Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the California constitution's prohibition against the impairment of contracts precluded the application of the defined benefit formulas and employee contribution provisions of the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act of 2013 to County of San Diego safety employees who were hired after the Act's effective date, but who were covered by preexisting collective bargaining agreements containing conflicting terms. After review, the Court concluded the application of the defined benefit formula provisions did not result in a constitutionally prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court did not reach the constitutional question as to the application of the employee contribution provisions as the Court concluded their application resulted in a statutorily prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the application of the defined benefit formula provisions and remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings as to the application of the employee contribution provisions. View "Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The narrow dispute on appeal in this case centered on the straightforward interpretation of a few statutes. Those statutes authorized plaintiffs City of Emeryville and Successor Agency to the Emeryville Redevelopment Agency (collectively, Emeryville) to "reenter" into three agreements entered into before the dissolution of certain redevelopment agencies. Contrary to the view of defendant California Department of Finance, nothing in the statutory scheme providing for the orderly distribution of redevelopment funds subsequently invalidated these reentered agreements. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment, which in effect compelled the Department to acknowledge the validity of those agreements. View "City of Emeryville v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The School District entered into a construction contract with Amoroso. Pursuant to Public Contract Code 22300, Amoroso elected to have the retention held in an escrow account in the form of securities. The escrow agreement stated that “District shall have the right to draw upon the securities and/or withdraw amounts from the Escrow Account in event of default by Contractor as determined solely by District.” The District gave written notice of material breach on March 30, 2011, based on Amoroso’s failure to complete, timely or at all, any of the three project phases and requested that Amoroso cure by April 4. Amoroso contested the assertions of material breach by letter dated April 1. The District sent notice of termination on April 18 and filed suit. On April 28, the parties entered into an “Exit and Demobilization Agreement,” “in lieu of any final termination or statement of default under the Contract.” The District sent a letter requesting withdrawal of $3.5 million from the escrow account, attaching its attorney’s memorandum as to why withdrawal was permissible. Amoroso unsuccessfully sought an injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Amoroso’s claim that a public project owner must await judicial resolution of the underlying contract dispute before it can withdraw retention funds. View "Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Cobra was a prequalified vendor of information technology goods and services to the city. In 1999-2000, Cobra submitted invoices based on invoices submitted by its subcontractor, Monarch. Monarch had not performed the work, but was a sham corporation run by Armstrong, then-manager of information technology for a city agency. The city paid the invoices. After uncovering another scheme involving Armstrong and a different vendor, the city received complaints that Cobra had not paid subcontractors for work for which the city had paid Cobra. Cobra did not submit to an audit request. The City Attorney had represented Cobra on matters including city contracts while in private practice. Although he had personally been screened from matters related to Cobra, the court ordered the city to retain independent counsel, but stayed proceedings pending appeal. The California Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification. A jury returned verdicts against Cobra and rejected all counterclaims. The court of appeal held that Cobra waived appeal of its motion to preclude the city from using evidence procured with the participation of the City Attorney; reversed as to intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the false claims acts; and remanded for a new trial limited to those claims. View "City & Cnty, of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion."View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

A contractor entered into a public works contract to modernize a building at a Santa Clara County community college. Will was the subcontractor for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work. The subcontract provided that the project was to be built according to the specifications of the prime contract. The subcontract and general contract did not specify whether Will was required to fabricate any material necessary to complete the HVAC work. The subcontract required Will to “pay not less than the [applicable prevailing wage] to all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by him at the project site.” California’s prevailing wage law generally requires that workers employed on public works be paid the local prevailing wage for work of a similar character. (Lab. Code,1771.) Since 1991, Will has fabricated materials at a permanent, offsite facility it operates in Hayward. An employee of Will complained to the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement alleging he should have been paid prevailing wages for work related to the project, involving the fabrication of sheet metal at the Hayward facility. DLSE issued a civil wage and penalty assessment. The Department of Industrial Relations reversed, in favor of Will. The trial court reversed. The court of appeal held that offsite fabrication is not covered by the prevailing wage law if it takes place at a permanent, offsite manufacturing facility and the location and existence of that facility is determined wholly without regard to the particular public works project. View "Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l. Ass'n v. Duncan" on Justia Law

OSSC provided nonemergency services to a participant of a health plan covered by CalPERS and CalPERS paid OSSC a small portion of the amount charged for services. OSSC claims that it is entitled to receive its higher customary and usual rate. The trial court sustained CalPERS's demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that an oral promise cannot be enforced against a government agency like CalPERS. Accordingly, the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Orthopedic Specialists v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

The Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) hired general contractor S.J. and Burkhardt, Inc. (SJB) for a public works construction project in 2006. Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) executed performance and payment bonds for the project. Plaintiff Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB) was a subcontractor for the project, completing its work by September 2006, but it did not receive payment. In March 2008, SJB sent a voluntary default letter to Safeco. In July 2008, GSB sued SJB, EMWD, and Safeco for the unpaid amounts under the contract, separately seeking payment from Safeco under its payment bond. EMWD filed a cross-complaint to interplead retained sums. Safeco made a motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for payment under the bond on the ground that GSB’s claim was untimely. The trial court granted the motion, finding that there had been three cessations of labor that triggered GSB’s duty to file a stop notice in order to secure payment under Safeco's payment bond. At a subsequent court trial on the contract claims, GSB was awarded judgment against SJB, and Safeco was awarded judgment on the interpleader action. GSB appealed the summary judgment ruling, arguing: (1) the trial court erroneously overruled its objections to evidentiary matters presented in support of Safeco’s summary judgment; and (2) the court erred in finding the action was untimely. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden State v. Eastern Municipal Water Dist." on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 1021, AFL-CIO (SEIU) alleged that the Sonoma County Community Development Commission lacked legal authority to contract with a private corporation to conduct housing inspection services that had formerly been performed by public employees. The Commission argued that Health and Safety Code sections 34144 and 341452 expressly authorized it to enter into a contract with a private entity for necessary services, such as housing inspection. Section 34145 authorizes it to “hire, employ, or contract for staff, contractors, and consultants.” The trial court dismissed SEIU’s lawsuit. The appeals court affirmed, noting that the Commission’s powers, duties and scope of authority are not delegated but are fixed and circumscribed by statute. The statute does not include the limitations argued by SEIU. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Cnty. of Sonoma" on Justia Law