Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Catalina Island Yacht Club hosted social events for its members and also arranged for its members to dock their boats in Avalon Harbor. Real party in interest Timothy Beatty and petitioners Charles Boppell, V. Kelley York, Lowell Dreyfus, Tom Nix, and Dave Horst were members of the Yacht Club and its board of directors. In 2013, Beatty sued Petitioners, alleging they conspired to remove him from the board and suspend his membership in the Yacht Club. He alleged Petitioners defamed him by telling others that the Yacht Club removed him because he committed various acts that prejudiced “the best interests of the Club.” The complaint alleged claims for libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Beatty served inspection demands on Petitioners seeking written communications and other documents relating to his removal from the Yacht Club’s board of directors and suspension of his membership. In early February 2014, Petitioners served written responses that included boilerplate objections based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Nearly two months later, Petitioners served a privilege log identifying 17 “communications” they withheld from production based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. For each communication, the log simply provided the date of the communication and explained it was between “counsel for Defendants and Defendants.” The ultimate issue the Court of Appeal was asked to decide centered on the privilege log: the trial court found a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine when petitioners submitted a log that failed to provide sufficient information to evaluate the claims of privilege. The trial court ordered petitioners to produce 167 e-mails identified on their privilege log because the log failed to describe the subject matter or content of the e-mails, and therefore failed to show the e-mails were protected by either the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred because it exceeded its authority. "[W]hen a privilege log fails to provide a trial court with sufficient information to rule on the merits of a privilege objection, the only relief the court may grant – other than sanctions – is an order requiring a further privilege log that provides the necessary information." View "Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Developer Defendants seek a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order approving good faith settlements between codefendants Shell and Equilon and plaintiffs, as well as the City. The settlements involved mass tort litigation arising out of an environmental investigation showing that soil beneath a housing tract was contaminated with residual petroleum hydrocarbons. The court concluded that Shell's compliance with the Remedial Action Plan (RAP), which was mandated by the Water Board pursuant to the state’s police powers, was not part of the settlement consideration, and therefore should not be included in the valuation of the good faith settlement. The court concluded that, although the trial court gave some weight to the value of the RAP remediation in approving the good faith settlements, the error was harmless. On the record presented, the $90 million monetary payment, standing alone, was well within the range of Shell’s proportionate liability. The court finally concluded that the determination of good faith settlement did not require an allocation of the $90 million settlement consideration among the 1,491 individual plaintiffs and between their economic and noneconomic damages. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Dole Food Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Mamertos owned residential property located in Escondido, and leased the premises to George Jakubec. At some time during the tenancy, Jakubec created homemade explosives and stored explosive devices and materials on the premises. The Mamertos hired Mario Garcia to maintain the landscaping at the Premises. Garcia or his employees worked on the premises at least once every two weeks throughout the approximately five years leading up to the accident and never noticed anything suspicious or dangerous. On November 18, 2010, Garcia was injured when he walked over unstable explosive material on the backside of the premises and the material exploded under him. Garcia and his wife sued for premises liability alleging the Mamertos were negligent in the maintenance of the premises by allowing explosive materials to be kept on the premises. The Mamertos moved for summary judgment arguing they owed no duty to Mario because they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the explosive materials on the Premises, thus there was no foreseeable risk requiring an inspection. The trial court concluded the landowners owed no duty to Mario. The Garcias argued on appeal that a month-to-month tenancy provided the landlord the right to enter and inspect the property at periodic intervals without actual notice of a need to inspect. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Mamertos. View "Garcia v. Holt" on Justia Law

Damon Lane County Park in El Cajon, owned and controlled by the County of San Diego, is a 29-acre open space park with trails for hiking, walking and equestrian use. The park has information kiosks, but does not have any structures such as restrooms or a parking lot. Benjamin Casteen, then a high school student, used a rope swing tied to a tree at the park. The tree was located above a ravine. The rope broke, causing Casteen to fall into the ravine and onto debris located in the ravine. The debris in the ravine included cut down tree limbs and other brush left by the County's maintenance crews. Casteen suffered injuries to his head and face. Although Casteen did not remember the incident, his custom and practice before using a tree rope swing was to visually check the rope and branch it was hanging from, give the rope a big tug or yank to check for strength and then take a tentative short swing on the rope. The County had no policy requiring maintenance personnel to remove rope swings in the park. Casteen sued the County, asserting three causes of action all sounding in negligence on the part of the County for failing to warn about the rope swing, or to remove it completely. The County defended on immunity grounds, but was denied. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the trial court improperly denied the County summary judgment motion because the undisputed material facts show the public entity was immune from liability under section Government Code section 831.7 for injuries suffered by Casteen while tree rope swinging and none of the exceptions in section 831.7 applied. View "County of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Haunted Hotel operates four Halloween attractions in San Diego County, including The Haunted Trail located in Balboa Park. The Haunted Trail operates from September through October, ending on Halloween. In October 2011 Appellant Scott Griffin purchased a ticket to experience The Haunted Trail, an outdoor haunted house type of attraction where actors jump out of dark spaces often inches away from patrons, holding prop knives, axes, chainsaws, or severed body parts. After passing what he believed was the exit, Griffin unexpectedly was confronted by a final scare known as the "Carrie" effect (so named because patrons are led to believe the attraction is over, only to be met by one more extreme fright). This was delivered by an actor wielding a gas powered chainsaw (no chain) who approached Griffin, frightened him, and gave chase when Griffin ran away. Griffin was injured when he fell while fleeing. Griffin sued The Haunted Hotel, Inc. alleging negligence and assault. The trial court granted Haunted Hotel's motion for summary judgment, determining under the primary assumption of risk doctrine Haunted Hotel did not breach any duty to Griffin. "The risk that a patron will be frightened, run, and fall is inherent in the fundamental nature of a haunted house attraction like The Haunted Trail. Moreover, on this record there is no evidence creating a triable issue Haunted Hotel unreasonably increased the risk of injury beyond those inherent risks or acted recklessly." The Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Haunted Hotel. View "Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to Safety-Kleen 105 Solvent during the course of their employment, filed suit against defendants, including Calsol, a distributor of mineral spirits for the ultimate manufacturer, Safety-Kleen. The trial court granted Calsol's motion for summary judgment based on the raw material or component parts doctrine. The court concluded, however, that the component parts doctrine requires a showing that the mineral spirits supplied to Safety-Kleen was not inherently dangerous. Because Calsol failed to make that showing, the court concluded that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether mineral spirits are inherently dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brady v. Calsol, Inc." on Justia Law

California imposes criminal liability on a person aiding and abetting suicide. Plaintiffs contended Penal Code section 401 was inapplicable to physician aid-in-dying because prescribing a lethal dose of drugs a patient may or may not have filled or take is not direct participation in suicide and, in any event, the legislative history of section 401 showed the Legislature never intended that section 401 apply to a person furnishing the means of suicide. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended section 401 as applied to physician aid-in-dying violated the state constitutional right to autonomy privacy. On October 5, 2015, Governor Jerry Brown signed the End of Life Option Act, which authorized a terminally ill patient with the capacity to make medical decisions to request a prescription for a lethal dose of drugs, insulated a prescribing physician from criminal liability, and set forth rigorous procedures and safeguards to protect against abuse. The parties agreed Assembly Bill 15 did not render the appeal moot because it would likely not become effective in time to benefit plaintiffs, particularly Christy Lynne Donorovich-Odonnell, given her life expectancy. Opponents to the Bill filed paperwork with the Attorney General to challenge it by referendum on the state ballot in 2016. “We have great compassion for plaintiffs, but we conclude their statutory and constitutional arguments lack merit.” The Court of Appeal agreed with defendants that physician aid-in-dying, and attendant procedures and safeguards against abuse, were matters for the Legislature. The Court affirmed the judgment for defendants entered after their demurrers to the complaint were sustained. View "Donorovich-Odonnell v. Harris" on Justia Law

Legislation, effective in 2004 requires that injured workers’ requests for medical treatment be evaluated through a process called utilization review (UR). Under the UR process, a request for treatment cannot be denied by a claims adjustor and must be approved unless a clinician determines that the treatment is medically unnecessary. Workers can challenge decisions denying requested treatment, but employers cannot challenge decisions approving it. The 2004 legislation called for administrative adoption of uniform standards for physicians to use in evaluating treatment. In 2013, additional reforms went into effect, establishing a new procedure, independent medical review (IMR), to resolve workers’ challenges to UR decisions. Stevens challenged the constitutionality of the IMR process, arguing that it violated the state Constitution’s separation of powers clause, its requirements that workers’ compensation decisions be subject to review and the system “accomplish substantial justice,” and principles of due process. The court of appeal rejected those claims, but remanded Stevens’s request for a home health aid. The Legislature has plenary powers over the workers’ compensation system under article XIV, section 4 of the state Constitution. California’s scheme for evaluating workers’ treatment requests is fundamentally fair and affords workers sufficient opportunities to present evidence and be heard. View "Stevens v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd," on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tomas Vebr was employed by a painting contractor which contracted with defendants Gary and Georgia Culp to paint the interior of their home. An hour into working in the Culps’ home, Vebr fell 12 to 15 feet from an extension ladder provided by the painting contractor and was injured. Vebr sued the Culps for negligence and premises liability based on allegations that his fellow painters were negligent. The trial court granted the Culps’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the undisputed facts showed the cause of Vebr’s fall was a mystery. There was no evidence showing what had occurred or that Vebr was free from negligence himself. On this record, there was no reasonable and logical inference anyone else present in the residence at the time of the accident was negligent. “Someone might have been negligent, but we do not and likely never will know whether that was the case. The trial court did not err by concluding that the evidence before the court did not show all three conditions of the res ipsa loquitur presumption were satisfied.” View "Vebr v. Culp" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle collided into plaintiff’s vehicle at a busy intersection. Plaintiff sustained spinal injuries in the accident and filed suit against defendant. Eventually, plaintiff had surgery to repair a herniated lumbar disc. The jury found defendant negligent and awarded plaintiff a total of $429,773.71 in damages, including $261,773.71 in past medical expenses, which was the full amount of her medical bills. The trial court then entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant appealed. This case raised an issue regarding the calculation of reasonable medical expenses in economic damages awards. Plaintiff lacked medical insurance and contracted with her medical providers to treat her in exchange for a lien on whatever she might recover from defendant in this lawsuit. A third party assignee, MedFin Managers, LLC (MedFin), purchased the lien from the medical providers for a discounted amount. Plaintiff remained liable on the total bill. Defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying her motion to admit evidence of the amounts MedFin paid to purchase the right to recover the full amounts plaintiff’s medical providers billed plaintiff. Defendant argued that the trial court should have allowed her to introduce evidence of the amounts MedFin paid to the medical providers as evidence of the reasonable cost of treatment provided plaintiff, particularly since the court denied defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of the billed amounts. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that because defendant proffered no evidence to show that the MedFin payments represented the reasonable value of plaintiff’s treatment, the probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice as well as a danger of confusing and misleading the jury. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling precluding evidence of the MedFin payments was not an abuse of discretion. View "Uspenskaya v. Meline" on Justia Law