Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2018, a Sacramento Police Department administrative penalty of $137,500 was imposed on plaintiffs Zuhu Wang and Xiaoyan Yue based on the number of marijuana plants that were found on property they owned in excess of what was permitted under Sacramento City Code (City Code) section 8.132.040(B). Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal with the City of Sacramento. After a hearing, a hearing examiner found the penalty was properly issued. The examiner relied in part on City Code section 8.08.050(A), which stated that “[e]very owner of real property within the city is required to manage the property in a manner so as not to violate the provisions of this code and the owner remains liable for violations thereof regardless of any contract or agreement with any third party regarding the property.” The examiner found “[t]he property owner in good faith entrusted the management of his property to an established property management company that failed to adequately follow through with background research on the tenant, and to conduct adequate inspections of the property.” The examiner reduced the administrative penalty to $35,000 “in consideration of the evidence and testimony presented.” The question presented by this appeal was whether a de novo appeal to a superior court pursuant to Government Code section 53069.4 was unavailable to challenge an administrative penalty that exceeds $25,000. The Court of Appeal determined that because the statute contained no such limitation, it reversed the judgment dismissing the de novo appeal brought by plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wang v. City of Sacramento Police Dept." on Justia Law

A reverse validation action was brought by petitioners Bonnie Wolstoncroft, William Unkel, and Michael Wilkes against the County of Yolo (County) to challenge the County’s plan to continue water service to 95 residences within the North Davis Meadows County Service Area (County Service Area) by replacing two aging groundwater wells with the City of Davis’s (City) water supply. Under this plan, North Davis Meadows residents would pay substantially higher water rates to pay for the project. The County considered the increased water rates to be property-related fees and noticed a Proposition 218 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)) hearing. More than five months after the County adopted its resolution, but before the deadline contemplated by the parties’ tolling agreement, petitioners filed their action in superior court. The trial court rejected petitioners’ argument that the increased levy constituted an assessment for which majority approval was required by Proposition 218. The trial court also rejected petitioners’ contentions that the County wrongfully rejected protest votes it claimed not to have received or received in an untimely manner. After review of petitioners' arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined that the levy constituted a property-related fee under Proposition 218. "The fact that maintaining adequate water supply requires switching water sources does not turn the fee into an assessment. Thus, the County properly employed the majority protest procedure under article XIII D, section 6." Further, the Court concluded that even if the trial court erred in denying petitioners’ motion to augment the record with declarations regarding two mailed protest votes, petitioners’ evidence would not prove timely compliance with the protest procedure. Without the protest votes for which only evidence of mailing was tendered, the protest lacked a majority. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Wolstoncroft v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wendy McKenzie was injured by a falling tree branch while jogging in Lower Bidwell Park, a municipal park owned by the City of Chico, California. She and her husband, Leslie McKenzie, real parties in interest, sued the City for personal injuries. The City sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of its motion for summary judgment and to grant the motion, arguing the trial court, in denying the motion, failed to recognize the City was immune from liability for injuries caused by a natural condition of unimproved public property, under Government Code section 831.2. The Court of Appeal concurred with the City and issued the requested writ. View "City of Chico v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Olson appealed a trial court’s denial of her motion for preliminary injunction. Olson sought to enjoin defendant Hornbrook Community Services District (district) from having its employee, defendant Clint Dingman, perform “certain water-related duties (such as adding Chlorine to the [district’s] water, operating the Chlorination equipment, and doing water testing), or being paid to do so.” Olson asserted Dingman was required to be certified by the State Water Resources Control Board (board) under the operator certification program (program) as both a water treatment plant operator and a water distribution system operator to perform such duties and, because he was not certified as such, the district and Dingman (collectively defendants) violated several provisions of the Health and Safety Code. She further claimed “Dingman’s illegal operation of the [district’s] facilities ha[s] resulted in toxic and offensive water, resulting in public and private nuisances, and waste of taxpayer funds.” The trial court denied the preliminary injunction motion because Olson failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the injunction would not maintain the status quo, and the balance of hardships tipped in favor of Dingman. Olson appealed, arguing largely that the trial court erred in its decision. The Court of Appeal did not reach the merits of Olson’s arguments because the Court concluded judicial abstention was appropriate under the facts of this case. The preliminary injunction Olson sought would have required the court to assume the functions of the board. The Court thus affirmed the order denying her preliminary injunction motion. View "Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District" on Justia Law

Pacific Harmony Grove Development, LLC and Mission Valley Corporate Center, Ltd. (Owners) appealed the judgment entered in a condemnation case following the first phase of a bifurcated trial at which the trial court resolved certain legal issues concerning how to value the condemned property. The City of Escondido (City) sought to acquire by condemnation from Owners a 72-foot-wide strip of land (the strip) across a mostly undeveloped 17.72-acre parcel (the Property) to join two disconnected segments of Citracado Parkway. The City argued that the strip should have been valued under the doctrine from City of Porterville v. Young, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 (1987). Owners argued the Porterville doctrine did not apply, and that the court should have instead applied the “project effect rule.” After a four-day bench trial, the court issued a comprehensive statement of decision ruling in the City’s favor on all issues. Owners appealed, contending the trial court erred by finding the Porterville doctrine applied, the project effect rule did not, and the City was not liable for precondemnation damages. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with the City’s position and affirmed the judgment. View "City of Escondido v. Pacific Harmony Grove Development" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, California, the County of Butte Health and Human Services Department (Health and Human Services), and the County of Butte Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) (collectively County) for negligence under a theory Health and Human Services and the Sheriff’s Office failed to perform mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the investigation and reporting of allegations of child abuse perpetrated against plaintiff by his parents. The County demurred, contending plaintiff’s allegations were time barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The question before the trial court was, and on appeal was whether the discovery was available to plaintiff to excuse his filing of his complaint after the statute of limitation had expired. The trial court agreed with the County that the discovery rule was unavailable when section 338(a) was the applicable statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal reversed: “The problem with the County’s argument is that, whether diligent or not, plaintiff brought his claim within three years of the triggering event, thus falling within the statute of limitations when the discovery rule is applied. The discovery rule postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. Once the cause of action accrues, the injured party still has the statute of limitations period to investigate the parameters of his or her claim. Because plaintiff filed his action within three years from when he had reason to know of his causes of action, his suit is timely.” View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

Alameda County Waste Management Authority sought records from three out-of-county landfills (Waste Connections) that disposed of waste originating in Alameda County. The Integrated Waste Management Act, Public Resources Code sections 40000-49260, permits local government entities to inspect and copy specified records kept by landfills concerning waste received at such landfills originating in the government’s geographic jurisdiction “for the purposes of” verifying reports made by the landfills on “disposal tonnages by jurisdiction of origin” and “as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees.” Waste Connections refused to permit the inspections, contending that the Authority had not shown inspection of the records was “necessary” to enforce its fee ordinance. The Authority attached a copy of its fee ordinance and explained that the fee depends on where tonnage originated, the type and amount of waste, and the party responsible for transporting the waste to the landfill, facts that are documented in landfill weight tags of the kind the statute allows government entities to inspect.The superior court compelled Waste Connections to allow the inspection. The court of appeal affirmed. The “as necessary” language of section 41821.5(g)(2)'s inspection provision requires neither a factual showing nor a factual determination. View "Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc." on Justia Law

Debra Turner, formerly a director and president of the Conrad Prebys Foundation (Foundation), appealed judgments of dismissal in favor of the Foundation and its directors, following orders sustaining demurrers to her probate and civil actions. In those actions, Turner alleged the other Foundation directors breached their fiduciary duties in preapproving a settlement range for Laurie Victoria, who served both as a Foundation director and as the trustee of the Conrad Prebys Trust (Trust), to negotiate a settlement of a trust challenge by a disinherited heir. Turner also challenged Victoria’s actions as trustee. Several months after commencing her action, Turner’s term as a Foundation director and officer expired when she was not reelected to her positions during the annual election process. The civil and probate courts determined that Turner lost standing to maintain her causes of action. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a director of a nonprofit public benefit corporation who brings an action on behalf of the nonprofit public benefit corporation could lose standing to pursue its claims if the director was not reelected during the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded the statutory scheme and public policy considerations required a continuous relationship with the public benefit corporation that was special and definite to ensure the litigation was pursued in good faith for the benefit of the corporation. "If a plaintiff does not maintain such a relationship, the statutory scheme provides the nonprofit public benefit corporation with protection through the Attorney General, who may pursue any necessary action either directly or by granting an individual relator status." Because Turner lost standing to pursue her causes of action, the Court affirmed the judgments of dismissal as to Turner acting in her capacity as a former director and officer. The case was remanded, however, with directions for the civil and probate courts to grant 60 days leave to amend, limited to the issue of whether a proper plaintiff could be substituted to pursue the existing claims. The Attorney General could consider during that 60-day period whether granting relator status to Turner, or another individual, for these claims was appropriate. View "Turner v. Victoria" on Justia Law

The County appeals from a judgment and issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in a proceeding under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the interpretation of the existing facilities exemption. The court concluded that the issue exhaustion requirement does not apply to challenges to the exemptions because the county did not provide adequate notice that CEQA exemptions would be considered at the public hearing held by its Board of Supervisors. Consequently, the county did not provide an opportunity for members of the public to raise objections to its reliance on those exemptions. The court resolved the ambiguity by interpreting the word "facilities" to exclude unlined landfills and therefore concluded that the county misinterpreted the Guidelines and violated CEQA when it concluded the existing facilities exemption applied to the project. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. County of Inyo" on Justia Law

California Labor Code section 1197.1 (b) authorized the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the Division) to issue a citation to an employer if the Division “determines that a person has paid or caused to be paid a wage less than the minimum under applicable law.” The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether certain employers, farm labor contractor Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. (Zepeda), and Zepeda’s “client employers,” Anthony Vineyards, Inc. (AVI) and Richard Bagdasarian, Inc. (RBI) (collectively “Employers”), committed minimum wage violations that would support the Division’s issuance of section 1197.1 citations. It was undisputed that the Employers paid all of the employees at issue at least the minimum wage by payday. Nevertheless, the Division contended it properly issued section 1197.1 minimum wage citations because the Employers did not promptly pay the final wages of the employees who were purportedly discharged or deemed by the Division to have quit in accordance with the prompt payment mandates of Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203. The Division contended that the failure to pay wages on the dates that the employees were discharged or within 72 hours of when they quit subjected the Employers to waiting time penalties under section 203, and constituted independent minimum wage violations that supported the issuance of section 1197.1 citations, even though the Employers paid final wages that were at or above the minimum wage on or before payday, in accordance with the minimum wage law. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Division improperly issued the section 1197.1 minimum wage citations to the Employers. Therefore, the the superior court properly issued a peremptory writ of administrative mandate directing the Division to dismiss the citations with prejudice. View "Jamie Zepeda Labor Contracting v. Dept. of Industrial Relations etc." on Justia Law