Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff rejected defendant's offer of $75,000 in a personal injury action, plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant for $70,000. Defendant sought to tax plaintiff’s costs, and obtains her own costs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The trial court concluded that defendant’s settlement offer was invalid under section 998, and denied her the cost-shifting benefits of that statute. Because the release defendant submitted to plaintiff as part of her settlement offer sought to release defendant and others from claims outside the scope of the current personal injury action, it rendered the offer invalid under section 998. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ignacio v. Caracciolo" on Justia Law

Mike Stillwagon, a paramedic supervisor, was driving his employer’s pickup truck to the location of an injured victim to supervise the emergency response when he collided with a vehicle driven by Gerardo Aldana. Aldana subsequently filed a negligence suit against Stillwagon a year and a half later. The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) limits the time to file suit against a health care provider for professional negligence to one year from the date the injury is discoverable, Code Civ. Proc., 340.5. The trial court concluded that Aldana's suit was time-barred under MICRA. After briefing was complete and before the court heard oral argument, the state Supreme Court decided Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, which held that “the special statute of limitations for professional negligence actions against health care providers applies only to actions alleging injury suffered as a result of negligence in rendering the professional services that hospitals and others provide by virtue of being health care professionals: that is, the provision of medical care to patients.” The court found that, while Stillwagon’s status as a paramedic may demonstrate that he was a medical professional, the automobile collision remains a “garden-variety” accident not resulting from the violation of a professional obligation but from a failure to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle. Because the obligation was one that Stillwater owed to the general public by virtue of being a driver and not one that he owed to a patient by virtue of being a paramedic, the court reversed the judgment. View "Aldana v. Stillwagon" on Justia Law

After a series of thefts from residents at a residential community for the elderly called "Cypress Court," police advised Cypress Court's management to install video cameras and place bait money in some of the residents' apartments, in an attempt to catch After doing so, Cypress Court's resident relations director, defendant Tamara Gutierrez, determined that bait money that had been planted in a box in an elderly person's apartment had been removed. That same day, Gutierrez and Cypress Court's executive director, appellant Ricky Lansford, reviewed surveillance video that potentially implicated respondent Maria Delaluz Santos, who worked at Cypress Court as a resident assistant. Lansford and Gutierrez decided to call police. After viewing the video, the police interviewed and searched Santos. Santos denied committing the theft and was not found to be in possession of the bait money. The officer gave Santos a notice to appear on the charge of petty theft and escorted her from the facility. The district attorney subsequently filed a criminal complaint against Santos, but, in December 2012, the charges were dismissed. Santos filed this action in July 2013 against Gutierrez, Lansford, and two entities that either partially owned or managed Cypress Court, appellants Kisco Senior Living, LLC and KRC ESC Corp. (collectively "Kisco"), alleging numerous causes of action, including assault and battery, defamation, malicious prosecution, negligence, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the close of evidence, defendants moved for nonsuit and a directed verdict with respect to all of Santos's claims. The trial court granted the motion for nonsuit with respect to all of the claims asserted against Gutierrez, and all of the claims against the remaining defendants with the exception of the false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The jury returned a verdict against Kisco and Lansford (collectively "appellants") on the false arrest claim and in favor of appellants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Appellants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in which they claimed that they were absolutely immune from Santos's false arrest claim pursuant to an immunity provision. Appellants argued that the undisputed evidence established that Lansford was a mandated reporter under the Act, that Santos's claim was based on Lansford's "action of furthering the investigation [into elder abuse] by signing the citizen's arrest form," and that section 15634 prevents mandated reporters from being held liable for acts that "stem[ ] from [the] duty to report suspected financial abuse of an elder." The trial court denied the motion, stating that the court was "not persuaded . . . that the mandated reporter immunity . . . bar[s] the false arrest claim . . . ." Appellants argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing their immunity claim. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellants and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the JNOV motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Kisco Senior Living" on Justia Law

Defendant, a bar and dance club, challenged a judgment based on the jury’s award of $5.42 million in compensatory damages to plaintiff for failing to use reasonable care to protect her from a sexual assault in a unisex bathroom stall. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, defendant had a duty to ensure safety by undertaking minimally burdensome security measures, like requiring one of its security guards to remain posted in the restroom area as the club emptied out; substantial evidence supports breach of the duty of care; substantial evidence supports causation; admission of testimony regarding the perpetrator's brother's prior sexual misconduct in the workplace was not error; admission of the perpetrator's videotaped interview was not error; and the $5.35 million noneconomic damages award does not shock the conscience. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment on all grounds. View "Janice H. v. 696 North Robertson LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's almost-new Toyota Tundra Pickup sustained structural damage, while parked, as a result of a collision between the vehicles of Hollandsworth and Sebastian. Plaintiff had an insurance policy through AAA covering collision-related damages.Hollandsworth also had an AAA insurance policy, covering property damage that he caused through negligence. AAA refused to consider the pickup a “total loss,” had the vehicle repaired at a reported cost of $8,196.06, and provided a rental car during the interim. As a result of the collision and the repairs, the pickup’s future resale value was decreased by more than $17,100. Plaintiff sued Hollandsworth and Sebastian for negligence and sued AAA for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court dismissed the claims against AAA, finding that plaintiff essentially was seeking reimbursement for the lost market value of his pickup, a loss that specifically was excluded under his insurance policy. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the resale value exclusion violated public policy and was void. The court stated that, in the insurance context, courts are not at liberty to imply a covenant (of good faith) directly at odds with a contract’s express grant of discretionary power, View "Baldwin v. AAA N. Cal." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims stemming from his medical care and treatment at Mercy Hospital when he was a prison inmate at Corcoran State Prison. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the trial court's dismissal entered in favor of Mercy Hospital after the trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint on statute of limitations grounds. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred because it failed to apply the tolling provision set forth at Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1, which grants a two-year tolling of the statute of limitations to persons who are imprisoned “for a term less than for life.” The court concluded that when the Legislature enacted section 352.1 and continued to use the same language from former section 352, stating that tolling would be granted to persons imprisoned “for a term less than for life,” the Legislature did so with knowledge and in light of Grasso v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.'s prior judicial construction thereof, and with an intention to continue that construction of the statutory language. Accordingly, Grasso remains good law. The court concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer on statute of limitations grounds, which error stemmed from the trial court’s failure to apply the tolling provision in section 352.1 to plaintiff. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "Brooks v. Mercy Hospital" on Justia Law

After Siasmorn Gopal was admitted to the emergency room at Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and died after she was transferred to another hospital, Gopal's husband and the trustee of her estate filed suit alleging that defendants violated California law. Plaintiffs alleged that Kaiser Hospitals, SCPMG, and Health Plan treated Gopal differently than they would have treated a member and that the different treatment caused her death. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' enterprise theory of liability. The court concluded that there is nothing inequitable in requiring plaintiffs to look to Kaiser Hospitals and SCPMG - the providers at issue - for compensation for their claims. Thus, plaintiffs are not without recourse or remedy. The court noted that the fact that health care providers, and not health plans, are subject to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code, 3333.2, is not an inequitable result, but a public policy determination made by the Legislature. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gopal v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aleksandr Vasilenko was hit by a car and injured while crossing Marconi Avenue in Sacramento. At the time, he was crossing a busy five-lane road on his way from an overflow parking lot controlled and staffed by defendant Grace Family Church (GFC or the church) to a function at the church. Vasilenko and his wife Larisa (collectively Vasilenko) sued GFC and others for, among other things, negligence and loss of consortium, alleging that GFC acted negligently in locating its overflow parking lot in a place that required invitees like him to cross a busy street where they might be hit by a car and by failing to protect him from that risk. The trial court granted GFC’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that GFC owed no duty to Vasilenko because it did not own, possess, or control the public street where Vasilenko was injured. Vasilenko appealed, contending that the location of his injury was not dispositive, and that GFC failed to satisfy its burden of negating the general duty of ordinary care set forth in Civil Code section 1714.2 The Court of Appeal concluded that the location of the overflow lot, which required GFC’s invitees who parked there to cross a busy thoroughfare in an area that lacked a marked crosswalk or traffic signal in order to reach the church, exposed those invitees to an unreasonable risk of injury offsite, thus giving rise to a duty on the part of GFC. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Vasilenko v. Grace Gamily Church" on Justia Law

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake arcing machines used to grind asbestos brakes. Rondon used Hennessy’s machines while working as a mechanic, 1965-1988. Rondon developed mesothelioma as the result of exposure to asbestos while working as a mechanic and brought claims for strict liability and negligence against Hennessy, alleging that its brake arcing machines released asbestos dust that caused him injury when he used them to grind standard brake linings. Hennessy’s grinders themselves did not contain asbestos. Hennessy alleged that the machines were not designed to be used exclusively with asbestos-containing products and were used on non-asbestos brakes. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, citing the 2015 decision from the Second District Court of Appeal in Sherman v. Hennessy, holding that the proper test is not the “exclusive use” standard argued by Hennessy and relied on by the trial court, but whether the “inevitable use” of Hennessy’s machines would expose a worker like Rondon to asbestos dust absent safety protection or adequate warning. Rondon produced sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the “inevitable use” standard was met. View "Rondon v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney Hassell obtained a judgment holding Bird liable for defamation and requiring her to remove defamatory reviews she posted about Hassell on Yelp.com. The judgment contained an order requiring Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews from its site. Yelp, who was not a party in the defamation action, moved to vacate the judgment. The court of appeal affirmed denial of that motion, but remanded. The court concluded that Yelp is not “aggrieved” by the defamation judgment against Bird, but is “aggrieved” by the removal order; Yelp’s motion to vacate was not cognizable under Code of Civil Procedure section 6632; Yelp has standing to challenge the validity of the removal order as an “aggrieved party,” having brought a nonstatutory motion to vacate; Yelp’s due process rights were not violated by its lack of prior notice and a hearing on the removal order request; the removal order does not violate Yelp’s First Amendment rights to the extent that it requires Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews; to the extent it purports to cover statements other than Bird’s defamatory reviews, the removal order is an overbroad unconstitutional prior restraint on speech; and Yelp’s immunity from suit under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, does not extend to the removal order. View "Hassell v. Bird" on Justia Law