Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant the City of Sacramento (City) approved and adopted a 2035 General Plan in March 2015. At the same time, the City certified the environmental impact report (EIR) for the 2035 General Plan in accordance with the California Environmental Quality Act. Plaintiff Citizens for Positive Growth & Preservation (Citizens) filed a petition for writ of mandate and injunctive relief and a complaint for declaratory relief (petition) against the City and its city council seeking to set aside both administrative actions. The trial court denied the petition, upholding both actions; Citizens appealed, challenging the validity of the 2035 General Plan and the EIR. It contends the Court of Appeal should vacate the trial court’s ruling regarding the 2035 General Plan and order the City to rescind its approval thereof because a sentence in the introductory paragraph violated and conflicted with state planning laws. Citizens also argued the Court should do the same as to the EIR because the City’s analyses pertaining to traffic, greenhouse gas emissions, air quality, cyclist safety, and the “no project” alternative failed to comply with CEQA, and the City was required to recirculate the EIR after releasing substantial supplemental changes shortly before the city council’s public hearing. Finding no merit in Citizens’s arguments, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Citizens for Positive Growth & Preservation v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Real party in interest filed suit against the school district and two individuals for, inter alia, retaliation in violation of the Reporting by School Employees of Improper Governmental Activities Act. The trial court subsequently denied the school district's motion to strike the punitive damages allegations from the complaint and held that the Act supersedes Government Code section 818.The Court of Appeal held that Government Code section 818 prohibits the imposition of punitive damages against school districts sued under the Act, and the trial court therefore erred in denying the motion to strike the punitive damage allegations as to the school district from the complaint. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to strike the punitive damage allegations as to the school district from the complaint. View "Visalia Unified School District v. Superior Court of Tulare County" on Justia Law

Riley was riding a motorcycle through a green light in Oakland, when he was struck by a car fleeing from Sheriff’s deputies in marked cars. The suspects in the car that struck Riley were suspected of theft and the car had been reported as stolen. Riley traveled on the hood of the car for some distance, until the car crashed. Riley suffered serious bodily injury. Riley filed suit. Defaults were entered against the suspects. The court dismissed the individual officers from the action and later granted the Sheriff summary judgment, concluding the Sheriff is entitled to immunity under Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which provides a public agency immunity from liability for collisions involving vehicles being pursued by peace officers if the agency “adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits.” The court of appeal affirmed. The Oakland Policy does effectively “control and channel the pursuing officer’s discretion” in determining the speed of pursuit. The Sheriff showed that deputies were trained in accordance with the Policy and that the training included adequate consideration of speed limits as required by Penal Code section 13519.8(b). View "Riley v. Alameda County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Sally Loeb sued the County of San Diego (County) for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped on an uneven concrete pathway in a County park. The County filed successive motions for summary judgment based on a "trail immunity" defense, which provided absolute immunity to public entities for injuries sustained on public trails that provide access to, or are used for, recreational activities. The trial court denied these motions, finding disputed facts existed regarding whether the pathway was used for recreational purposes. But when Loeb conceded during argument over the proposed special verdict forms that the pathway was used, at least in part, for recreational purposes, the trial court granted a nonsuit in the County's favor. Loeb contended the trial court erred procedurally and substantively. Finding no reversible error in the grant of a nonsuit, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Loeb v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Stephen Taylor was convicted by jury of numerous sex offenses against his adopted daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. In total, the jury convicted him on 12 counts. The trial court sentenced him to prison for a one-year determinate term and an aggregate indeterminate term of 165 years to life. On appeal, Taylor argued the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and instructing the jurors that they could use that evidence to evaluate the victims’ credibility. He also claimed the court made several sentencing errors: (1) by imposing two indeterminate terms under the former “One Strike” law for two offenses that occurred during a single occasion; (2) by imposing multiple punishments for four counts of aggravated sexual assault and four counts of lewd acts arising from the same facts; and (3) by imposing a restitution fine and court operations and facilities fees without an ability to pay hearing. The Court of Appeal agreed that the court erred by imposing multiple punishments on four counts of aggravated sexual assault (counts 1 through 4) and four counts of forcible lewd acts (counts 5 through 8) that arose from the same conduct. Accordingly, Taylor’s sentence was stayed on counts 5 through 8. The Court also agreed the court should hold an ability to pay hearing, at least as to the court operations and facilities fees. Therefore, the Court reversed the order imposing those fees and remanded for a hearing on Taylor’s ability to pay them. As to the restitution fine, Taylor forfeited his contention. The Court otherwise rejected Taylor’s arguments and affirmed. View "Holden v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Monterey County's Laguna Seca Raceway obtained a license from the Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (FIM) to hold FIM-sanctioned motorcycle racing events. No one at the Sports Car Racing Association of the Monterey Peninsula (SCRAMP), which manages operations, possessed any experience or training on-track safety. Without consulting experts, SCAMP directed the placement of sandbags—provided by the County—around the Raceway for erosion control, in violation of FIM Standards. Kim attended a Raceway event. It was foreseeable that participants would lose control of their motorcycles and enter the safety zone, but they were not warned about unmarked sandbags placed around the racecourse. Kim “ran wide” into the safety zone, collided with sandbags, was ejected from his motorcycle, and suffered serious injuries.The court of appeal reversed summary judgment in favor of the County and SCRAMP on claims of dangerous conditions of public property and gross negligence. Kim adequately alleged that the presence of sandbags on or near a track is not an inherent risk of amateur motorcycle track racing. A reasonable factfinder could determine that the use of sandbags was a severe departure from the “first-class manner” that SCRAMP was contractually obligated to operate the Raceway; that because local conditions made erosion inevitable and in light of $5.25 million revenue contractually-designated for “capital improvements,” it was grossly negligent for SCRAMP to divert this money to operations; and that defendants were grossly negligent for relying entirely on the assessments of a SCRAMP executive with virtually no track safety training. View "Kim v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

In 2002 or 2003, Sonoma County authorized increased pension benefits for County employees, pursuant to a settlement of employee lawsuits alleging past miscalculation of retirement benefits. In doing so, the County failed to comply with state laws requiring local legislative bodies to obtain an actuarial statement of the future annual costs of proposed pension increases and to make the future annual costs public at a public meeting, before authorizing the pension increases, Gov. Code 7507, 23026, 31515.5, 31516. In 2017, Plaintiff, a county resident and taxpayer filed a mandamus petition, alleging those violations and seeking to enjoin payment of the increased pension benefits. The trial court dismissed, finding the claim barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeal affirmed., holding that the continuous accrual doctrine does not trigger a new limitations period every time retirement benefits are paid pursuant to the increased pension benefits approved in 2002 and 2003. Neither delayed discovery nor estoppel applies to toll the statute of limitations. View "Luke v. Sonoma County" on Justia Law

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (Physicians Committee) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to prohibit local educational agencies Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Poway Unified School District (PUSD) from serving processed meats in their schools, and directing them to modify wellness policies to reflect the goal of reducing or eliminating processed meats. The local educational agencies demurred, arguing they were under no statutory obligation to reduce or eliminate processed meat from schools. The trial court granted the demurrers. Physicians Committee appealed, contending the local educational agencies' failure to reduce or eliminate processed meat from schools abused their discretion in developing statutorily-mandated, local wellness policies. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "Physicians Com. for Responsible etc. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Sturgell was a commercial fisher for 48 years. He held Dungeness crab permits in Washington, Oregon, and California. During the 2012–2013 season, Sturgell landed 203,045 pounds of crab in California. Sturgell’s taking of crab in California before the delayed opening of the Oregon crab fishery meant he was required to wait until January 30, 2013, before taking, possessing, or landing that crab in Oregon. He could take crab in Washington on January 24. On January 29, Sturgell arrived in Astoria, Oregon to offload the crabs he had taken in Washington. He began to offload crabs at 6:15 p.m and offloaded 38,295 pounds; the balance of the 64,694 total offload was completed by 4:00 a.m. on January 30. A “Receiving Ticket,” indicating the “date of landing” as January 29, 2013, was signed by Sturgell and the buyer. The buyer later stated that this was “in error” as the ticket was actually written, “between 4[:00] a.m. and 5[:00] a.m. on January 30, 2013, after the offload was completed.” Pursuant to Fish and Game Code section 8043, a landing receipt “shall be completed at the time of the receipt, purchase, or transfer of fish.” Sturgell’s permit was revoked. The trial court ordered the permit reinstated. The court of appeal dismissed the agency’s appeal as moot, with instructions that the trial court vacate its decision. Sturgill had retired and sold his permit for over $500,000. The Department approved the transfer. View "Sturgell v. Department of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Albion Little River Fire Protection District, organized under Health and Safety Code 13800, lies within a state responsibility area. MRC, a commercial timberland operator, owns 8,269.54 acres of commercial timberland within the District’s geographical boundaries. In 2014, the District adopted an ordinance that levied a special parcel tax, at the rate of $75 per unit, for fire protection, suppression, prevention, and related services. In a special election, 82 percent of District voters approved that ordinance. MRC has paid all taxes owed under the ordinance, under protest, and filed unsuccessful claims with Mendocino County seeking refunds. MRC filed complaints, citing Revenue and Taxation Code sections 5096 and 5097, alleging that the MRC parcels “were not included in the District because they were commercial forest lands and timbered lands declared to be in a state responsibility area within the meaning of [section] 13811.” The trial court agreed and found that MRC was owed $60,870.08, with interest. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the refund claims were barred because they challenged the validity of the ordinance which was validated and immune from review by the time MRC filed its complaint. The action did not challenge the validity of the ordinance, but only its applicability to particular parcels. View "Mendocino Redwood Co., LLC v. County of Mendocino" on Justia Law