Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing. These allegations were in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment and Housing Act). The District demurred, arguing that Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s claim presentation requirement and that the statute of limitations barred her cause of action under the Act. The trial court sustained the District's demurrer without leave to amend, citing Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School District and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C).The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the trial court's ruling independently and applied the standard for demurrers. The court agreed with the trial court, stating that a plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. Campbell had not demonstrated that she substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement. Furthermore, Campbell's amended complaint did not plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement.Additionally, Campbell's claim for violation of the Act was time-barred. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing had provided Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018, giving her one year to file a civil action. Campbell did not sue until September 2021, making her suit untimely. The court also rejected Campbell's argument that the discovery rule saved her lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Campbell v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

In August 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom and the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) introduced the Blueprint for a Safer Economy, a color-coded, risk-based framework for managing restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Blueprint included restrictions on business activities, including customer capacity limitations. Plaintiffs, Central California businesses and their owners, filed suit against the Governor and others responsible for creating and enforcing the Blueprint, alleging that its creation and enforcement were unlawful. They claimed that the Governor and CDPH lacked statutory authority to implement the Blueprint, and that broadly interpreting the Emergency Services Act (ESA) and Health and Safety Code section 120140 conferred unfettered discretion on defendants to impose restrictions on businesses, violating the California Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine.The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Blueprint. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal as moot because the Governor had rescinded the Blueprint. After this, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion, holding that the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Newsom v. Superior Court (Gallagher) had rejected the same challenges to the Governor’s emergency powers that plaintiffs assert. The court entered judgment in defendants’ favor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court followed Gallagher and concluded it governs the outcome of this appeal. The court held that the ESA permitted the Governor to amend or make new laws and did not violate the constitutional separation of powers by delegating quasi-legislative power to the Governor in an emergency. The court also found that the ESA contained several safeguards on the exercise of the power, including that the Governor must terminate the state of emergency as soon as possible and that the Legislature may terminate the emergency by passing a concurrent resolution. View "Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case involves two public school districts, Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) and Grossmont Union High School District (GUHSD), located within the boundaries of the former El Cajon Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in San Diego County. In 1988, the districts entered into “pass-through” agreements with the RDA, which agreed to provide the districts a portion of its annual property tax increment revenue up to a specified dollar cap. After the RDA was dissolved in 2012, the San Diego County Auditor-Controller continued to make payments according to the agreements. The districts sought a writ of mandate to compel the Auditor-Controller to make statutorily defined pass-through payments to them after the caps in their respective agreements were reached. The Auditor-Controller responded that she would not make further pass-through payments to the districts once their respective caps were reached.The trial court denied the requested relief. The court found that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, when the RDA adopted an amendment lifting the time limit to establish loans, advances, and indebtedness, it triggered a statutory obligation to pay one or the other of two things to affected taxing entities, depending on whether the RDA had entered into a pass-through agreement with any particular entity before January 1, 1994, that required pass-through payments to that entity. If such an agreement did exist, the RDA would need to make the contractually defined pass-through payments. If such an agreement did not exist, the RDA would need to make statutorily defined pass-through payments. The court concluded that the statute does not require other payments and it would not read such a requirement into the plain language of the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and found that the districts were not entitled to receive statutorily defined pass-through payments once the payment caps in the agreements were reached. View "Cajon Valley Union School District v. Drager" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a proposed project to significantly alter the California State Capitol complex. The plaintiff, Save the Capitol, Save the Trees (Save the Capitol), appealed against an order discharging a peremptory writ of mandate issued by the trial court. The writ was issued following a previous court decision that found an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, prepared by the defendant Department of General Services and the Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS), failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The writ directed DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, and to file a final return to the writ “upon certification of a revised EIR.”The trial court had previously denied two petitions for writ of mandate, one sought by Save the Capitol and the other by an organization named Save Our Capitol!. The Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s denial. On remand, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals. After DGS partially vacated its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, it revised, recirculated, and certified the revised final EIR. DGS then partially reapproved the project without one of the project components, the visitor center. DGS thereafter filed its final return and the trial court discharged the writ, over plaintiff’s objection, without determining whether the revised final EIR remedied the CEQA violations the Court of Appeal had identified in its opinion.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, Save the Capitol argued that the discharge of the writ was premature because the writ not only required DGS to revise and recirculate the defective portions of the EIR, but also to certify a revised EIR consistent with the previous court decision before the writ could be discharged. The court agreed with Save the Capitol, concluding that the trial court must determine that the revised EIR is consistent with the previous court decision before discharging the writ. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Save the Capitol, Save the Trees v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by plaintiff Harold Malmquist against the City of Folsom (City). The plaintiff alleged that the City failed to maintain proper corrosion control measures at its water treatment plant, causing the pH level of its water to rise and become corrosive. This, in turn, led to pinhole leaks in copper pipes receiving the water, damaging persons and property. The plaintiff sought class certification, defining the class as all individuals and entities who have owned or leased real property in the City, plumbed with copper piping receiving water from the City’s plant since February 23, 2015.The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones. The court reasoned that the existence, cause, and extent of damage to copper piping required individual proof. The court also overruled the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness, concluding that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that individual issues predominated over common ones. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to overrule the plaintiff's objections to the City's expert witness. The court concluded that the expert was qualified and his opinion was founded on reliable information. View "Malmquist v. City of Folsom" on Justia Law

The case involves D.K., a patient diagnosed with an unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders, who was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) by the Orange County Superior Court. After D.K.'s transfer to Napa State Hospital, DSH filed a petition for an interim order to compel involuntary medication of D.K. with antipsychotic medication. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing and ordered D.K. involuntarily medicated from January 17, 2023, to February 7, 2023. D.K. filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate with the Napa County Superior Court, challenging the medication order. The superior court denied her petition, concluding D.K. was not entitled to writ review.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three found that D.K.'s appeal was moot because the order had expired and no meaningful relief could be effectuated through review of that order. However, the court exercised its discretion to address D.K.'s appeal of the superior court's finding that the statutory scheme of section 1370 precluded her from filing a writ of administrative mandamus to challenge the medication order. The court concluded that both the significant liberty interests at issue and the language of section 1370 support D.K.'s right to seek writ review. The court reversed the superior court's holding that D.K. was not entitled to writ review. However, it dismissed as moot D.K.'s challenge to the court's finding that substantial evidence supported the involuntary medication order, so it did not remand the case for further proceedings. View "D.K. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Brady Helm, tripped and fell on a wire cable while walking to a recreational area at Diaz Lake. The wire cable was suspended between two wooden poles and was intended to prevent vehicles from accessing a pedestrian pathway. Helm sued the County of Inyo and the City of Los Angeles, alleging causes of action for dangerous condition on public property, premises liability, and negligence.The defendants prevailed on summary judgment in the Superior Court of Inyo County, arguing that Helm tripped while walking along a trail, and thus, they were immune under Government Code section 831.4 (trail immunity). Helm appealed the final judgment, contending that trail immunity does not apply in this case and that disputed questions of material facts exist regarding the alleged dangerous condition of the subject public property.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, disagreed with Helm’s first contention and concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment because trail immunity barred Helm’s claims. The court found that the area where Helm fell was a trail for purposes of section 831.4 and the wooden poles and wire cable were incorporated into the design of the trail. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Helm v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law. View "Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

The case involves Sutter’s Place, Inc., a cardroom operator in San Jose, California, and the California Gambling Control Commission. Sutter’s Place sought to increase the number of gambling tables in its cardroom from 49 to 64. The request was based on a local ballot measure, Measure H, which was approved by San Jose voters. However, the Commission denied the application, arguing that Measure H did not comply with the requirements of the Gambling Control Act (GCA), specifically a provision governing the text of local ballot measures authorizing expansions of gambling. The Commission's decision was upheld by the San Francisco County Superior Court.Previously, the Commission had denied Sutter’s application for more tables, concluding that the San Jose ballot measure authorizing the increase did not comply with the GCA. The superior court denied writ relief, and Sutter appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, rejecting Sutter's arguments that recent state legislation validated San Jose’s ordinance and abrogated the Commission’s decision denying permission to expand.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sutter argued that the Commission lacked authority to deny a gambling expansion application on the ground that a local authorizing measure fails to comply with state law. However, the court rejected each argument and concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Sutter’s writ petition. The court held that the Commission had the authority to refuse an application that conflicted with state law. The court also found that Measure H did not substantially comply with the GCA's requirements for ballot language. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of San José and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA). The city had a significant unfunded liability in its pension plans for city employees. To address this shortfall, the city council adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds, provided they result in savings for the city. The HJTA argued that this action violated the constitutional debt limitation, which prohibits cities from incurring any indebtedness or liability exceeding the income and revenue provided for a given year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters.The trial court upheld the city's actions, ruling that the bond issuance falls under the obligation imposed by law exception to the debt limitation. The HJTA appealed this decision, arguing that the city's actions violate the constitutional debt limitation and lack statutory authority.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment, but for different reasons than the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the city has not incurred any indebtedness or liability exceeding its annual income and revenue because the city's actions do not trigger the constitutional debt limitation. The court also found that the city has the authority under state law to issue the bonds. View "City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn." on Justia Law