Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for common law and statutory misappropriation of likeness based on defendants' alleged unauthorized display of the models' images in connection with defendants' cosmetic medical services advertising. After discovering that defendants had been using their images without consent, the models assigned their rights to bring suit for misappropriation of their images to plaintiff. The court reversed the trial court's ruling that a cause of action for misappropriation of likeness is not assignable and the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that a misappropriation of likeness claim, which concerns only the pecuniary benefits to be derived from the commercial exploitation of a person's likeness, is assignable. View "Time Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc." on Justia Law

Kaiser Permanente covered three patients who received care at an emergency room operated by Dameron Hospital Association. The patients were injured due to the negligence of third party tortfeasors who had automobile liability insurance with California Automobile Association Inter-insurance Bureau (AAA) and Allstate Insurance Company. Unlike Kaiser, neither AAA nor Allstate had contracts with Dameron. In the absence of an agreement for negotiated billing rates, Dameron sought to collect from AAA and Allstate its customary billing rates by asserting liens filed under the Hospital Lien Act (HLA). AAA and Allstate ignored Dameron’s HLA liens when paying settlements to the three Kaiser patients. Upon learning of the settlements, Dameron sued AAA and Allstate to recover on its liens. The trial court granted the automobile liability insurers’ motions for summary judgment on grounds the patients’ debts had already been fully satisfied by their health care service plans. Reasoning the HLA liens were extinguished for lack of any underlying debt, the trial court dismissed the case. The trial court further found dismissal was warranted because Dameron failed to timely file some of its HLA liens against AAA. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a heath care service plan’s payment of a previously negotiated rate for emergency room services insulate the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer from having to pay the customary rate for medical care rendered? AAA and Allstate contended they were not responsible for any amount after Kaiser paid in full the bill for the emergency room services provided by Dameron. Dameron contended that it contracted with Kaiser to preserve its rights to recover the customary billing rates from tortfeasors and their automobile liability insurers. Dameron argued the tortfeasors and their liability insurers were responsible for the entire bill for medical services at the customary rate, not just the difference between the reimbursement received from Kaiser and the customary billing rate. Although Dameron claimed it should benefit from the California Supreme Court’s holding that it may avoid extinguishment of its HLA liens upon receiving payments from health insurers, the contract in this case preceded that case by 10 years. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Dameron/Kaiser contract did not preserve the right to recover the customary billing rate for emergency room services from third party tortfeasors: "[I]f Dameron wishes to preserve its right to recover its customary billing rates through an HLA lien, it is free to contract for this right. But Dameron must actually contract for this right. A history of voluntary cooperation with Kaiser does not suffice to avail Dameron of the [Supreme Court's] guidance on reservation of contractual rights under the HLA." Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of AAA and Allstate. As to Dameron’s argument that it filed a timely claim relating to patient Rita H.’s HLA lien, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal based on the statute of limitations. Dameron has not made a sufficient showing of diligence to toll the claim under the discovery rule. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA etc. Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

The Hoffmans purchased the 170 Wolfe property. After close of escrow, the owner of adjoining property, 162 LLC, claimed a landscape easement and prescriptive easement rights of ingress and egress over 170 Wolfe and sued to quiet title. The Hoffmans cross-claimed that 162 LLC had defrauded them by falsely advising that they had no claims or interest with respect to the 170 property, based upon a conversation that allegedly occurred eight months before close of escrow between Hoffman and one of 162 LLC’s members. The Hoffmans had observed vehicles crossing the 170 property to service the 162 property, but neither raised the issue with the then-owner of 170 Wolfe, nor complained to 162 LLC. 162 LLC successfully moved for summary adjudication of the fraud claims. The parties settled their remaining claims. The court of appeal affirmed. The concealment/suppression of facts claim failed because there was no evidence of a duty on the part of 162 LLC to disclose that it claimed rights or of justifiable reliance on the facts as the Hoffmans understood them without such disclosure. The intentional misrepresentation claim failed for lack of evidence that the Hoffmans justifiably relied on 162 LLC’s alleged implicit representation that it did not claim any easement rights. View "Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe, LLC" on Justia Law

LeFiell filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging an order denying its summary judgment motion on a Labor Code section 4558 claim. Section 4558 provides an exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation system for employees injured as a result of the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press. The court concluded that, in this case, the door that was removed from the Fenn 5F swaging machine is not a point of operation guard as a matter of law. While the door acted as a barrier from the power press mechanisms, it was not a point of operation guard within the meaning of section 4558. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "LeFiell Mfg. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Carl McIntyre, Destiny McIntyre (through her guardian ad litem), Theresa McIntyre, and My Jeweler, Inc. appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of The Colonies-Pacific, LLC. Colonies owns the Colonies Crossroads shopping center in Upland. The common areas of the shopping center were under Colonies's exclusive control, but maintenance expenses were chargeable to tenants on a pro rata basis. Initially, Colonies did not budget anything for security services. McIntyre owned a jewelry business called My Jeweler. In January 2006, two stores in Colonies Crossroads were robbed at gunpoint, eight days apart. In May 2006, there was a shoplifting incident at another store, which police reportedly classified as a robbery because it resulted in a physical altercation in which the perpetrator pulled out a knife. After the first two robberies, McIntyre expressed concern several times about the lack of security to Leanne Meissner, an employee of Colonies's property management company. Meissner reported the robberies to her superior, but Colonies decided not to provide security or seek anchor tenants' approval of an expense for security. Rather, Colonies asked the Upland Police Department to "step up the patrol through the center" because it believed "the police are much more capable than the . . . private security force." McIntyre took his then 14-year-old daughter, Destiny, to work with him at the Colonies Crossroads store on summer morning in 2006. Shortly after the store opened, three men entered. Despite offering his cooperation, the men severely pistol whipped McIntyre, and one of them tied up Destiny and held a gun to her head. The men shattered glass display cases and stole jewelry, cash and digital security recording equipment. After this robbery, Colonies hired a security service to provide an unarmed guard to patrol the common areas of the shopping center. The McIntyres sued Colonies for negligence and premises liability, a species of negligence. At the beginning of trial, Colonies brought a motion in limine under section 1151 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The McIntyres argued section 1151 was inapplicable because they did not intend to use the evidence to show Colonies was negligent by breaching its duty of care, but rather to show the lack of a security patrol was the cause of the robbery. The McIntyres contended the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. Alternatively, the McIntyres contended the court abused its discretion by not admitting the evidence as rebuttal to a comment Colonies's attorney made during opening statement. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment. View "McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Loren Collin was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he and his wife Verna Lee Collin sued 22 entities for negligence, strict liability, false representation, intentional tort/failure to warn, alter ego, and loss of consortium, alleging Loren was exposed to asbestos from the defendants' products or activities when he worked in various construction trades. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of four defendants: CalPortland Company, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (J-MM), and Formosa Plastics Corporation USA, named as an alter ego of J-MM. Plaintiff argued those defendants did not show that plaintiff did not possess and could not reasonably obtain evidence of exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which defendants were responsible; but even if the burden shifted to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of exposure. Plaintiff also claimed J-MM and Formosa did not establish that Loren was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the potential risks and dangers of using J-MM’s asbestos cement pipe. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded summary judgment was proper as to CalPortland and Kaiser Gypsum, because they met their initial burdens on summary judgment and the evidence and reasonable inferences would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that Loren was exposed to one of their asbestos-containing products. With respect to J-MM and Formosa, however, summary judgment was not proper: the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Loren was exposed to asbestos from a J-MM product. In addition, J-MM and Formosa did not establish they were entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law based on the sophisticated user defense. View "Collin v. CalPortland Co." on Justia Law

The health care service plan in this case, Kaiser Permanente, covered three patients who received care at an emergency room operated by Dameron Hospital Association. The patients were injured due to the negligence of third party tortfeasors who had automobile liability insurance with California Automobile Association Inter-insurance Bureau (AAA) and Allstate Insurance Company. Unlike Kaiser, neither AAA nor Allstate had contracts with Dameron. In the absence of an agreement for negotiated billing rates, Dameron sought to collect from AAA and Allstate its customary billing rates by asserting liens filed under the Hospital Lien Act (HLA). AAA and Allstate, however, ignored Dameron’s HLA liens when paying settlements to the three Kaiser patients. Upon learning of the settlements, Dameron sued AAA and Allstate to recover on its HLA liens. The trial court granted insurers’ motions for summary judgment on grounds the patients’ debts had already been fully satisfied by their health care service plans. Reasoning the HLA liens were extinguished for lack of any underlying debt, the trial court dismissed the case. The trial court further found dismissal was warranted because Dameron failed to timely file some of its HLA liens against AAA. The question this case presented to the Court of Appeal was whether the health care service plan’s payment of a previously negotiated rate for emergency room services insulated the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer from having to pay the customary rate for medical care rendered. AAA and Allstate argued they were not responsible for any amount after Kaiser paid in full the bill for the emergency room services provided by Dameron. Dameron argued that it contracted with Kaiser to preserve its rights to recover the customary billing rates from tortfeasors and their automobile liability insurers, and that the tortfeasors and their liability insurers were responsible for the entire bill for medical services at the customary rate - not just the difference between the reimbursement received from Kaiser and the customary billing rate. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Dameron/Kaiser contract did not contain the term described by case law as sufficient to preserve the right to recover the customary billing rate for emergency room services from third party tortfeasors. Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of AAA and Allstate. View "Dameron Hosp. Assn. v. AAA Nor. Cal., Nev. & Utah Ins. Exc." on Justia Law