Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was injured while performing work in the Adult Offender Work Program (AOWP), he filed suit against the county for its failure to accommodate his preexisting physical disability and failure to engage in the interactive process under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. The court held that an individual sentenced to perform work activities in lieu of incarceration in the absence of any financial remuneration, is precluded, as a matter of law, from being an "employee" within the meaning of the FEHA. The court explained that, while remuneration alone is not a sufficient condition to establish an individual is an employee under the statute, it is an essential one. Because plaintiff earned no sufficient financial remuneration as a result of participation in the AOWP, he could not be deemed an employee under the FEHA. The court did not reach plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Talley v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

In May 2020, the chairs of the California Assembly and Senate committees that consider election-related matters prepared a formal letter to Governor Gavin Newsom indicating they were working on legislation to ensure Californians could vote by mail in light of the emergency occasioned by COVID-19. The Governor issued Executive Order No. N-64-20 on May 8, 2020, which required all voters to be provided vote-by-mail ballots. That order affirmed, however, that the administration continued to work “in partnership with the Secretary of State and the Legislature on requirements for in-person voting opportunities and how other details of the November election will be implemented” and “[n]othing in this Order is intended, or shall be construed, to limit the enactment of legislation on that subject.” The order was signed on June 3, 2020. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review concerned an order of the Sutter County Superior Court, entered on June 12, 2020, granting a temporary restraining order against the Executive Order, finding it constituted “an impermissible use of legislative powers in violation of the California Constitution and the laws of the State of California.” The Court of Appeal determined there was no basis for the superior court to grant real parties in interest relief using ex parte procedures prescribed by California law. "The hearing on the ex parte application, conducted only one day after the underlying action was filed in superior court, was held without proper notice to the Governor or his appearance. Apart from these procedural deficiencies, real parties in interest also failed to make the requisite substantive showing for use of an ex parte proceeding. In short, the real parties in interest failed to present competent evidence establishing imminent harm from the Governor’s executive order requiring immediate action." View "Newsome v. Superior Court (Gallagher)" on Justia Law

In 2013 the Carcinogen Identification Committee (Committee) voted to list the chemical diisononyl phthalate (DINP) as a cancer causing chemical. DINP was used to soften vinyl for use in flooring, wire insulation, gloves, garden hoses, artificial leather, and roofing materials. The Committee concluded DINP caused various types of cancer in animals and that the mechanisms by which DINP caused cancer in animals were relevant to humans. Subsequently, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) added DINP to the Proposition 65 list. Plaintiff American Chemistry Council (Chemistry) challenged the action, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Chemistry. Chemistry appealed the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate, arguing there was insufficient evidence that DINP causes cancer in humans. The Court of Appeal found, after its review of the record, that the Committee considered much of the evidence Chemistry accused it of ignoring. "The record reveals the Committee review was not rushed and did not render the Committee’s decision arbitrary and capricious." The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate. View "American Chemistry Council v. Office of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law

In the November 2018 general election, 61percent of San Francisco voters voted for Proposition C, entitled “Additional Business Taxes to Fund Homeless Services.” San Francisco filed suit to establish that Proposition C has been validly enacted through the voters’ initiative power. The City’s complaint against “All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C” was answered by three defendants: the California Business Properties Association, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and the California Business Roundtable (the Associations). The Associations allege that Proposition C is invalid because it imposes a special tax approved by less than two-thirds of the voting electorate as required by Propositions 13 and 218. (California Constitution Art. XIII A, section 4 & Art. XIII C, section 2(d).)The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal affirmed, citing two California Supreme Court cases interpreting other language from Proposition 13 and Proposition 218. The supermajority vote requirements that those propositions added to the state constitution coexist with and do not displace the people’s power to enact initiatives by majority vote. Because a majority of San Francisco voters who cast ballots in November 2018 favored Proposition C, the initiative measure was validly enacted. View "City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Proposition C" on Justia Law

A toll increase for seven Bay Area bridges that was submitted to the voters as Regional Measure 3 in 2018, and approved by a 55 percent majority. Revenue from the toll increase is to be applied toward various designated highway and public transit improvement projects and programs. Opponents contend that most of the revenue will not be used for the benefit of those who use the bridges and pay the toll but rather for the benefit of those who use other means of transportation; they argue the toll increase is a tax for which the California Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote, and therefore is invalid.The court of appeal affirmed judgment on the pleadings, upholding the fee increase. The Legislature, not the Bay Area Toll Authority, imposed the toll increase in Senate Bill 595, which required imposition of a toll increase of up to $3, subject to approval by the voters, and specified in great detail the uses to which the resulting revenue would be put. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. Bay Area Toll Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, contending that the trial court misinterpreted the conditions placed on the approved vesting tentative map for a small subdivision he is attempting to develop. The trial court interpreted the conditions to require a fire suppression system, with functional fire hydrants to be in place, before the county would approve the final subdivision map.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff's claims of misinterpretation are not barred by the 90-day period set forth in Government Code section 66499.37. The court held that a claim of misinterpretation is distinct from a claim challenging the validity of the condition of approval and the two types of claims accrue at different times. View "Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

On March 13, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in California, the Superior Court of Contra Costa County announced it would be closed to the public between March 16 and April 1 and ceased conducting most, but not all, proceedings. Bullock, charged with human trafficking and pimping, contends his custodial preliminary hearing should have occurred during the March closure period under Penal Code section 859b, which establishes a 10-court-day timeframe for a preliminary hearing.The court of appeal dismissed Bullock’s petition for a writ of mandate. Good cause to delay the hearing was not established: the Superior Court’s finding that “the unprecedented [COVID-19] pandemic conditions that California was facing directly impacted the court[] operations” is insufficient. In the absence of a particularized showing of a nexus between the pandemic and the Superior Court’s purported inability to conduct Bullock’s preliminary hearing in a timely fashion, the Superior Court abused its discretion in finding no violation of section 859b. However, Bullock recently pled no contest to one of the charges against him pursuant to a negotiated disposition. View "Bullock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Company (Stanford Vina) sued the California Water Resources Control Board (the Board), among other defendants, challenging the Board’s issuance of certain temporary emergency regulations in 2014 and 2015, during the height of one of the most severe droughts in California’s history. The challenged regulations established minimum flow requirements on three tributaries of the Sacramento River, including Deer Creek in Tehama County, in order to protect two threatened species of anadromous fish, Chinook salmon and steelhead trout, during their respective migratory cycles. Furthermore, Stanford Vina challenged the Board’s implementation of those regulations by issuing temporary curtailment orders limiting the company’s diversion of water from Deer Creek for certain periods of time during those years in order to maintain the required minimum flow of water. Judgment was entered in favor of the Board and other defendants. Stanford Vina appealed. Finding the Board possessed broad authority to regulate the unreasonable use of water in California by various means, including the adoption of regulations establishing minimum flow requirements protecting the migration of threatened fish species during drought conditions and declaring diversions of water unreasonable where such diversions would threaten to cause the flow of water in the creeks in question to drop below required levels, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Board’s adoption of the challenged regulations was not arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support, nor did the Board fail to follow required procedures, and the Court declined to override the Board’s determination as to reasonableness set forth in the regulations. View "Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Co. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Objector, a conservatee subject to conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, contested the petition to reappoint a public guardian as his conservator. On appeal, objector contends the trial court violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), and denied him due process by failing to commence the jury trial within 10 days of his demand for trial.The Court of Appeal was deeply troubled by the significant delay of over four months in holding a trial on objector's petition, especially given the lack of any justification by the court for most of the delay. The court emphasized the statutory obligation of trial courts to hold a jury trial within 10 days, with only a limited exception for a 15-day continuance if requested by the proposed conservatee. However, the court held that the trial court's failure to commence trial within 10 days of the jury trial demand did not support dismissal of the petition. Rather, the time limit in section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), is directory, not mandatory, because the Legislature has not expressly provided for dismissal of the conservatorship petition if a trial is not held within 10 days. Furthermore, objector was not prejudiced and denied due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservatorship of Jose B." on Justia Law

Officer Walker, responding to a reported hit and run collision, found the vehicle. Delgado was standing by the driver’s door and acknowledged that she had been driving during the collision, that she had had “ ‘two, maybe three’ ” beers during the evening, and that she was still feeling the alcohol's effects. Delgado showed signs of intoxication. Walker administered two breath tests. Both showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 percent, nearly twice the legal limit. Walker certified that he was “qualified to operate this equipment and that the test was administered pursuant to the requirements" of the California Code of Regulations. Walker signed a checklist for carrying out the test on the machine. At a continued DMV hearing, Walker did not appear. In response to Delgado's subpoena, the Contra Costa County Laboratory replied that it found no training record for Walker. The hearing officer ordered Delgado’s license suspended for four months. The DMV submitted evidence that Walker had been trained in another county but the trial court ruled in favor of Delgado. The court of appeal reversed. DMV met its initial burden by submitting the pertinent reports. There was no affirmative evidence that the test was not conducted or reported properly, so the burden did not shift to the DMV to show whether official standards were observed. View "Delgado v. California Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law