Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tinoco, employed by Express, injured Escobar by negligently operating a vehicle. Escobar received treatment at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, owned and operated by the county, at a cost of $1,249,545.38. Escobar sued Tinoco and Express and recovered a judgment for $5,689.624.87. County asserted a lien against the judgment pursuant to Government Code 23004.1. Escobar’s attorney contended that the county was not entitled to the full amount of its bill but only to some lesser amount under schedules promulgated by the Workers Compensation Appeals Board. Express delivered a $1,249,545.38 check to Escobar’s attorney payable to the county and Carcione’s firm. The county sued Express, for statutory liability; Express and Escobar for money had and received; Escobar for value of services rendered; and Escobar, for imposition of a constructive trust. The trial court dismissed, ruling that the county could no longer pursue its own action against Express, but must seek enforcement of the lien in Monterey courts. The court of appeal reversed. An adjudicated tortfeasor holding disputed funds known to be encumbered by a public hospital lien cannot avoid liability by turning control of the funds over to the injured person in a check payable to both contestants, which satisfies neither the judgment nor the lien. View "Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Escobar" on Justia Law

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

According to plaintiff-appellant Randall Blackwell, as he was at the top of a ladder installing rain gutters at an investment property owned by defendant-respondent Ray Vasilas, Blackwell stepped on scaffolding that another contractor had erected at the job site, and the scaffolding collapsed. The collapse caused Blackwell to fall, and he suffered injuries when he landed on a pile of bricks approximately 10 feet below. Blackwell sued Vasilas for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vasilas. After review of the arguments made on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that as the moving party, Vasilas did not meet his initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Vasilas's motion, and the resulting judgment was reversed. View "Blackwell v. Vasilas" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Adrian was a full-time student at UCSC, living in an off-campus apartment. He commuted to the university on his bicycle, traveling on the Great Meadow Bikeway, a paved bike path that runs through part of the UCSC campus. Constructed in 1973, the purpose of the Bikeway is bicycle transportation to and from the central campus that is separate from automobile traffic. There have been several bicycle accidents on the Bikeway. After Adrian was fatally injured in a bicycle accident on the Bikeway, his family sued, alleging that the Regents of the University of California were liable for Adrian’s death due to the dangerous condition of the Bikeway. The trial court granted the Regents summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred under the recreational trail immunity provided by Government Code section 831.4.2 The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the causes of action for dangerous condition of public property and wrongful death are barred as a matter of law because the Regents have absolute immunity from claims arising from Adrian’s accident. View "Burgueno v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal." on Justia Law

Kirk King sustained a back injury while at work for CompPartners, Inc. In July 2011, King suffered anxiety and depression due to chronic back pain resulting from the back injury. In 2011, King was prescribed a psychotropic medication known as Klonopin. The Klonopin was provided to King through Workers’ Compensation. In July 2013, a Workers’ Compensation utilization review was conducted to determine if the Klonopin was medically necessary. Naresh Sharma, an anesthesiologist, conducted the utilization review. Sharma determined the drug was unnecessary and decertified it. As a result, King was required to immediately cease taking the Klonopin. Typically, a person withdraws from Klonopin gradually by slowly reducing the dosage. Due to the sudden cessation of Klonopin, King suffered four seizures, resulting in additional physical injuries. In September 2013, someone requested King again be permitted to take Klonopin. In October 2013, Mohammed Ashraf Ali, a psychiatrist, conducted a second utilization review. Ali also determined Klonopin was medically unnecessary. Neither Sharma nor Ali examined King in-person, and neither warned King of the dangers of an abrupt withdrawal from Klonopin. King sued CompPartners and Sharma for: (1) professional negligence; (2) negligence; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. King's wife, Sara, sued CompPartners and Sharma for loss of consortium. The Kings sought general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The Kings raised three issues on appeal to the Court of Appeal: (1) their claims were not preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA); (2) defendants owed them a duty of care; and (3) the trial court erred by denying them leave to amend. The Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer but reversed the denial of leave to amend. View "King v. CompPartners" on Justia Law

United Parcel Service (UPS) delivery driver, Plaintiff Stephen Moore, was injured when he lifted a box with a shipping label prepared by defendant William Jessup University that inaccurately stated the weight of the box. Moore argued the trial court erred in granting the University summary judgment because the doctrine of primary assumption of risk did not apply where the University increased the risk of injury to Moore by understating the weight of the box and failing to use highlighted tape to mark the box. The trial court concluded the University owed Moore no legal duty of care and that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred Moore’s action. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court was correct in applying the primary assumption of risk doctrine, therefore making summary judgment in favor of the University appropriate. View "Moore v. William Jessup University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit after their father, Leonard Goddard, drowned in the Tuolumne River downstream from the remnant of what was once known as the Dennett Dam. Plaintiffs claimed that the State and other public entities were liable for Goddard's death under Government Code section 835 because his death was caused by a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court denied DWR’s motion for summary judgment, but granted summary judgment to DFW. Plaintiffs appealed. The court found that DFW did not have jurisdiction over the riverbed, and therefore did not “own” it for purposes of liability under section 835, and DFW did not control the dam remnant, as it did not have the power to repair the breach or remove the remnant. Therefore, the court concluded that DFW was immune from suit under section 831.2 and that it did not own or control the dam remnant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Goddard v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a negligence and strict products liability action against E.F. Brady, alleging that asbestos-containing products it distributed caused Joel Hernandezcueva’s mesothelioma. On appeal, Jovana Hernandezcueva challenged the trial court's rulings on the motions for nonsuit and a new trial. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on the strict products liability claim because the Hernandezcuevas’ evidence sufficed to show that E. F. Brady, while acting as a subcontractor in the construction of a commercial building, was in the stream of commerce relating to the asbestos-containing products, for purposes of the imposition of strict liability. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Seventeen-year-old driver Simone Lionudakis got into a motor vehicle accident, injuring defendants-appellants Aweia and Flora Shimon. Simone was driving a GMC pickup truck owned by and registered to her father Phillip Lionudakis, but he had excluded Simone from his insurance policy to save money, even though Simone was the only one who ever drove the GMC. Phillip’s ex-wife (Simone’s mother) Kristen Doornenbal, had insurance through plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company for her own and her current husband’s vehicles, but not the GMC. The Doornenbals’s Nationwide policy provided coverage for a household family member’s use of a “non-owned” vehicle, but not if the non-owned auto was “furnished or available” for her “regular use.” The trial court entered declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff Nationwide against the Shimons as defendants, finding the GMC was furnished or available for Simone’s regular use and therefore coverage was excluded. The Shimons appealed, arguing the vehicle was not available for Simone’s use at the time and place of the accident, because her parents did not want her driving that far from home and had told her not to drive at all for a week or two as punishment for bad grades. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Shimon" on Justia Law