Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ordinances banning “land uses in support of” new oil and gas wells and “land uses in support of” wastewater injection in unincorporated areas of Monterey County were enacted as part of Measure Z, an initiative sponsored by PMC and passed by Monterey County voters.The trial court upheld, in part, a challenge to Measure Z by oil companies and other mineral rights holders. The court of appeal affirmed. Components of Measure Z are preempted by state laws. Public Resources Code section 3106 explicitly provides that the State of California’s oil and gas supervisor has the authority to decide whether to permit an oil and gas drilling operation to drill a new well or to utilize wastewater injection in its operations. Those operational aspects of oil drilling operations are committed by section 3106 to the state’s discretion and local regulation of these aspects would conflict with section 3106. View "Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Margaret McCann appealed a judgment in favor of defendant City of San Diego (City) on McCann’s petition for writ of mandate and an order denying her request for a preliminary injunction. McCann challenged the City’s environmental review process related to its decision to approve two sets of projects that would convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods. McCann’s primary concern was the need for the underground system to be supplemented with several above-ground transformers, which would be housed in three-foot-tall metal boxes in the public right-of-way. According to McCann, the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) for both sets of projects. The Court of Appeal concluded McCann’s claims were barred as to the first set of projects because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies to challenge the City’s determination that the projects were exempt from CEQA. The Court determined the City complied with the CEQA. However, the Court found merit in McCann’s argument the City’s finding that the projects would not have a significant environmental impact due to greenhouse gas emissions was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court found remand was necessary to allow the City to conduct a further review to determine if the greenhouse gas emissions were consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. Judgment was therefore reverse in part and affirmed in all other respects. View "McCann v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jenaro Carrasco worked as a parole agent for real party in interest Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (department) for five years. He was promoted to the position of special agent and was subject to a 12-month probationary period. The department served Carrasco with a notice of rejection before the end of the probationary period and stated six reasons for the rejection. Carrasco challenged his rejection before defendant-respondent the State Personnel Board (the board) and, when the board upheld his rejection, he petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus. At the conclusion of the administrative and superior court proceedings, only two of the reasons given for Carrasco’s rejection were found to have been supported by substantial evidence. However, both the board and the superior court concluded Government Code section 19175 did not mandate reinstatement if less than all the reasons given for the rejection were upheld. In addition, the board and the superior court concluded the department had not acted in bad faith when it rejected Carrasco. Therefore, the superior court denied Carrasco’s petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with the board and superior court, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Carrasco v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

In separate petitions for extraordinary writ relief, Michael G. (Father) and Kristie G. (Mother) asked the Court of Appeal to set aside the juvenile court’s order at the 18-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to their 16-year-old daughter, A.G. According to the parents, the court should have continued services in light of its finding that the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) had provided inadequate services during the most recent review period. Father further contended there was a substantial probability that A.G. could be returned to him with additional services, and the court should have granted a continuance under section 352. Father also argued the court’s ruling denied him fundamental fairness and due process. After review, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error and denied the writ petitions. View "Michael G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellants Folsom Police Department and City of Folsom (collectively, Folsom) appealed a trial court’s order denying a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 8102 for authorization to dispose of firearms that were confiscated from respondent M.C. after police officers detained M.C. for psychiatric evaluation under a section 5150 involuntary hold. The trial court denied the petition, relying on City of San Diego v. Kevin B., 118 Cal.App.4th 933 (2004) for the proposition that Folsom had no authority to petition for such authorization, as M.C. was not “evaluated” during the involuntary hold. Folsom contended the trial court erred when it relied on Kevin B. to deny the petition. The Court of Appeal found the trial court indeed erred when it ruled that it had no authority to conduct a forfeiture hearing under section 8102 because M.C. had not been both assessed and evaluated during an involuntary hold under section 5150. "Section 8102 does not so require [:] the trial court could not even consider Folsom’s petition, because M.C. was not assessed and evaluated. While there is language in Kevin B. that appears to suggest that only assessment and evaluation triggers the confiscation provisions of section 8102, that language is dicta, as it was unnecessary to the decision, since Kevin B. was never even detained. ... Here, by contrast, M.C. was detained (and assessed, but not evaluated) and then released, satisfying the threshold requirement of section 8102 (c). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s ruling was in error." Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a hearing on the merits. View "Folsom Police Dept. v. M.C." on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, petitioner Quinn Li challenged the continued vitality of the "Chamberlain rule" (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com., 69 Cal.App.3d (1977)) claiming the California Supreme Court’s recent Conservatorship of O.B., 9 Cal.5th 989 (2020) decision impliedly abrogated Chamberlain’s long-standing interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (c). The Chamberlain rule held that the weight of the evidence phrase in subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 is synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. O.B. held that an appellate court applying the substantial evidence standard of review must account for the standard of proof required in the underlying proceeding when determining whether a finding is supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal disagreed with petitioner’s implied abrogation argument but concluded, in sum, that a trial court reviewing an administrative agency’s findings under the independent judgment standard of review in section 1094.5 must, like under the substantial evidence standard of review, account for the standard of proof required and applied in the underlying proceeding. "We recognize this conclusion breaks with over four decades of established law. ... however, after closely reexamining the statutory construction employed by the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts, it is clear there is no basis for the interpretation that the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5 is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence." Despite the significance of its conclusion on this important question of law, the Court denied petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate because he failed to raise any argument demonstrating the correct application of the standard of review would have resulted in a different outcome in the trial court. "Prejudicial error must be proven; it is not presumed." View "Li v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Dawson, the City Manager of Del Rey Oaks, purchased the Portola lot, “the last vacant lot” in the City. It had a water meter but no water credits and could not be built upon without water credits. The prior owner had never been able to obtain water rights or water credits. The City lacked any water credits and had no surplus water. In 2015, the City leased the Rosita property, part of Work Memorial Park, to Mori for a garden center. Dawson contracted on behalf of the City for a new well on the Rosita property and arranged for the water credit from the Rosita property to be transferred to Dawson’s Portola lot. Dawson never reported his ownership of the Portola lot on his Form 700 disclosure.Dawson was convicted of a felony count of violating Government Code section 10901 (conflict of interest as to a contract entered into in his official capacity) and a misdemeanor count of violating section 91000 (failing to report an interest in real property under the Political Reform Act). The court granted him probation. The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove the inapplicability of an exception to section 1090 “for remote or minimal interests” because it was an affirmative defense; Dawson bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Government Code 65915 requires that municipalities allow increased building density, and grant concessions and waivers of permit requirements, in exchange for an applicant’s agreement to dedicate a specified number of dwelling units to low-income or very low-income households. Neman proposed a Los Angeles mixed-use development, with retail space on the ground floor and 54 residential units above, including five very low-income units and five moderate-income units. The application included a Financial Feasibility Analysis, calculating the cost per unit as $1,106,847 without requested incentives, and $487,857 with incentives. At the City Planning Commission (CPC) hearing, a city planner stated that as a result of A.B. 2501, “financial pro formas, or financial analyses can no longer be considered as part of the density-bonus application.” The CPC approved the project including the requested density bonus plus increased floor area and maximum height, and two waivers (transitional height and rear yard setback requirements). Neighboring owners sued.The court of appeal upheld the approvals. Neither the statute nor the implementing ordinance requires the applicant to provide financial documentation to prove that the requested concessions will render the development “economically feasible.” CPC was required to grant the incentives unless it made a finding that they did not result in cost reductions. It did not make such a finding. It was not required to make an affirmative finding that the incentives would result in cost reductions. View "Schreiber v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant County of Sacramento (County) appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Department of Water Resources (DWR). In 2019, the County sought injunctive relief alleging that DWR failed to obtain county permits before conducting geotechnical exploration activities related to a state water infrastructure project in the Delta region of Sacramento County. The County noted that its ordinance required all persons, including the state, to obtain county permits before conducting activities including drilling exploratory holes and borings. The County contended that it adopted its ordinance pursuant to division 7, chapter 10 of the California Water Code, and the Legislature had expressly waived the state’s sovereign immunity with respect to the chapter’s provisions. DWR, in moving for summary judgment, asserted that, as a state agency acting within its governmental capacity, it was immune from local regulations except where the Legislature expressly waived that immunity. DWR further contended that its activities did not fall within the scope of chapter 10, which is a limited statute governing “wells,” “water wells,” “cathodic protection wells,” and “geothermal heat exchange wells” as those terms are defined in the chapter. The trial court granted the motion, concluding DWR’s exploration activities did not fall within the scope of chapter 10, and the County was not authorized to expand its regulatory authority over the state beyond that which was expressly authorized by the Legislature. The County appealed the trial court’s ruling, contending the scope of the Legislature’s waiver of sovereign immunity extended beyond activities expressly defined in chapter 10 to include activities governed by an administrative bulletin establishing drilling and boring standards that the Legislature referenced in chapter 10. Alternatively, the County argued various statements made by DWR created a triable issue of fact as to whether DWR’s exploration activities fell within the scope of activities expressly defined by chapter 10. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the scope of the Legislature’s waiver of the state’s immunity extended only to the activities expressly defined in chapter 10. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court agreed with DWR that the County failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether DWR’s exploration activities fall within the scope of chapter 10 as the Court construed it, and also concluded that the County failed to demonstrate prejudice from the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

In 2016, Placer County, California (the County) approved a project to develop a resort on about 94 acres near Lake Tahoe. Sierra Watch challenged the County’s approval in two lawsuits, both of which were appealed. In this case, Sierra Watch challenged the County’s environmental review for the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In particular, Sierra Watch contended the County: (1) failed to sufficiently consider Lake Tahoe in its analysis; (2) insufficiently evaluated the project’s impacts on fire evacuation plans for the region; (3) inadequately evaluated and mitigated the project’s noise impacts; (4) failed to allow for sufficient public review of the project’s climate change impacts; (5) failed to consider appropriate mitigation for the project’s climate change impacts; (6) overlooked feasible mitigation options for the project’s traffic impacts; and (7) wrongly relied on deferred mitigation to address the project’s impacts on regional transit. The trial court rejected all Sierra Watch’s arguments. But because the Court of Appeal found some of Sierra Watch’s claims had merit, judgment was reversed. View "Sierra Watch v. County of Placer" on Justia Law