERL imposed a ministerial duty on a county board of supervisors to include in the county’s employment classifications and salary ordinance the classifications and salaries adopted by the board of a county public employee retirement system for employees of that system. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court. View "L.A. County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a public contract for services to be rendered to the state. The plaintiffs, Talley Amusements, Inc. and others, alleged that the 32nd District Agricultural Association and others violated the Public Contract Code section 10339 when they solicited proposals for a master carnival operator contract for the county fair. The plaintiffs claimed that the request for proposal (RFP) was written in such a way that only one carnival operator in the United States could qualify, thereby limiting the bidding process.The Superior Court of Orange County initially reviewed the case. The court found that section 10339, which prohibits a state agency from drafting an RFP in a way that directly or indirectly limits bidding to any one bidder, did not apply to this particular contract. As a result, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction under section 10421, which allows a court to issue a temporary injunction preventing further dealings on a public contract awarded in violation of section 10339.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three. The main issue on appeal was whether the competitive bidding requirements of section 10339 apply to a district agricultural association’s RFP on a master carnival contract. After reviewing the matter de novo, the court held that section 10339 did not apply to the contract at issue because it was not a contract for services to be rendered to the state. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying injunctive relief under section 10421. View "Talley Amusements v. The 32nd District Agricultural Association" on Justia Law

The case involves two former faculty members at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), who were accused of serious misconduct. An independent law firm was hired to investigate the allegations, and the resulting report concluded that the professors had engaged in improper activities. The professors resigned their positions as part of a settlement agreement, with no findings of misconduct or admissions of liability. A former UCLA employee requested the report under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), and the professors objected, leading to a series of legal actions known as "reverse-CPRA" actions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the professors' petitions to withhold the report, concluding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the professors' privacy interests. The court found that the allegations of misconduct were serious and substantial, and that the public had a strong interest in knowing how the university handled such complaints. The professors appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the Los Angeles Times made its own CPRA request for related documents, including the investigation report and the settlement agreements. The professors sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of these documents, but the trial court denied their request. The court found that the professors were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, as the analysis for the disclosure of these documents was the same as for the investigation report. The professors appealed this decision as well.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's analysis and found no reason to delay a decision on a matter concerning public transparency. The court concluded that the professors had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim and were therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Ververka, who was employed as an administrator at a veterans home operated by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet). Ververka alleged that CalVet terminated him in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits retaliation against whistleblowing employees. He claimed that he was dismissed for reporting safety and health issues at the home and potential violations of federal law. The jury found that while Ververka made protected disclosures that were contributing factors in CalVet's decision to remove him, CalVet was not liable as it proved it would have made the same decision for non-retaliatory reasons.After the trial court entered judgment for CalVet, Ververka moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the analysis in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, did not extend to section 1102.5 claims, which are evaluated under the procedures set forth in section 1102.6.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One, Ververka contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. He argued that an employer’s “same decision” showing under section 1102.6 precludes only an award of damages and backpay and an order of reinstatement, and as a result, he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The court disagreed with Ververka's interpretation of section 1102.6 and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing CalVet’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that if the employer satisfies its burden at the second step in making a same decision showing, the employer is not liable regardless of whether the employee made an initial showing that his or her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment action. View "Ververka v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the International Association of Firefighters, Local 1319, AFL-CIO (Local 1319) and the City of Palo Alto (the city). In 2011, the city, facing a budget crisis, proposed an amendment to its city charter to alter a provision requiring certain labor disputes with its public safety unions to be submitted to binding interest arbitration. The city council adopted a resolution proposing the amendment, which was subsequently approved by city voters as "Measure D". However, the city did not consult with Local 1319 before proposing the amendment, which both the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the appellate court later determined was a violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).The trial court in the quo warranto proceedings agreed that the city violated the MMBA by enacting the resolution and submitting Measure D to the voters without prior good faith consultation with Local 1319. However, the trial court did not declare Measure D invalid. Instead, it issued a multi-step order that suspended the operation of the charter’s current dispute resolution procedures, required good faith consultation between the city and the public safety unions, and retained jurisdiction with the possibility of a future finding of invalidity of Measure D.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not invalidating Measure D after finding that the city's submission of Measure D to the voters violated the MMBA. The appellate court directed the trial court on remand to enter a new judgment ordering the city to restore the pre-amendment portion of the city charter's article V, invalidating Measure D, and providing any other appropriate relief consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "P. ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

The case involves a developmentally disabled woman, referred to as A.L., who was sexually assaulted by an employee of a transportation service. The transportation service was contracted by Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation, a regional center under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act. The regional center's role is to assess the needs of developmentally disabled individuals and contract with service providers to meet those needs. A.L. sued the employee, the transportation service, and the regional center, arguing that the regional center had a duty to protect her from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the regional center, concluding that the regional center did not have a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees unless the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The trial court's decision was based on the fact that the regional center had no such knowledge in this case.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the regional center had a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees only if the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The court concluded that imposing a broader duty on the regional center would effectively convert regional centers into insurers of all harm to consumers, which could potentially shut down these centers and deny essential services to the entire population of developmentally disabled persons. View "A.L. v. Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation" on Justia Law

Arasely Soto, a public school teacher, was injured during a routine medical procedure and had to retire. She sued her medical providers for malpractice and also sought disability retirement benefits from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). She and her husband, Raul Soto, settled with several of the medical malpractice defendants. CalSTRS brought an action against the Sotos, seeking to enforce its right to subrogation or reimbursement from the Sotos' settlement with the malpractice defendants.The trial court granted CalSTRS’s motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief cause of action and denied the Sotos’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that CalSTRS was entitled to seek reimbursement from the Sotos and rejected the Sotos’ defense that Civil Code section 3333.1 bars any subrogation claim that CalSTRS would have asserted against the malpractice defendants. The Sotos filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two to vacate the trial court’s orders.The appellate court agreed with CalSTRS’s argument that it has a statutory reimbursement claim against the Sotos, and the evidence in this case does not support application of section 3333.1 to bar CalSTRS’s claim. The court denied the Sotos' petition for writ of mandate. View "Soto v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tara Shawnee Pritchett, who was on probation for two misdemeanor offenses. In September 2021, a detective conducted a warrantless search of Pritchett's room, believing she was on searchable probation. The search resulted in the discovery of U.S. currency and what was believed to be fentanyl. Pritchett was subsequently charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. However, Pritchett moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that her probation had been automatically terminated by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (AB 1950), which limited the maximum term of probation for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.The trial court granted Pritchett's motion to suppress the evidence. It concluded that Pritchett's probation had automatically terminated when AB 1950 became effective on January 1, 2021, several months before the search. The court also ruled that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, leading to the dismissal of the charge against Pritchett.The People appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District. They argued that the trial court erred in concluding that Pritchett's probation had terminated automatically due to AB 1950. They also contended that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule should apply because the detective had made objectively reasonable efforts to determine Pritchett's probation status.The appellate court agreed with the People's latter contention and reversed the trial court's decision. The court found that the detective had acted in objectively reasonable good faith by relying on court records to verify Pritchett's probation status prior to conducting the search. The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule in this case would not serve its purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to set aside the order granting Pritchett's motion to suppress and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "People v. Pritchett" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Donald Ververka, was an administrator for a veterans home operated by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet). He was removed from his position after reporting safety and health issues at the home and potential violations of federal law to his superiors and an independent state agency. Ververka sued CalVet, alleging that his termination was in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities, in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.The case went to trial, and the jury found that Ververka's protected disclosures were contributing factors in CalVet's decision to remove him. However, the jury also found that CalVet was not liable because it proved it would have made the same decision for non-retaliatory reasons. After the trial court entered judgment for CalVet, Ververka moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion.On appeal, Ververka argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. He contended that an employer’s “same decision” showing under section 1102.6 precludes only an award of damages and backpay and an order of reinstatement, and as a result, he was entitled to declaratory relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the whistleblower statutes are not reasonably susceptible to Ververka’s interpretation. The court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Ververka v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing. These allegations were in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment and Housing Act). The District demurred, arguing that Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s claim presentation requirement and that the statute of limitations barred her cause of action under the Act. The trial court sustained the District's demurrer without leave to amend, citing Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School District and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C).The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the trial court's ruling independently and applied the standard for demurrers. The court agreed with the trial court, stating that a plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. Campbell had not demonstrated that she substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement. Furthermore, Campbell's amended complaint did not plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement.Additionally, Campbell's claim for violation of the Act was time-barred. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing had provided Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018, giving her one year to file a civil action. Campbell did not sue until September 2021, making her suit untimely. The court also rejected Campbell's argument that the discovery rule saved her lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Campbell v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law