Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

M.J. (Mother) appeals the order entered following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her minor child, D.S. D.S. was living with his paternal aunt (Aunt), later determined to be his presumed mother. The Agency alleged D.S.'s father was deceased, Mother had previously caused the death of another minor, and Aunt was no longer able to care for D.S. As discussed in the detention report, Mother's parental rights were terminated after she was charged and convicted of killing D.S.'s brother. D.S. had been placed in the care of his father, who subsequently died suddenly in March 2018. Aunt assumed care for D.S., but reported to the Agency that she could not currently care for D.S. due to her own health issues. In a report prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency detailed its inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to the proceedings. The Agency stated: (1) Mother denied having any Indian heritage; (2) D.S.'s great-grandmother stated that her great-grandmother (D.S.'s great-great-great-great-grandmother) was "affiliated with the Sioux and Blackfeet tribes;" (3) Aunt denied that she or [her grandmother] have ever lived on an Indian reservation, have a tribal enrollment number or identification card indicating membership/citizenship in an Indian tribe; and (4) Aunt denied she has any reason to believe D.S. was an Indian child. Mother contended the court erred by not complying with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the juvenile court's finding that the Agency completed its further inquiry was supported by the evidence. Similarly, there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's conclusion that "there is no reason to believe or know that [ICWA] applies." View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

In 2017, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) released a final environmental impact report (FEIR) for the construction of two freeway interchange ramps connecting Interstate 5 and State Route 56 (SR 56) (the Project). However, before the public comment period for the FEIR commenced and without issuing a notice of determination (NOD), Caltrans approved the Project a few days later and then filed a notice of exemption (NOE) two weeks later. The NOE stated that the Project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Streets and Highways Code section 103,1 which was enacted January 1, 2012. Citizens for a Responsible Caltrans Decision (CRCD) did not become aware of the NOE filing until after the 35-day statute of limitations period for challenging the NOE had run. CRCD filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief alleging, inter alia, that Caltrans erroneously claimed the Project was exempt from CEQA under section 103 and that Caltrans is equitably estopped from relying on the 35-day statute of limitations for challenging notices of exemption. Caltrans demurred to the petition on the grounds that the causes of action were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the Project was exempt from CEQA under section 103. CRCD opposed the demurrer. On appeal, CRCD contended the trial court erred by sustaining Caltrans's demurrer to the petition because: (1) section 103 did not exempt Caltrans from complying with CEQA in its approval of the Project; and (2) the petition alleged facts showing equitable estoppel applies to preclude Caltrans from raising the 35-day statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal agreed that the court erred by sustaining Caltrans's demurrer and therefore reversed the judgment of dismissal. View "Citizens for Responsible Caltrans Decision. v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

This proceeding concerned three children, ages seven, four, and two. Their parents had an extensive history of drug abuse, treatments, and relapses. After one such relapse in 2018, after a hypodermic needle was found under a sofa cushion in the family home, Orange County Social Services Agency ("SSA") petitioned to take the children into protective custody.Both mother and father consistently drug tested over the protracted course of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, which did not finish up until late July 2019, ten months after the children were removed. Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(13), allowed a court to bypass reunification services to parents if they had “a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and [have] resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition . . . .” This appeal concerned the meaning of the word “resist.” The parents in this case indisputably had the sort of history that satisfied the first condition of subdivision (b)(13). They contended, however, and the court found, that they had not resisted a court-ordered treatment program: they simply relapsed. SSA and the children appealed, contending that the parents’ extensive history of relapses irrefutably demonstrated so-called passive resistance. The Court of Appeal found it was "compelled" to break with the line of cases that interpreted subdivision (b)(13) as encompassing passive resistance, where passive resistance simply means relapse. "The bypass provision was intended for parents who refuse to participate meaningfully in a court-ordered drug treatment program, not parents who slip up on their road to recovery." The Court determined the parents her did not "resist" treatment; thus the trial court correctly offered them reunification services. View "In re B.E." on Justia Law

Mother, M.G., and Father, A.G., both petitioned for an extraordinary writ in the dependency cases of their children, A.G. and C.G. They challenged the juvenile court’s order after a contested review hearing. The court terminated family reunification services for Mother and Father and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing for March 19, 2020. Mother and Father assert the court erred by setting the .26 hearing because there was an insufficient evidentiary showing the children would be at risk in their care. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parents that Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to present sufficient evidence the children would be at risk if returned to their parents. View "M.G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Government Code section 53069.4 authorizes local governments to assess administrative fines or penalties for ordinance violations. Judicial review of a final administrative decision may be obtained either by petition for writ of mandate or by a limited de novo appeal to the superior court. Humboldt County brought an enforcement action against Quezada for conditions on his property which were deemed public nuisances in violation of county ordinance. Quezada sought review of the adverse agency determination through a de novo appeal to the superior court, which reduced his penalty from $88,800 to $59,200. Although the amount in controversy exceeded the $25,000 threshold for a limited civil case, the County appealed to the appellate division of the superior court based on section 53069.4(b)(1), which provides that “a proceeding under this subdivision is a limited civil case.” The appellate division dismissed, concluding that no right to appeal exists in a code enforcement proceeding beyond section 53069.4(b) and that a superior court order after a de novo appeal under section 53069.4 is final and nonreviewable.The court of appeal directed that the appellate division vacate its order. In an unlimited civil action such as this, a final judgment from a de novo appeal to the superior court under section 53069.4 is reviewable on appeal to an intermediate appellate court, Code Civil Procedure 904.1(a)(1). View "County of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Humboldt County" on Justia Law

The Attorney General sought an accounting relating to the Trust, alleging that Shine, a trustee, failed to fulfill his duties and failed to create a charitable organization, the “Livewire Lindskog Foundation.” The court removed without prejudice Shine and the other trustees. The other trustees were later dismissed from the case. During his trial, Shine agreed to permanently step down. Addressing whether Shine should be disgorged of fees he was paid as trustee, the court found “that Shine violated most, if not all of his fiduciary responsibilities and duties.” The court nonetheless entered judgment in favor of Shine on many of the examples of his alleged breaches because the Attorney General either failed to prove that Shine was grossly negligent or failed to prove specific damages. Based on instances in which the Attorney General met its burden of proof, the court ordered Shine to reimburse the Trust for $1,421,598. The Attorney General sought (Government Code section 12598) reasonable attorney fees and costs of $1,929,757.50. The court of appeal affirmed an award of $1,654,083.65, finding that Shine is precluded from seeking indemnification from the Trust. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce the award based on the difference between the Attorney General’s goals and its results. View "Becerra v. Shine" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was how long a board of supervisors must wait before reenacting the essential feature of the protested ordinance. The Court of Appeal interpreted Elections Code section 9145 to mean a board of supervisors may reenact the essential feature of the repealed ordinance after there has been a material change in circumstances. The court held that a change in circumstances is material if an objectively reasonable person would consider the new circumstances significant or important in making a decision about the subject matter of the ordinance.Applying this statutory interpretation in this case, the court held that the Board did not violate section 9145 when it enacted the May 2016 moratorium on new marijuana dispensaries or subsequently banned dispensaries, and thus the ordinance banning dispensaries is enforceable. Accordingly, the court reversed the permanent injunction portion of the judgment. View "County of Kern v. Alta Sierra Holistic etc." on Justia Law

DSH appealed from orders imposing sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, in the amount of $1,500 per each "incompetent to stand trial" (IST) defendant that DSH failed to admit within 60 days of the commitment order.The Court of Appeal affirmed the orders, holding that the trial court was permitted to sanction DHS, because DHS was a "person" subject to section 177.5 and the ability to sanction DSH here is consistent with section 177.5's purpose to compensate public agencies for the cost of unnecessary hearings. In this case, the trial court was entitled to punish the repeated violation of orders designed to ensure compliance with IST defendants' constitutional and statutory rights. Furthermore, the sanctions had a compensatory purpose. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the underlying commitment orders, or in finding DSH did not have good cause or substantial justification for its violations of those orders. View "People v. Kareem A." on Justia Law

This proceeding stemmed from a minor’s collapse during football try-outs at Lincoln High School in Stockton in 2017. Respondent Shynelle Jones presented a timely claim on behalf of her son, Jayden, to the Lincoln Unified School District under the Government Claims Act. About four months later, Jones submitted an application to the school district for leave to present a late claim on her own behalf based on her allegedly newfound realization of the severity of her son’s injuries, their impact on her own life, and her right to file her own claim. She declared that up until that point she had been able to attend to her own interests. After the application was denied, Jones filed a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement in the superior court based on the same facts. At the hearing on her petition, her counsel, Kenneth Meleyco, presented a new explanation for the delay in submitting Jones’s claim: the day after Jones presented a claim on her son’s behalf, she retained Meleyco on her own behalf, and an error in the handling of Meleyco’s dictated memo within his office prevented the earlier preparation of Jones’s claim. The superior court granted Jones’s petition, despite noting “legitimate concerns regarding [her] credibility” because it “determined based on the directives provided in case law, to provide relief from technical rules, that [Jones] has met her burden of proof to demonstrate that her neglect was excusable.” The Court of Appeal found this ruling was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. "[T]he general policy favoring trial on the merits cannot justify the approval of a petition that is not credible and that does not demonstrate a right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." The Court issued a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its order and enter a new order denying Jones relief from the claim presentation requirement. View "Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendants County of Sacramento and the County Board of Supervisors (the County) approved Cordova Hills, a large master planned community comprised of residential and commercial uses and including a university (the Project). Plaintiffs Environmental Council of Sacramento and the Sierra Club (Environmental Council) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Project, which the trial court denied. Environmental Council appealed, contending the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) contained a legally inadequate project description, an inadequate environmental impact analysis, failed to analyze impacts to land use, and the County failed to adopt feasible mitigation measures. Central to the Environmental Council’s appeal was the contention that the university was not likely to be built, and since the EIR assumed the buildout of a university, it was deficient in failing to analyze the Project without a university. We shall affirm the judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment, that the County, in drafting the EIR, was required to assume all phases of the Project, including the university, would be built. The Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Environmental Council of Sacramento v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law