Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Valentino Bocanegra claimed that he was arrested on a warrant for a man with a similar (but not identical) name. Bocanegra repeatedly told the authorities that they had the wrong man and noted that his driver’s license, social security number, booking photos, and fingerprints would all prove this, he remained in jail for nine days. While incarcerated, he was forcibly sodomized by another inmate. This appeal centered on one of the multiple defendants who Bocanegra contended were responsible for his plight: Donald Jakubowski, a deputy district attorney who, according to Bocanegra, negligently failed to determine his true identity and tried to prevent him from ultimately being released. The trial court sustained Jakubowski’s demurrer, which was based on several alternative governmental immunity statutes.The Court of Appeal affirmed. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court held that Bocanegra adequately alleged that Jakubowski was liable for false imprisonment; the Court also held that statutory prosecutorial immunity did not apply to the false imprisonment claim. However, the demurrer had to be sustained based on common-law prosecutorial immunity. View "Bocanegra v. Jakubowski" on Justia Law

Chand was treated for his injuries at San Francisco General Hospital and subsequently sued the driver of the car that struck him, among others. Chand settled with the driver for $100,000 and filed a notice of partial settlement. The City of San Francisco Bureau of Delinquent Revenue Collections filed a medical reimbursement lien for approximately $370,000 in Chand’s personal injury case to recover the cost of the medical care it provided to him. Chand moved to expunge the City’s lien. The trial court concluded the City had a valid lien pursuant to section 124 of the San Francisco Health Code, which authorizes it to place a lien on a patient’s recovery from a third party tortfeasor, and rejected Chand’s claims that section 124 is preempted by state law and alternatively determined that the City may rely on section 124 because it is a charter city and its ordinance regulates a municipal affair. The court rejected Chand’s claim that the City waived section 124 when it adopted a subsequent resolution that expanded its options for pursuing medical reimbursement from patients and third parties.The court of appeal affirmed View "Chand v. Bolanos" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

Katherine Rosen filed a negligence action against defendants, alleging that they breached their duty of care by failing to adopt reasonable measures that would have protected her from another student’s foreseeable violent conduct. The student, Damon Thompson, was treated by the school months before the attack for symptoms indicative of schizophrenia disorder, including auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that UCLA did not owe a legal duty to protect Rosen from third party criminal conduct based on her status as a student; UCLA did not owe a duty to protect Rosen based on her status as an invitee onto the property; Rosen failed to establish a triable issue of material fact whether UCLA owed a duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine; Rosen failed to produce evidence establishing the existence of a triable issue of material fact whether a UCLA psychologist who treated Thompson had a duty to warn under Civil Code section 43.92; and Rosen failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding either of her newly-raised theories of liability. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' petition for writ of mandate. View "Regents v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Dahl sustained a cumulative industrial injury to her neck and right shoulder while employed by Contra Costa County as a medical records technician. The injuries resulted in surgeries and scarring. She was 49 years old and had worked for the county for over 8 years. Dahl has a bachelor’s degree and a felony conviction for possession and sale of methamphetamine. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board awarded Dahl a permanent disability rating of 79 percent. Dahl’s permanent disability rating on the California Permanent Disability Rating Schedule is 59 percent. Dahl sought to rebut that rating, arguing that she “will have a greater loss of future earnings than reflected in a rating because, due to the industrial injury, the employee is not amenable to rehabilitation.” The court of appeal annulled the award. Dahl’s “rebuttal” included no evidence that the injuries she sustained rendered her incapable of rehabilitation, but consisted solely of a vocational expert’s opinion that his method for determining Dahl’s diminished future earnings capacity produced a higher rating than the Schedule rating produced and that his method more accurately measured Dahl’s diminished future earnings. Dahl’s attempted rebuttal did not comport with any approved method for rebutting the presumptively-correct Schedule rating. View "Contra Costa County v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Lario Melendrez worked for Ameron for 24 years where he was exposed to asbestos and died of asbestos-related mesothelioma. Plaintiffs, Lario's survivors, filed a wrongful death suit against Ameron, alleging that in addition to his workplace exposure to asbestos, Lario was also permitted to take waste or scrap pipe home, where he was exposed to asbestos in using the pipe for home projects. The trial court granted Ameron's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' sole and exclusive remedy against Ameron lies in the California Workers’ Compensation Act, Lab. Code, 3600 et seq. The court concluded that the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule applies; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Ameron expert witness fees; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Melendrez v. Ameron Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the District in plaintiff's suit for negligent supervision. Plaintiff alleged that a teacher employed by the District sexually abused plaintiff on and off campus over several months while attending middle school. The court concluded that the trial court erred in modifying jury instructions concerning negligent hiring, supervision or retention of an employee to require plaintiff to prove that defendant had a “dangerous propensity to sexually abuse minors.” The court concluded that plaintiff was only required to prove that defendant had the potential to sexually abuse minors, not a “propensity” to do so. The court also concluded that the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting evidence of her prior sexual history where the trial court did not weigh the prejudicial potential of the evidence against its probative value and did not make a finding of exceptional circumstances which would permit the use of plaintiff’s sexual history or behavior at trial. Further, the court concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative fault and consent, superseding cause, and discretionary immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

While driving into an intersection, defendant hit a car driven by plaintiff. Defendant told the traffic collision investigator, Linda Villelli, that when he entered the intersection the light was yellow and he believed he could make it through before the light turned red. An eyewitness, Kathryn Napoli, told Villelli defendant ran the red light. A few weeks after the accident, defendants’ insurance company recorded an interview with Napoli who said defendant ran the red light. After plaintiff and his wife prevailed on their personal injury action against defendant and his mother, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to recover costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 based on defendants’ failure to admit certain requests for admissions. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion, arguing abuse of discretion. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded defendants had no reasonable basis to deny liability or plaintiff’s ankle injury and certain treatment for it. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount to be awarded plaintiffs for their costs of proving these issues. The order was affirmed in all other respects. View "Grace v. Mansourian" on Justia Law

Defendant Cy Tapia, a teenager living with his aunt and grandmother, was driving a vehicle which crashed, inflicting severe and eventually fatal injuries on his passenger, Cory Driscoll. Before his death Driscoll and his mother filed an action for damages. The parties established that the vehicle driven by Tapia was owned by his grandfather and that Tapia was entitled to $100,000 in liability coverage under an auto policy issued to Melissa McGuire (Tapia’s sister), which listed the vehicle as an insured vehicle and listed Tapia as the driver of the vehicle. The policy was issued by petitioner-defendant 21st Century Insurance Company. 21st Century offered to settle the action for the policy limits of the McGuire policy ($100,000). However, plaintiff1 also believed that Tapia might be covered under policies issued to his aunt and grandmother, each offering $25,000 in coverage and also issued by 21st Century. Plaintiff communicated an offer to settle for $150,000 to Tapia’s counsel; 21st Century contended that it never received this offer (although there was certainly evidence to the contrary). Inferrably having realized the seriousness of its position, 21st Century affirmatively offered the “full” $150,000 to settle the case against Tapia. Plaintiff did not accept this offer, but a month later plaintiff’s counsel served a statutory offer to compromise seeking $3,000,000 for Cory Driscoll and $1,150,000 for his mother Jenny Driscoll. Shortly before the expiration of this offer, 21st Century sent Tapia a letter warning him that it would not agree to be bound if Tapia personally elected to accept the offer. Nonetheless, Tapia agreed to the entry of a stipulated judgment in the amounts demanded by plaintiff. 21st Century paid $150,000 plus interest to the plaintiff. Tapia then assigned any rights he had against 21st Century to plaintiff. This assignment and agreement included plaintiff’s promise not to execute on the judgment against Tapia so long as he complied with his obligations, e.g., to testify to certain facts concerning the original litigation and 21st Century’s actions. This bad faith action followed. Petitioner's unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court's denial. Upon review, the Court of Appeal found that plaintiff’s efforts to pursue essentially a “bad faith” action as assignee of the insured was misguided. Accordingly, petitioner was entitled to summary judgment. View "21st Century Ins. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Allison, an elderly woman, suffering from dementia, had two daughters. For several years, a team of paid caregivers, consisting of personal friends, tended to Allison, including Barker. A rift developed between Allison’s daughters, and Wagner was appointed conservator of the person and estate of Allison. Wagner made changes to Allison’s care, began paying caregivers legitimately and reporting their wages as employees, and hired Fox, a registered nurse, as Allison’s case manager. Fox determined that Allison required nursing oversight, as none of the caregivers had any background or training in nursing or home healthcare. While being tended to by Newell, an employee of Fox, Allison “became combative and a quarrel resulted,” causing injuries to Allison. A series of emails followed, some critical of those involved in caregiving, and Barker was eventually terminated as a caregiver. Barker sued for defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Fox and Wagner filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Barker had not met his burden to show that his complaint was legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing to support a favorable judgment. View "Barker v. Fox & Assocs." on Justia Law