Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Harb, driving home from his shift in a neonatal intensive care unit, suffered a stroke and drove onto a sidewalk. The responding officer deduced from Harb’s vomiting, slurred speech and disorientation that he was intoxicated and, after a struggle, placed him in handcuffs. The first ambulance that arrived left without Harb. A second ambulance took Harb to a hospital. He survived, but is unable to care for himself. Harb sued the city, the officer, the ambulance company, and the first paramedic. A jury returned a defense verdict. The court of appeal reversed. An instruction that an officer is not liable if exercising due care was unnecessary because Harb was already required to prove negligence. Use of the phrase “exercising due care” without definition, and without explaining how it related to the reasonable care standard in the negligence instructions, created an ambiguity; it is unlikely the jurors would have understood there was no immunity for an officer who acted negligently. The jury also should not have been instructed on comparative negligence. Harb’s alleged failure to manage his high blood pressure occurred before the accident. Where a plaintiff is seeking damages only for the aggravation of a condition, plaintiff’s preaccident conduct cannot constitute comparative negligence when that conduct merely triggers the occasion for aid. View "Harb v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

Bertoli was struck by a car as she walked inside a crosswalk on state Highway 116, and was rendered permanently physically and mentally disabled. Her attorney, Rouda, erved the Sebastopol Police Department with a request under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) seeking all evidence, including photos, reports, audio logs, handwritten notes, and emails, with respect to the accident, and any surveys, traffic or pedestrian counts, and letters or complaints received with respect to the intersection, for the past 10 years. The city claims never to have received the request, but that, in response to an earlier request, had produced a copy of the collision report, notes of the investigating officer, and a report listing all accidents on Healdsburg Avenue for the past 10 years. Rouda submitted an additional PRA request, seeking 62 different categories of records. The city characterized the request as “overly extensive, overly broad and, in some cases, unlimited in time.” Ultimately, the trial court denied Rouda’s request for a writ of mandate, found the litigation “clearly frivolous” and awarded the city costs and attorneys fees. The court of appeal reversed with respect to fees and costs, reasoning that the city was not justified with respect to requested electronically stored information. View "Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, John Sanderson and George Taylor, sued Douglas Burdick, an Illinois resident, for defamation and other intentional torts, based on an allegedly defamatory posting made by Burdick on his personal Facebook page while he was in Illinois. The respondent court denied Burdick’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Burdick challenged that ruling by petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that posting defamatory statements about a person on a Facebook page, while knowing that person resides in the forum state, is insufficient in itself to create the minimum contacts necessary to support specific personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit arising out of that posting. Instead, it is necessary that the nonresident defendant not only intentionally post the statements on the Facebook page, but that the defendant expressly aim or specifically direct his or her intentional conduct at the forum, rather than at a plaintiff who lives there. View "Burdick v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Li crashed a new BMW during a test drive. Gonsalves, a salesperson for the BMW dealership, was a passenger in the vehicle. Gonsalves sued, alleging that Li drove recklessly during the test drive, causing the accident, and that Gonsalves suffered significant back injuries as a result. A jury found that Li was negligent, that Gonsalves was not comparatively negligent, and awarded Gonsalves more than $1.2 million in damages. The court of appeal remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in admission of certain evidence and that Gonsalves’s counsel committed misconduct in at least two instances, resulting in cumulative prejudice. The discovery statutes do not authorize admission at trial of denials to requests for admissions; the court erred in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine him about his qualified denials and in admitting the written responses. The court also erred in in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine Li on “substantial factor” causation and in admitting evidence of prior speeding tickets. View "Gonsalves v. Li" on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Schultz sought workers’ compensation benefits after suffering injuries in a traffic accident while driving his personal vehicle at Edwards Air Force Base where he worked for JT3. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board denied benefits. The court of appeal annulled the denial. Under the “going and coming rule” workers’ compensation benefits are generally not available for injuries suffered by an employee during a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours, because the injury does not occur during the ordinary course of employment. However, the ordinary course of employment is deemed to commence when an employee enters the employer’s premises (the premises line rule); at that point, the going and coming rule does not bar workers’ compensation liability. In this case, the employee was working on a secure base not generally open to the public, entered the base in his personal vehicle after passing a gate using an employer-issued security pass, and had travelled one mile inside the base when the accident occurred. Although Schultz worked at a fixed location, the employer had multiple locations on the base and he travelled sometimes in his own vehicle, as needed, throughout the base to perform assigned work. View "Schultz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant operates Geoffrey’s restaurant in Malibu. Decedent was operating a motorcycle on Pacific Coast Highway when it collided with a vehicle operated by Turner. Turner was exiting the Geoffrey’s parking lot. The median of the roadway is lined with temporary traffic dividers and the highway has a speed limit of 45-55 mph. Plaintiffs allege that Turner was confused and attempted to make a left turn instead of a right turn. Plaintiffs allege that defendant failed to adequately staff the parking lot; the parking lot had only one attendant on duty. No one was present to assist Turner in exiting the parking lot. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant should have known that its parking lot and driveway were designed and in such condition as to create a danger of decreased visibility and that patrons had difficulty exiting the parking lot, but failed to provide adequate signage. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, finding that plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege additional facts to establish that although defendants could not control conditions on the highway, defendants had a duty to warn patrons leaving the restaurant that only a right turn was safe.View "Annocki v. Peterson Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County after officers fired a tear gas canister into plaintiff's mobile home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the County. In this case, once the officers decided to arrest plaintiff's adult son, they were vested by the Department with discretion to determine the means by which the arrest should be carried out, including the possible use of tear gas as a way to determine whether plaintiff's son was in plaintiff's house. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the County was immune under Government Code section 820.2, which provides immunity for discretionary acts of County employees.View "Conway v. County of Tuolumne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against Union Carbide for personal injuries and loss of consortium stemming from plaintiff's exposure to Union Carbide asbestos and subsequent diagnosis of mesothelioma. On appeal, Union Carbide challenged the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the jury's causation finding that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos supplied by Union Carbide and that Union Carbide's asbestos was a substantial factor in increasing plaintiff's risk of developing mesothelioma; substantial evidence supports the jury's apportionment of comparative fault; substantial evidence supports the amount of compensatory damages after remittitur; and the punitive damage award is not unconstitutionally excessive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Izell v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law