Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2013 the Carcinogen Identification Committee (Committee) voted to list the chemical diisononyl phthalate (DINP) as a cancer causing chemical. DINP was used to soften vinyl for use in flooring, wire insulation, gloves, garden hoses, artificial leather, and roofing materials. The Committee concluded DINP caused various types of cancer in animals and that the mechanisms by which DINP caused cancer in animals were relevant to humans. Subsequently, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) added DINP to the Proposition 65 list. Plaintiff American Chemistry Council (Chemistry) challenged the action, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Chemistry. Chemistry appealed the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate, arguing there was insufficient evidence that DINP causes cancer in humans. The Court of Appeal found, after its review of the record, that the Committee considered much of the evidence Chemistry accused it of ignoring. "The record reveals the Committee review was not rushed and did not render the Committee’s decision arbitrary and capricious." The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate. View "American Chemistry Council v. Office of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law

In the November 2018 general election, 61percent of San Francisco voters voted for Proposition C, entitled “Additional Business Taxes to Fund Homeless Services.” San Francisco filed suit to establish that Proposition C has been validly enacted through the voters’ initiative power. The City’s complaint against “All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C” was answered by three defendants: the California Business Properties Association, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, and the California Business Roundtable (the Associations). The Associations allege that Proposition C is invalid because it imposes a special tax approved by less than two-thirds of the voting electorate as required by Propositions 13 and 218. (California Constitution Art. XIII A, section 4 & Art. XIII C, section 2(d).)The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal affirmed, citing two California Supreme Court cases interpreting other language from Proposition 13 and Proposition 218. The supermajority vote requirements that those propositions added to the state constitution coexist with and do not displace the people’s power to enact initiatives by majority vote. Because a majority of San Francisco voters who cast ballots in November 2018 favored Proposition C, the initiative measure was validly enacted. View "City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Proposition C" on Justia Law

A toll increase for seven Bay Area bridges that was submitted to the voters as Regional Measure 3 in 2018, and approved by a 55 percent majority. Revenue from the toll increase is to be applied toward various designated highway and public transit improvement projects and programs. Opponents contend that most of the revenue will not be used for the benefit of those who use the bridges and pay the toll but rather for the benefit of those who use other means of transportation; they argue the toll increase is a tax for which the California Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote, and therefore is invalid.The court of appeal affirmed judgment on the pleadings, upholding the fee increase. The Legislature, not the Bay Area Toll Authority, imposed the toll increase in Senate Bill 595, which required imposition of a toll increase of up to $3, subject to approval by the voters, and specified in great detail the uses to which the resulting revenue would be put. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. Bay Area Toll Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, contending that the trial court misinterpreted the conditions placed on the approved vesting tentative map for a small subdivision he is attempting to develop. The trial court interpreted the conditions to require a fire suppression system, with functional fire hydrants to be in place, before the county would approve the final subdivision map.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff's claims of misinterpretation are not barred by the 90-day period set forth in Government Code section 66499.37. The court held that a claim of misinterpretation is distinct from a claim challenging the validity of the condition of approval and the two types of claims accrue at different times. View "Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

On March 13, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in California, the Superior Court of Contra Costa County announced it would be closed to the public between March 16 and April 1 and ceased conducting most, but not all, proceedings. Bullock, charged with human trafficking and pimping, contends his custodial preliminary hearing should have occurred during the March closure period under Penal Code section 859b, which establishes a 10-court-day timeframe for a preliminary hearing.The court of appeal dismissed Bullock’s petition for a writ of mandate. Good cause to delay the hearing was not established: the Superior Court’s finding that “the unprecedented [COVID-19] pandemic conditions that California was facing directly impacted the court[] operations” is insufficient. In the absence of a particularized showing of a nexus between the pandemic and the Superior Court’s purported inability to conduct Bullock’s preliminary hearing in a timely fashion, the Superior Court abused its discretion in finding no violation of section 859b. However, Bullock recently pled no contest to one of the charges against him pursuant to a negotiated disposition. View "Bullock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Company (Stanford Vina) sued the California Water Resources Control Board (the Board), among other defendants, challenging the Board’s issuance of certain temporary emergency regulations in 2014 and 2015, during the height of one of the most severe droughts in California’s history. The challenged regulations established minimum flow requirements on three tributaries of the Sacramento River, including Deer Creek in Tehama County, in order to protect two threatened species of anadromous fish, Chinook salmon and steelhead trout, during their respective migratory cycles. Furthermore, Stanford Vina challenged the Board’s implementation of those regulations by issuing temporary curtailment orders limiting the company’s diversion of water from Deer Creek for certain periods of time during those years in order to maintain the required minimum flow of water. Judgment was entered in favor of the Board and other defendants. Stanford Vina appealed. Finding the Board possessed broad authority to regulate the unreasonable use of water in California by various means, including the adoption of regulations establishing minimum flow requirements protecting the migration of threatened fish species during drought conditions and declaring diversions of water unreasonable where such diversions would threaten to cause the flow of water in the creeks in question to drop below required levels, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Board’s adoption of the challenged regulations was not arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support, nor did the Board fail to follow required procedures, and the Court declined to override the Board’s determination as to reasonableness set forth in the regulations. View "Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Co. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

Objector, a conservatee subject to conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, contested the petition to reappoint a public guardian as his conservator. On appeal, objector contends the trial court violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), and denied him due process by failing to commence the jury trial within 10 days of his demand for trial.The Court of Appeal was deeply troubled by the significant delay of over four months in holding a trial on objector's petition, especially given the lack of any justification by the court for most of the delay. The court emphasized the statutory obligation of trial courts to hold a jury trial within 10 days, with only a limited exception for a 15-day continuance if requested by the proposed conservatee. However, the court held that the trial court's failure to commence trial within 10 days of the jury trial demand did not support dismissal of the petition. Rather, the time limit in section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), is directory, not mandatory, because the Legislature has not expressly provided for dismissal of the conservatorship petition if a trial is not held within 10 days. Furthermore, objector was not prejudiced and denied due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservatorship of Jose B." on Justia Law

Officer Walker, responding to a reported hit and run collision, found the vehicle. Delgado was standing by the driver’s door and acknowledged that she had been driving during the collision, that she had had “ ‘two, maybe three’ ” beers during the evening, and that she was still feeling the alcohol's effects. Delgado showed signs of intoxication. Walker administered two breath tests. Both showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 percent, nearly twice the legal limit. Walker certified that he was “qualified to operate this equipment and that the test was administered pursuant to the requirements" of the California Code of Regulations. Walker signed a checklist for carrying out the test on the machine. At a continued DMV hearing, Walker did not appear. In response to Delgado's subpoena, the Contra Costa County Laboratory replied that it found no training record for Walker. The hearing officer ordered Delgado’s license suspended for four months. The DMV submitted evidence that Walker had been trained in another county but the trial court ruled in favor of Delgado. The court of appeal reversed. DMV met its initial burden by submitting the pertinent reports. There was no affirmative evidence that the test was not conducted or reported properly, so the burden did not shift to the DMV to show whether official standards were observed. View "Delgado v. California Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has withdrawn money from Daniel Lak’s (Father) Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) to pay for child/spousal support arrears since 2015. Father disputed the Department's authority to withdraw money, and at a hearing, sought reimbursement for overpayments and maintained the Department violated Family Code section 5246 (d)(3) by collecting more than five percent from his SSDI. The court denied Father’s requests and determined the Department could continue withdrawing money from SSDI for support arrears. On appeal, Father maintaned the court misinterpreted the law and failed to properly consider his motion for sanctions. Finding his contentions lack merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order the Department did not overdraw money for arrears, Father failed to demonstrate he qualified for section 5246(d)(3)’s five percent rule, and sanctions were not warranted. View "Lak v. Lak" on Justia Law

San Diego County (County) challenged a judgment, writ of mandate, and injunction directing it to set aside its approvals of a Climate Action Plan (2018 CAP or CAP), Guidelines for Determining Significance of Climate Change, and supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The primary issue was whether a greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation measure in the SEIR, called M-GHG-1, was California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)-compliant. The superior court ordered the County to vacate its approvals of the CAP, Guidelines for Determining Significance, and the certification of the SEIR. The court also enjoined the County from relying on M-GHG-1 during review of greenhouse gas emissions impacts of development proposals on unincorporated County land. The Court of Appeal limited its holding to the facts of this case, particularly M-GHG-1. "Our decision is not intended to be, and should not be construed as blanket prohibition on using carbon offsets—even those originating outside of California—to mitigate GHG emissions under CEQA." The Court held: (1) M-GHG-1 violated CEQA because it contained unenforceable performance standards and improperly defers and delegates mitigation; (2) the CAP was not inconsistent with the County's General Plan; however (3) the County abused its discretion in approving the CAP because the CAP's projected additional greenhouse gas emissions from projects requiring a general plan amendment was not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the SEIR violated CEQA because its discussion of cumulative impacts ignores foreseeable impacts from probable future projects, (b) finding of consistency with the Regional Transportation Plan was not supported by substantial evidence, and (c) analysis of alternatives ignored a smart-growth alternative. The judgment requiring the County to set aside and vacate its approval of the CAP was affirmed because the CAP's greenhouse gas emission projections assumed effective implementation of M-GHG-1, and M-GHG-1 was itself unlawful under CEQA. Except to the extent that (1) the CAP is impacted by its reliance on M-GHG-1; and (2) the CAP's inventory of greenhouse gases was inconsistent with the SEIR, the Court found the CAP was CEQA-compliant. View "Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law