Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Bob has been the pastor of Visalia’s Calvary Chapel Church for 35 years; he wrote a book, “A Common Miracle,” runs a website to teach the Bible, hosts a radio show, and volunteers as a police chaplain. Bob has been married since 1977 and has four children, including Alex, a stepson who Bob raised since Alex was three years old. In 2004-2005, Alex accused Bob of emotionally and physically abusing him and his brothers. Tim joined the Church in 2005 and began an online discussion about Bob. Alex added comments. In 2010, Alex created his own website/blog where he writes about Bob and Calvary Chapel. Tim contributes comments. The two referred to Bob’s drug dealing, drug smuggling, child abuse, stealing money from the church, and spiritual abuse. Denying a motion to dismiss Bob’s defamation suit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, the trial court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest and that Bob was a limited purpose public figure, but that Bob had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court of appeal affirmed, while holding that Bob is not a limited purpose public figure. View "Grenier v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Nealy was hired by Santa Monica in 1996 and became a recycling worker. Nealy injured his knee on the job in 2003. A doctor declared him temporarily totally disabled until 2005, when he was released to “light duty” with the restriction that he could not push large trash bins. Nealy requested a clerical or refuse collection vehicle operator position, but began working as a groundskeeper. Nealy met with the accommodations committee again in 2006 because of difficulty climbing or descending stairs. The city did not have any office work available; Nealy never returned to work after a 2006 emergency room visit. After additional accommodation meetings, in 2010, the city indicated that it was unable to provide reasonable accommodation into an alternative position because Nealy was not minimally qualified for the only available position that was not a promotion. The city filed a disability retirement application but, in 2011, CalPERS canceled the application for failure to submit necessary information. Nealy obtained a right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court entered judgment for the city on disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Meanwhile, an ALJ awarded Nealy $36,260 on his workers’ compensation claim. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the city. View "Nealy v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

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The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

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Daer filed a personal injury suit, alleging material and design defects in a tire manufactured by Yokohama and sold by Costco. Costco settled for $5.5 million and Yokohama for $1.1 million. National, as excess insurer of Costco, sued Yokohama and its insurers (Tokio) to recover the costs of defending plus money paid on behalf of Costco to settle that lawsuit. National, as subrogee of Costco, sought recovery based on an express indemnity provision in the supplier agreement between Costco and Yokohama, and alleged breach of Yokohama’s contractual insurance obligations. It sued Tokio for indemnity and contribution. The court ruled in limine that National’s proof of a tire defect would be limited to the opinions of Daer’s expert in the underlying case. After National made its opening statement in a proceeding to determine whether a tire defect was a cause of Daer’s accident, the court dismissed the express indemnity claim. Having determined that the tire was not defective, the court granted summary adjudication as to claims based on refusal to defend and Yokohama’s breach of insurance obligations. The court awarded Yokohama $863,706.75 in fees as the prevailing party on the indemnity claim. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the court erred in excluding relevant, material expert evidence on a matter properly subject to expert opinion. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Wright was a correctional officer and lived on the San Quentin premises, in a unit he rented from his employer, the state. Living on the grounds was not mandatory and he paid market rate rent. Wright was injured when he fell in the course of his lengthy walk from his home to his actual place of work and received workers’ compensation. He then sued the state, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy, based on the “premises line” rule, which provides that the employment relationship commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether Wright’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. That the State did not intend its workers’ compensation policy would insure Wright for all injuries suffered on San Quentin grounds, even at or near the home where he lived, is evidenced by the terms of Wright’s lease agreement, which required Wright to obtain a “broad policy of comprehensive coverage of public liability insurance, naming the State as the insured.” View "Wright v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

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Velasquez worked at a company that made food flavorings, moving diacetyl, in closed and open containers. He breathed ambient diacetyl particles while mixing liquid and dry flavorings. Material safety data sheets attached to the containers warned that diacetyl was “harmful by inhalation,” but, consistent with industry practices at the time, did not warn of specific risks. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health did not issue exposure limits until years later. During a 2005 incident, Velasquez inhaled fumes from a concentration that included acetaldehyde, but not diacetyl. He experienced trouble breathing and sought medical attention. Velasquez returned to the hospital twice in the next two months. In 2005, Velasquez’s supervisor took him to a clinic where a “company doctor” told him he could not continue working for the company in his condition. In 2006 Velasquez was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans, a rare lung disease which is usually progressive and fatal. He filed suit. After finding the issue relevant to Velasquez’s ability to receive a lung transplant, the judge advised prospective jurors that Velasquez is an undocumented immigrant. The court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict, including findings that the supplier’s acts were not a substantial factor in causing Velasquez’s harm. The court of appeal reversed, based on the error in disclosing Velasquez’s status to jurors. View "Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc." on Justia Law

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AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

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Robert Fazio, Jr. appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Fairbanks Ranch Country Club. Fazio, a professional musician, filed a lawsuit against Fairbanks claiming negligence after he fell from a stage on Fairbanks's property before a performance. Fairbanks argued in its motion for summary judgment, among other things, that as a musician who regularly performed on stage Fazio assumed the risk of falling. On appeal, Fazio argued there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Fairbanks constructed the stage in a way that unreasonably increased the risk of falling. The Supreme Court, after review, agreed summary judgment was improper and reversed the judgment. View "Fazio v. Fairbanks Ranch Country Club" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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In 2006, plaintiffs-appellants Karan and Stan Eriksson's 17-year-old daughter Mia was competing in an equestrian event. Defendant-respondent Kristi Nunnink was Mia's riding coach. At the event, the horse struck a hurdle during the cross-country portion of an event at Galway Downs in Temecula. Mia fell off her horse and the horse fell on Mia, causing her death. The Erikssons sued Nunnink for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The Erikssons alleged that Nunnink substantially increased the risk Mia reasonably assumed by, among other actions, allowing Mia to ride a horse that 'was unfit to ride because of prior falls and lack of practice" and concealing this condition from the Erikssons. In an earlier appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed an order granting summary judgment for Nunnink. The case was thereafter tried to the court. After the presentation of the Erikssons' case-in-chief, the court granted Nunnink's motion for entry of judgment. The court relied, in part, on a release of liability entered into between Nunnink and Mia about six months prior to Mia's death. The Erikssons appealed. The Erikssons argued on appeal of that judgment that the release of liability was ambiguous and did not apply to their claims and that, based on the evidence presented and the applicable law, the court erred in granting Nunnink's motion for entry of judgment. In the published portion of the Court of Appeal's opinion, it held the release was enforceable and could be asserted by Nunnink as a defense to the Erikssons' wrongful death and NIED claims and Nunnink can therefore be liable only if Mia's death was caused by Nunnink's gross negligence. In the unpublished portion, the Court concluded that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Eriksson v. Nunnink" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Vargas and Villalobos were driving a tractor-trailer across the country. Villalobos was driving and Vargas was in the sleeper berth when the tractor-trailer rolled over, injuring Vargas. Vargas sued FMI (the motor carrier and trailer owner), Eves (the tractor owner), and Villalobos for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for FMI and Eves, concluding as a matter of law that neither was vicariously liable for Villalobos’s alleged negligence. The court of appeal reversed. Federal law requires motor carriers using leased vehicles to “have control of and be responsible for” such vehicles (49 U.S.C. 14102) in order to “protect the public from the tortious conduct of the often judgment-proof truck lessor operators.” Defendants did not establish as a matter of undisputed fact that the tractor’s owner is entitled to the protection of the “Graves Amendment,” 49 U.S.C. 30106(a), which shields owners of leased vehicles “engaged in the business or trade of renting or leasing motor vehicles” from vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of their lessee’s drivers. View "Vargas v. FMI, Inc." on Justia Law