Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The trial court in this case granted defendant Rideout Memorial Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, finding that, as a matter of law, the emergency room physician who failed to diagnose and treat decedent’s brain hemorrhage was not an agent of the hospital. On appeal, the surviving children argued that, despite the hospital’s boilerplate admissions form and signage stating the emergency room physicians are independent contractors, they presented triable issues of material fact whether their mother entrusted herself to the hospital, whether the hospital selected the physician, whether their mother reasonably believed the doctor was an agent of the hospital, and whether the form and signage could give notice of the employment status of the emergency room physician to a patient suffering acute pain at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. Based on analogous cases in California and around the country, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Hospital based on a review of the facts entered into the trial court record. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Whitlow v. Rideout Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (24 Hour) stating causes of action for premises liability, general negligence, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs Etelvina and Pedro Jimenez appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of 24 Hour. Etelvina sustained a catastrophic injury while using a treadmill at a 24 Hour facility in Sacramento. Etelvina’s expert opined that she fell backwards off of a moving treadmill and sustained severe head injuries when she hit her head on the exposed steel foot of a leg exercise machine that 24 Hour placed approximately three feet ten inches behind the treadmill. 24 Hour filed an answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations and claiming several affirmative defenses, including the defense that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a liability release. Plaintiffs asserted that 24 Hour was grossly negligent in setting up the treadmill in a manner that violated the manufacturer’s safety instructions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 24 Hour’s favor because: (1) the liability release was not enforceable against plaintiffs’ claim of gross negligence; (2) the release was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation; and (3) the release only encompasses reasonably foreseeable risks and Etelvina’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable at the time she signed the release. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff's first two contentions. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Woodhouse worked at a school run by Camp, but was terminated for inappropriate interactions with young girls. The incident was reported to Child Protective Services but no official action was taken. In 2006, Woodhouse was rehired. Camp staff had continuing concerns about Woodhouse’s behavior toward young girls. In 2007, a lifeguard noticed the girl, age nine, sitting on Woodhouse’s lap in the pool. Woodhouse was kissing her on the neck. The girl complained that “something [is] poking me in the butt.” Despite being advised not to hold children on his lap, Woodhouse was seen with the girl on his lap again. Camp determined there was no evidence of inappropriate touching. Woodhouse was terminated for failing to follow rules. Camp never disclosed the incident to parents or the police. Parents learned about the incident in 2013 through a police investigation of allegations that Woodhouse molested other children. Their complaint alleged that parents were not told that the girl was a victim (as opposed to a witness) until 2013. They filed suit. The trial court dismissed two claims, reasoning that while Camp may have had a special relationship sufficient to create a duty to prevent harm to children at Camp, “a duty to prevent harm is not the same as a duty to disclose.” The court of appeal reversed. View "Doe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from judgments entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the evidence is susceptible to only one legitimate inference supporting the conclusion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was aware of his injury and facts that would lead a reasonable person to suspect a wrongful cause for that injury. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the evidence is susceptible to more than one legitimate inference, and that it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the facts known to plaintiff before November 2006 were enough to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that his lung disease was caused by the wrongful act of another. View "Rosas v. BASF Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the widow and children of a deceased firefighter, sought a writ of review after the Board denied reconsideration of the decision of the workers' compensation judge finding that the cancer presumption of Labor Code section 3212.1 did not apply to petitioners' claim. At issue was whether an amendment to the Labor Code, enacted by Senate Bill 1271 on February 19, 2008 and effective on January 1, 2009, which would extend the cancer presumption to firefighters like the deceased, is applicable to the claim for workers’ compensation benefits filed on November 3, 2009. The court held that the amendment of Labor Code section 3212.1 effected a procedural change, and accordingly that the presumption is properly applied in the post-enactment adjudication of this claim. Therefore, the court annuled the decision of the appeals board and remanded the case for further proceedings View "Lozano v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, Debra Hackett was seriously injured in an accident in Sacramento County in which a tractor and trailer owned by Silva Trucking, Inc. and driven by Elaine McDonold jackknifed and collided with the vehicle being driven by Hackett. In 2012, the Hacketts filed a personal injury action in Sacramento County against Silva Trucking and McDonold. The jury awarded the Hacketts $34.9 million in damages. Silva Trucking was insured by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC), who retained the law firm Cholakian & Associates to provide a defense. Silva Trucking had an excess liability insurance policy with Lexington Insurance Company (LIC), who retained the law firm Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP (Lewis Brisbois) as counsel. In 2014, Silva Trucking and McDonold brought suit in Sacramento County against LIC, CCIC, Cholakian & Associates and individual attorneys Kevin Cholakian and Jennifer Kung (collectively Cholakian), and Lewis Brisbois and individual attorney Ralph Zappala (collectively Lewis Brisbois). As to LIC and CCIC, the complaint alleged bad faith and breach of contract. As to the law firms and attorneys, the complaint alleged legal malpractice. The gravamen of the complaint was that the insurers unreasonably refused to accept the policy limit demand when the insured’s liability was clear and damages were known to be in excess of the policy limit. The attorneys failed to advise their insurer clients to accept the demand and the consequences of failing to do so, and failed to advise Silva Trucking and McDonold of their need for personal counsel. LIC and CCIC responded with demurrers. Lewis Brisbois answered with a general denial and asserted 22 affirmative defenses. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), where an action has been filed in the “wrong venue,” a defendant may move to transfer the case to the “proper court for the trial thereof.” In such a case, “if an answer is filed,” the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer and may retain the action in the county where filed to promote the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, in a multi-defendant case, an answer must be filed by all defendants before the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer venue. The Court concluded the answer was yes. In this case, the trial court considered opposition to the motion before all defendants had answered the complaint. Accordingly, the Court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to transfer and to issue a new order granting the motion. View "Cholakian & Assoc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Victoria Cook pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of driving with a suspended license. A jury convicted defendant of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter for the respective deaths of Zaria Williams, Christine Giambra, and Cedric Page.1 The jury additionally found true three allegations attached to the count 1 offense that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Giambra, Page, and Robert Valentine. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of incarceration of nine years, eight months, striking punishment for the enhancements as to Giambra and Page, but imposing a three-year consecutive term for the enhancement as to Valentine. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the court erred in excluding evidence of the victims' propensity for reckless driving as a potential defense of legal necessity; (2) the State committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct in alluding to the pristine driving records of the victims and witnesses; (3) the enhancements should have been reversed because the statute explicitly forbade its application to cases of manslaughter; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for release of juror information. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the true findings on enhancements. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Cook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Asama Pouzbaris appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Prime Healthcare Services-Anaheim LLP d/b/a West Anaheim Medical Center. Plaintiff alleged that while she was a patient at defendant’s hospital, she slipped and fell on a recently mopped floor that lacked any warning signs. Defendant obtained summary judgment on the ground plaintiff’s action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations period imposed by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). The issue this case raised on appeal was whether a hospital’s purported conduct in mopping a floor and failing to provide warning signs constitutes “professional negligence” within the meaning of section 340.5 rather than ordinary negligence subject to the two-year limitations period under section 335.1. The California Supreme Court had granted review of a case involving the similar issue concerning a hospital’s alleged negligence in allowing a patient’s bed rail to collapse. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1386, review granted May 22, 2013, S209836.) The Court of Appeal concluded this case fell within the two-year statute. View "Pouzbaris v. Prime Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Following his last day of work as an employee of San Bernardino County, Frank Flethez underwent surgery for a work-related spinal injury he suffered in 1998. In 2008, he filed an application with the San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association (SBCERA) for work-related disability retirements benefits. SBCERA granted his request for disability benefits, beginning as of 2008, but did not grant him retroactive benefits for the period before the date of his application. Flethez filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking retroactive disability retirement benefits. The trial court issued a judgment granting his petition and awarding him Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a),1 (section 3287(a)) prejudgment interest on the retroactive benefits to which the judgment provided he was entitled. On appeal, SBCERA argued the trial court erred by awarding Flethez section 3287(a) prejudgment interest on his retroactive benefits because SBCERA could not have granted those benefits until he filed an application for disability retirement and submitted evidence showing his entitlement to those benefits in 2008. Based on its interpretation of section 3287(a) and consideration of relevant case law and the facts in this case, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by awarding Flethez prejudgment interest on his retroactive disability benefits before payments of those benefits were due and before his right to recover those payments became vested under section 3287(a). View "Flethez v. San Bernardino Co. Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Lawrence Pasternack appealed an order that granted a special motion to strike his complaint for malicious prosecution against an attorney and his law firm, defendants-respondents Thomas B. McCullough, Jr. and Thomas B. McCullough, Jr., A Professional Corporation (the McCullough defendants). The parties agreed the complaint was based on protected speech and petitioning activity. They differed on whether the underlying action was terminated in favor of Pasternack, and thus whether Pasternack met his burden of stating and substantiating the favorable termination element of his malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that Pasternack did not and could not prove the favorable termination element of his malicious prosecution claim. When Pasternack filed his malicious prosecution complaint, and when the special motion to strike was heard, he was still pursuing a cross-complaint in the underlying action against some of the same defendants he claimed maliciously filed the complaint in the underlying action. Thus, Pasternack's malicious prosecution complaint was premature, as a matter of law. View "Pasternack v. McCullough" on Justia Law