Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Rufini purchased his Sonoma residence with a $600,000 loan. Rufini and his fiancée lived in the home until they separated. In June 2009, CitiMortgage approved Rufini for a loan modification and told him he would receive a permanent modification after making timely trial payments of $2787.93 in July, August and September. Rufini timely made the payments at the modified rate through December. In January, 2010, CitiMortgage informed him that his permanent loan modification agreement would be ready in three days. Three months later, with still no written agreement, he rented out his house to offset expenses In August Rufini learned that Citibank was denying his loan modification, because the home was not owner-occupied. He attempted to make timely mortgage payments at the modified level, but CitiMortgage returned his checks. Rufini received a notice of default in September 2010, followed by a notice of trustee’s sale scheduled for January 2011. He contacted CitiMortgage and obtained its agreement to delay the foreclosure. CitiMortgage assigned Semien to Rufini’s account, but Rufini was unable to contact him on the phone for three and a half weeks. On April 11 Rufini was informed his modification was “in final state of completion.” On May 4, his house was sold at auction. The trial court dismissed Rufini’s complaint alleging “breach of contract—promissory estoppel,” breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair business practices, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court reversed and remanded the claims of negligent representation and under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law. View "Rufini v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

After the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from a tractor-trailer accident, both parties appealed the trial court's orders. The court concluded that defendants' motion for a new trial and motion notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) were premature because they were filed before the case was fully decided. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to those rulings. Further, the trial court's order striking the awards of noneconomic damages is nonappealable and defendants' appeal from the judgment is of no effect and must be dismissed because there is no judgment. The court also concluded that unpaid medical bills are not evidence of the reasonable value of the services provided, and no expert witness declaration is required for a treating physician offering an opinion based on facts acquired in the physician-patient relationship or otherwise acquired independently of the litigation, including, to the extent it is otherwise admissible, an opinion on reasonable value. View "Ochoa v. Dorado" on Justia Law

Mark Ganoe filed suit against multiple corporations, including Metalclad, after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, alleging that the disease was caused by his exposure to asbestos from when he worked at the Goodyear plant. Ganoe died during the pendency of this action and the case was converted to a survival and wrongful death action. The trial court granted summary judgment to Metalclad. The court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that plaintiffs could show causation. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the court reversed and awarded plaintiffs their costs on appeal. View "Ganoe v. Metalclad Insulation Corp." on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

Anthony S., then 15 years old, admitted an assault with a firearm, in which he and a co-defendant seriously wounded Houston, resulting in a hospital bill of more than $400,000. The hospital has not attempted to collect from Houston, having determined that he was indigent and the debt was uncollectable. At a hearing to set restitution, a hospital representative testified that after a debt is written off as uncollectable, the hospital generally makes no further attempt to recover it. Nevertheless, the juvenile court t set restitution at 20 percent of $412,546.89 with a credit of $1,000 for the amount that Anthony had already paid to the victim restitution fund, with Anthony and his parents jointly and severally liable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the restitution order was contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 because there was insufficient evidence of economic loss to Houston. View "In re Anthony S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Carlsen was severely injured from a fall from a cliff above the Sacramento River. Although he could not recall how or why he fell, he sued his two travel companions, defendants Sarah Koivumaki and Zachary Gudelunas, asserting causes of action for assault and battery, negligence, willful misconduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed defendants put him in peril by bringing him to the edge of a cliff when he was highly intoxicated, leading to his fall, and that they aggravated his injuries by waiting several hours to inform the authorities of the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sarah, finding that it could not reasonably be inferred from the evidence submitted that she touched or threatened to touch plaintiff or that she breached a duty of care owed to him. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred because "[m]ultiple material issues of fact [existed] relating to [Sarah]'s role in placing [him] in peril at the bottom of the cliff," and "[Sarah] owed [him] an affirmative duty to summon aid so as to protect [him] in the face of the ongoing imminent harm, danger, and medical emergency" and "as a result of a special relationship." The Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff established triable issues of material fact as to the negligence and willful misconduct causes of action, and that on the facts tendered, a jury could have reasonably inferred Sarah had acted to put an inebriated plaintiff in peril at the edge of a cliff. The Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Sarah but affirmed the summary judgment as to the assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. Zach failed to respond to plaintiff's complaint, and a clerk's default was entered against him. After the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Sarah, plaintiff filed a request for the entry of a default judgment against Zach. The trial court denied plaintiff's request and entered judgment in favor of Zach, finding that plaintiff "failed to prove his case against [Zach]." Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in doing so. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, and reversed the judgment entered in Zach's favor and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether plaintiff could establish damages and, if so, to enter a default judgment for plaintiff and against Zach. View "Carlsen v. Koivumaki" on Justia Law