Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gottschall sued 18 defendants for allegedly causing him to develop an “asbestos-related disease” because of the products those defendants produced, and to which he was exposed by his work from 1957 to 1989 in shipyards and similar facilities. Gottschall died. His heirs filed an amended state court complaint against 17 of the defendants, including Crane, and filed a wrongful death and survival action in federal court against six defendants that had not been named in state court. The federal court granted General Dynamics summary judgment; it had been sued because it had supplied the U.S. Navy vessels with asbestos-containing materials. The court held that under California law the Navy was a “sophisticated user” of asbestos-containing material that had knowledge of asbestos hazards at the time of the alleged exposure. Crane moved for summary judgment in state court. Relying on the federal court’s decision, Crane contended that it, too, had supplied asbestos-containing products to the Navy, and that the heirs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue. The superior court granted Crane summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the federal court’s resolution of the issue was wrong under California law, so that collateral estoppel does not apply.View "Gottschall v. Crane Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Bobbie and Helen Izell, filed suit against Union Carbide, alleging claims for personal injuries and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Izell's alleged exposure to asbestos and subsequent diagnosis of mesothelioma. On appeal, Union Carbide challenged the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding that Mr. Izell was exposed to asbestos supplied by Union Carbide and Union Carbide's asbestos was a substantial factor in increasing Mr. Izell's risk of developing mesothelioma. Therefore, the evidence of causation was sufficient. Further, substantial evidence supported the jury's apportionment of comparative fault, and substantial evidence supported the award of compensatory and punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Izell v. Union Carbide" on Justia Law

Defendant and his wife appealed from the trial court's order denying, in part, their anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, special motion to strike claims against them. The claims arose out of the wife's police reports and her filing of two civil harassment petitions under section 527.6 against plaintiff. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's order granting, in part, defendants' special motion to strike. The court held that the trial court erred when it denied the special motion to strike as to the conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action; the conduct underlying those causes of action is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits where her malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the filing of a petition under section 527.6 and the conduct underlying plaintiff's other tort claims is privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). On cross-appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err in granting the special motion to strike as to the abuse of process, libel, and slander causes of action because those claims arose from protected activity, and plaintiff cannot prevail on them as a matter of law as they are barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).View "Kenne v. Stennis" on Justia Law

In "Lobo v. Tamco" (182 Cal.App.4th 297 (2010)) (Lobo I), the Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Tamco, and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. Trial was held solely on the issue of Tamco's vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Luis Del Rosario. The jury found in favor of Tamco. Plaintiffs, the survivors of a deputy sheriff killed in a vehicular collision with Del Rosario's car as he left Tamco's premises, contended that based on the legal principles the Court enunciated in Lobo I, the evidence adduced at trial compeled a finding that Del Rosario was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. They also argued that the trial court erred in refusing a requested jury instruction. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the court properly rejected the requested instruction.View "Lobo v. Tamco" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a plaintiff's claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were based on a health care provider's professional negligence and therefore subject to the one-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Plaintiff-appellant Wayne Larson alleged defendant-respondent Richard Shuman, M.D., served as the anesthesiologist on Larson's kidney stone surgery performed at defendant and respondent UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc.'s hospital. In performing a preoperative checkup and administering the anesthesia, Larson alleged Shuman committed a battery and intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress by grabbing and twisting Larson's arm, prying open his mouth, and lifting, pulling, and pushing on his face and head. The trial court sustained Shuman's and UHS's demurrers without leave to amend on the ground section 340.5's one-year limitation period applied and barred his claims. On appeal, Larson argued the two-year limitations period generally applicable to personal injury claims governs because he alleged intentional tort claims, not claims for professional negligence. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Larson's contention and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "we must look past the labels Larson uses and examine the specific conduct Larson alleged to determine which limitations period applies. Larson bases his lawsuit on Shuman's conduct in providing professional health care by performing a preoperative checkup and administering anesthesia. Larson does not allege any other purpose for the challenged conduct. Because his claims constitute a challenge to how Shuman performed his professional services, Larson's claims are based on professional negligence and barred by section 340.5's one-year limitations period." View "Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs" on Justia Law

Nguyen was born in 1994. She was 16 years old when she filed a complaint, alleging that her mother’s occupational exposure and her in utero exposure to hazardous and toxic chemicals at Western Digital Corporation (WDC) caused her to be born with agenesis of the corpus callosum (a birth defect affecting the structure of the brain) and other birth defects. She alleged that her parents did not know of the connection until 2008, when relatives heard on the radio that attorneys were investigating cases of birth defects caused by chemical exposures in the semiconductor industry. The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations for pre-birth injuries in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4, as opposed to section 340.8, applicable to claims based on exposure to hazardous substances, which includes tolling for minority and mental incapacity. She also claimed equitable estoppel, arguing that WDC knew the chemicals it used caused reproductive harm and concealed the connection to her injuries. The appeals court reversed, holding that the claims were subject to section 340.8; that even though section 340.8 did not take effect until 10 years after Nguyen was born, it applies in this case because the allegations supported a claim of delayed accrual until December 1998; and that Nguyen is also entitled to tolling for minority. View "Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp." on Justia Law

Mercury Casualty Company filed an action seeking declaratory relief regarding its obligation to students Hung Chu and his roommate Tu Pham. Mercury issued an automobile policy to Chu insuring his 1995 Honda Accord. Chu was driving, and Pham was a passenger, when Chu collided with a vehicle driven by Krystal Nguyen Hoang. Pham filed a personal injury action against Chu and Hoang and obtained a $333,300 judgment against Chu. Mercury sought a judicial determination confirming Mercury’s decision Chu’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s judgment under a “resident exclusion.” Mercury also sought an order requiring Chu to reimburse Mercury the fees and costs it incurred in defending him against Pham’s lawsuit. Chu cross-complained against Mercury for breach of contract, bad faith, and general negligence. Mercury prevailed on the issue of whether the policy provided coverage for Pham’s judgment. The court determined Mercury had no duty to indemnify Chu with respect to the judgment. It granted Mercury’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (JOP) on Chu’s cross-complaint but determined Mercury could not seek reimbursement of its attorney fees and costs in defending Chu because such damages were not sought in the JOP. Both parties appealed. Chu and Pham appealed the determination that Mercury’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s personal injury lawsuit against Chu. Mercury appealed the court’s ruling Chu was not required to reimburse Mercury for the defense fees and costs. After its review of the record, the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the policy provision excluding Pham from coverage was an overbroad expansion of the statutorily permitted exclusion and was also contrary to public policy. Based on this ruling, the Court did not address the issue raised in Mercury’s cross-appeal regarding its entitlement to defense costs and fees.View "Mercury Casualty v. Chu" on Justia Law

Defendants DISH Network LLC, AT&T Corporation, and EchoStar Satellite LLC appealed a judgment and two postjudgment orders in favor of plaintiffs Manuel and Deborah Holguin following a jury trial on the Holguins' complaint for breach of contract, negligence, and other torts. DISH, AT&T, and EchoStar argued that the trial court erred by denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial and by granting contractual attorney fees to the Holguins. The Holguins cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in making an award of attorney fees that allegedly did not fully compensate the Holguins' attorneys. The Holguins ordered a bundle consisting of telephone, Internet, and satellite television services. A DISH technician arrived at the Holguins' home to install the satellite dish and related equipment. The installation did not go as planned. The DISH technician drilled through a sewer pipe in the wall, fed a satellite television cable through it, and patched the wall without repairing the pipe. The Holguins did not discover the improper installation until 14 months later. In the intervening time, the damaged pipe leaked sewer water into the surrounding wall cavity and caused mold buildup in the Holguins' home. As a result, the Holguins suffered respiratory problems and other health issues. A DISH representative told the Holguins that DISH would reimburse them if they did not want to live in their house pending repair work, but the Holguins never received reimbursement. The Holguins retained an attorney and an industrial hygienist, who told the Holguins that there was still extensive mold growth even after remediation work. In particular, there was evidence of mold growth in other areas of the Holguins' home, in addition to the area immediately surrounding the damaged pipe. The Holguins asked DISH to complete the remediation and repair, but DISH did not do any additional work. The Holguins eventually hired their own contractor, who performed the remediation and repair at the Holguins' expense. DISH California admitted that the Holguins' satellite television equipment was negligently installed, but it denied that it was responsible for damages beyond the cost of repairing the pipe and certain incidentals. Aside from DISH California's admission of negligence, the defendants denied all of the Holguins' claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendants' posttrial motions, and the trial court's order awarding attorney fees. View "Holguin v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law

This case centered on a July 2008 motor vehicle accident. The vehicle occupied by plaintiffs Leo Pope and Judi Nightingale was hit by a vehicle driven by Debbie Sert (who was no longer a party). Plaintiffs proceeded to trial against Thomas Stanley, who they argued made a negligent lane change and caused Sert to hit plaintiffs’ car, and Matthew Babick, the vehicle’s owner. The jury found defendants not liable. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict; and (2) misconduct of Babick’s attorney, Gregory Kane, was so egregious the court should have granted plaintiffs’ request for a mistrial or motion for a new trial. Kane directly violated a court order by eliciting causation evidence from a California Highway Patrol officer who responded to the scene. Kane was subsequently sanctioned $500 and the jury was given a curative instruction. The Court of Appeal completely rejected plaintiffs' first contention. While it found Kane’s behavior unacceptable from an officer of the court, the Court did not find the single question and answer on this subject was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial or new trial. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Pope v. Babick" on Justia Law

Manuel Lainez had been independently driving commercial vehicles for eight and a half years. He owned his own truck and his own business, Lainez Trucking. He purchased a trucker’s liability policy from Scottsdale Indemnity Company with a $1 million liability limit. Lainez entered into a motor carrier agreement with Western Transportation Services. Western did not own tractors or trailers, but contracted with owner/operators or drivers. The agreement provided that Lainez was an independent contractor and was responsible for all costs and expenses incidental to the performance of transportation services. He agreed to maintain liability insurance and to name Western Transport as an additional insured. Western Transport, through the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP), purchased a commercial assigned risk policy from National Continental Insurance Company (NCI), which stated "'Named Insured’s Business: 1 Trucker for Hire-Excess'" and named Lainez as a driver. It did not list, describe, or rate any vehicle. It was rated on an excess cost of hire basis at a premium that was 4 to 10 percent of the cost of a policy rated on a primary cost of hire basis. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the two insurance companies were coprimary insurers or whether NCI was an excess insurer for an underlying fatality involving Lainez. The trial court granted NCI’s motion for a summary judgment, concluding that Scottsdale was the primary insurer pursuant to California Insurance Code section 11580.9, subdivisions (d) and (h). The Court of Appeal agreed that Scottsdale was the primary insurer and NCI was the excess insurer and affirmed the judgment. View "Scottsdale Indemnity v. National Continental Insurance Co." on Justia Law