Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Christina Elliott appealed the dismissal of her lawsuit against Geico Indemnity Company (Geico). Elliott’s husband was killed when his motorcycle was struck by a truck driven by a drunk driver, Lesa Shaffer, who was returning to her job at Peterson’s Corner, a restaurant and bar in Nevada City. The trial court concluded Geico was not required to pay underinsured motorist benefits under a motorcycle insurance policy issued to Elliott and her husband because Elliott recovered more than the $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage limits in settlement of a wrongful death action brought against Shaffer and the owners of the restaurant (Shaffer’s insurer paid $15,000 and the owners’ general liability insurer paid $250,000). The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court: the Geico policy at issue here unambiguously allowed Geico to deduct from the underinsured motorist coverage limits “the amount paid to the insured by or for any person or organization that may be held legally liable for the injury.” Because $265,000 was paid to Elliott in settlement of her claims that both Shaffer and the owners may be held legally liable for the injury, Geico properly deducted this amount from the underinsured motorist coverage limits.View "Elliott v. Geico" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Bard, manufacturer and seller of polypropylene mesh kits, for personal injuries, and plaintiff's husband sought damages for loss of consortium. A jury found Bard was negligent and awarded $5.5 million in damages. The jury also found that plaintiff's surgeon, a nonparty, was 40 percent at fault and the trial court reduced the award accordingly. The court concluded that the jury was properly instructed on the theory of negligent design, negligent training, and negligent misrepresentation; substantial evidence supported the negligence verdict; and Bard was not denied a fair trial. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that it was necessary to instruct the jury on medical professional negligence to support the apportionment and, because the jury was not so instructed, the trial court erred in reducing the damages. Plaintiffs acquiesced in the giving of incomplete jury instructions on the surgeon's fault when it was in their best interest for the jury to be properly instructed on that issue. Consequently, plaintiffs are estopped from asserting this instructional error on appeal. The court affirmed the judgment.View "Scott v. C.R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment.View "Graciano v. Mercury General Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Meridian after she was injured in a kickboxing class as a guest at Meridian. The trial court entered summary judgment for Meridian and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that, based upon the nature of the specific activity resulting in plaintiff's injury and the parties' relationship to that activity, the injury falls squarely within the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. Further, there is no evidence of gross negligence in this case. The court held that the release bars plaintiff's negligence action because there is no disputed issue of material fact on the issue of gross negligence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Honeycutt v. Meridian Sports Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against City Brewing after his college-age son was shot to death by police after drinking two 23.5 cans of Four Loko. Plaintiff alleged that City Brewing, the company that brewed, bottled, and labeled Four Loko, was negligent and strictly liable for his son's death. The trial court granted City Brewing's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that City Brewing did not "furnish" the beverage to the son and, therefore, the civil immunity in California's dram shop statutes did not extend to City Brewing; judgment on the pleadings cannot be upheld based on the statutory immunity that bars product liability claims for certain inherently unsafe common consumer products, Civ. Code 1714.45, subd. (a); the allegations about the interactive effect of Four Loko's ingredients preclude the court from finding, as a matter of law, that Four Loko's combination of alcohol and stimulants constitutes a "common consumer product" within the meaning of section 1714.45, subdivision (a)(2); and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Fiorini v. City Brewing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retired public employees of Stanislaus County and beneficiaries of a public pension trust administered by the Stanislaus County Employees Retirement Association sued defendants, providers of actuarial services to the Association, claiming that actuarial negligence caused the pension trust to be dramatically underfunded. The Association has not sued the actuaries for malpractice, which plaintiffs allege constituted a breach of the Association’s fiduciary duties to them as beneficiaries. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of the Association, reasoning that the decision to sue or not is an exercise of discretion. The court reversed as to the actuaries, reasoning that a defendant may be found liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty even though the defendant owes no independent duty to the plaintiff.View "Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants, LLC" on Justia Law

When he was five years old, plaintiff Michael Lawrence fell from a window in his family's second story hotel room at the La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club and suffered serious head and brain injuries. Michael's parents, Nan Lawrence and Jeff Lawrence, filed a first amended complaint against La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. and La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club Partners, L.P. seeking damages sounding in negligence: "Negligence," "Dangerous Condition of Property," and "Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress." Michael, through his mother as guardian ad litem, later filed a separate complaint alleging the same causes of action. After the court consolidated the cases, defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment on the two complaints. The court granted both motions and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs contended on appeal that the court erred in ruling: (1) defendants had no duty and breached no duty to install a fall prevention device on the window from which Michael fell; and (2) the accident was not caused by defendants' failure to install a fall prevention device on the window. The Court of Appeal reversed. On the record presented, the Court concluded defendants failed to carry their burden on summary judgment to establish they owed no duty to take measures to prevent the type of accident that occurred in this case. Based on the facts in record, a trier of fact could have reasonably found that defendants breached their duty to take measures to prevent an accident like Michael's. Because a trier of fact could have reasonably found defendants were negligent in failing to take reasonable measures that would have prevented Michael's accident, it could have also reasonably found that defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident.View "Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. and BRP US Inc. (collectively BRP) appealed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Haley Colombo and Jessica Slagel. Because plaintiffs were not wearing a wetsuit bottom or similar protective clothing, Haley sustained serious and permanent injury to her rectum and Jessica to her vagina when, because of operator negligence, they fell off the back of a three-passenger watercraft manufactured by BRP, model GFI 4-TEC. Once in the water, Haley and Jessica were both injured when the powerful jet thrust from the watercraft ripped their flesh. The jury found the owner of the personal watercraft (PWC), Robert Adamson dba Mission Bay Jet Sports (collectively Adamson), its operator and store employee, Brett Kohl, and BRP each one-third liable. The jury also awarded punitive damages against BRP, finding its conduct manifested a reckless or callous disregard for plaintiffs' rights and safety. On appeal, BRP argued the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the jury's causation and punitive damages findings, made under federal maritime common law. In the alternative, it contended the trial court erred when it refused, under the same law, to reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded each plaintiff to equal their respective compensatory damages awards; admitted evidence that, at the time of plaintiffs' accident, BRP had notice of previous claims of orifice injuries to passengers but excluded evidence proffered by BRP to show the causes of the previous claims allegedly were not substantially similar to plaintiffs' accident; and made a series of other rulings that BRP alleges amounted to a denial of a fair trial. The Court of Appeal rejected each of these contentions and affirmed the judgment.View "Colombo v. BRP US, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found in Bui’s favor on an intentional misrepresentation claim and awarded him $150,000 against Hi-Tech Dental and $50,000 against Hi-Tech’s owner and dental assistant, Nguyen. About three weeks later, before judgment was entered, Bui obtained a permanent injunction requiring Nguyen to identify herself as a dental assistant, not a dentist, in all Hi-Tech advertising, and to refrain from wearing a white dental lab coat. Bui made a post-judgment motion for more than $500,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5, arguing that he acted in the role of a private attorney general in obtaining injunctive relief that was beneficial to a large group of potential dental patients. The court awarded $126,974.13. The court of appeal reversed. Bui failed to establish that private enforcement was necessary to protect the public from false advertising by Nguyen; necessity of private enforcement is one of the required elements under section 1021.5.View "Bui v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a propane tank falling on truck driver, Steven King, while an AmeriGas Propane, L.P. employee, David Jones (Jones), was unloading empty propane tanks from King’s flatbed trailer at an AmeriGas facility. Landstar Ranger, Inc., a motor carrier, hired King and his company, King Transportation, LLC, to transport the load of propane tanks. King and his wife, Grace King, brought a personal injury action against shipper, AmeriGas, and carrier, Landstar, for damages for injuries arising from the tank falling on King. AmeriGas settled with the Kings and cross-complained against Landstar for equitable indemnification and contribution. Following a bench trial on AmeriGas’s cross-complaint, the trial court found Landstar not liable for equitable indemnification. The court concluded AmeriGas did not sustain any recoverable loss or damages and Landstar was not liable for violating any Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs).AmeriGas appealed that judgment, arguing the trial court erred in finding Landstar did not owe a legal duty to King and did not suffer a recoverable loss. Furthermore, AmeriGas argued the trial court erred by considering Landstar's affirmative defenses which the trial court had previously stricken from Landstar’s answer to AmeriGas’s cross-complaint, and erred in not issuing a tentative decision before requesting proposed statements of decision and in failing to rule on material issues raised by AmeriGas’s cross-complaint. AmeriGas further argues the trial court’s alternative findings of nonliability are incomplete, ambiguous, and not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s judgment in favor of Landstar, on AmeriGas’s indemnity cross-complaint. There was ample evidence supporting the court’s findings that King was a highly experienced truck driver, qualified to transport AmeriGas’s propane tanks. Therefore Landstar was not negligent based on violations of FMCSRs requiring carriers to ensure their drivers are adequately trained and/or experienced in securing their loads, and adhere to proper securement methods and procedures. Even if Landstar violated FMCSRs, any such violations did not proximately cause or contribute to King’s injuries because the load of propane tanks was secure and stable during transit and upon arrival at AmeriGas’s Fontana yard. The Court also rejected AmeriGas’s objections relating to the trial court’s statement of decision. Any procedural errors were harmless, and the statement of decision was sufficiently thorough and clear in addressing the material disputed issues in this case.View "Amerigas Inc. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc." on Justia Law