Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Secundino Medino died of asbestos-related mesothelioma, Medina's estate and his family filed suit against several defendants, including BWMT, alleging claims for negligence, strict liability, and wrongful death. The court affirmed the district court's grant of nonsuit to Eli, Medina's great-grandson, and rejected Eli's contention that substantial evidence showed that he was dependent on Medina for one-half or more of his support, thereby conferring upon him standing to assert wrongful death claims. The court affirmed the noneconomic damages awarded to Medina's daughters because the court concluded that they were amply supported by the record and were not the product of passion or improper evidence. However, the court reversed as to the punitive damages because plaintiffs' limited evidence of BWMT's financial condition was not sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Finally, the court affirmed the jury's allocation of fault. View "Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC" on Justia Law

After Secundino Medino died of asbestos-related mesothelioma, Medina's estate and his family filed suit against several defendants, including BWMT, alleging claims for negligence, strict liability, and wrongful death. The court affirmed the district court's grant of nonsuit to Eli, Medina's great-grandson, and rejected Eli's contention that substantial evidence showed that he was dependent on Medina for one-half or more of his support, thereby conferring upon him standing to assert wrongful death claims. The court affirmed the noneconomic damages awarded to Medina's daughters because the court concluded that they were amply supported by the record and were not the product of passion or improper evidence. However, the court reversed as to the punitive damages because plaintiffs' limited evidence of BWMT's financial condition was not sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Finally, the court affirmed the jury's allocation of fault. View "Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC" on Justia Law

John PD Doe was a Boy Scout who attended the Mataguay Scout Ranch, which was owned and operated by San Diego-Imperial Council (formerly Desert Pacific Council) and Boys Scouts of America (together Respondents). Glenn Jordan was an employee at the Mataguay Scout Ranch. Around August 1998, when Doe was 14 years old, and continuing until around 2000, Jordan repeatedly and continuously sexually abused him. Respondents knew Jordan had a propensity to molest children, but failed to warn Doe, Doe's parents or other camp attendees of Jordan's dangerous propensities. In 2003, when Doe was about 19 and 20 years old, Respondents provided him counseling for the abuse he suffered. Through this counseling process, Doe began to realize that the earlier sexual abuse he had suffered caused the emotional and psychological problems he had been experiencing. Doe retained counsel in November 2012. On January 9, 2013, Doe filed this action against Respondents alleging various causes of action. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the interaction of the statute of limitations and certificate of merit requirement set forth in section Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 with the tolling provision of Insurance Code section 11583. Specifically, Doe contended that Insurance Code section 11583 tolled the statute of limitation for his claims; thus, although he was chronologically 29 years old when he filed his lawsuit, he was not required to file a certificate of merit because he was actually 20 years old at the time he filed his complaint based on the tolling provisions of Insurance Code section 11583. The Court disagreed and concluded the trial court properly dismissed Doe's complaint after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. View "Doe v. San Diego Imperial Council" on Justia Law

Z.V., then 15 years old and in foster care, was sexually assaulted by Riverside County social worker Birdsong in September 2009. Z.V. sought to hold Birdsong’s employer, Riverside County, responsible for the assault under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court rejected the theory. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Birdsong was not Z.V.’s assigned social worker, he merely volunteered to transport Z.V. to a new foster home at the end of the workday. The sexual assault took place after 8:30 at night, several hours after Birdsong’s shift would have normally finished, and after he had already completed the task of delivering Z.V. to the new home without incident. It was several hours after the delivery that Birdsong went back to pick up Z.V. under the pretext of building “rapport,” took him to a liquor store and then to Birdsong’s own apartment, where the attack took place. View "Z.V. v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

After Stacey Chavez suffered a traumatic brain injury while exercising at one of 24 Hour's facilities, she and her husband filed suit against 24 Hour for ordinary and gross negligence, premises liability, and strict products liability. Stacy's husband sought recovery for loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 24 Hour and plaintiffs appealed the gross negligence claim, as well as the denial of their request for a continuance. The court concluded that a trier of fact could conclude from the record evidence that 24 Hour failed to perform regular preventative maintenance and, on that basis, that it failed to exercise scant care or demonstrated passivity and indifference toward results. Further, other triable issues of material fact bearing on the question of gross negligence exist. The court also concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for a continuance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Epp suffered severe injuries after diving into a swimming pool at the St. Regis Resort, Monarch Beach. Epp and his wife sued the owner of the St. Regis and the entities involved in the design and construction of the swimming pool. The defendants included Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. (the general contractor for exterior improvements at the St. Regis), and Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (the subcontractor that built the swimming pool). Summary judgment motions and settlements reduced the litigation to a cross-complaint by Valley Crest and its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, against Mission Pools. Valley Crest sought to recover the amount it spent in the litigation based on a claim of express indemnity under the terms of the subcontract with Mission Pools. National Union sought to recover attorney fees and costs it had spent for Valley Crest’s defense and settlement of the Epps’ claims pursuant to the policy of general liability insurance that National Union had issued to Valley Crest. National Union proceeded on a claim it was equitably subrogated to Valley Crest’s claims against Mission Pools. The trial court conducted a two-part bench trial on the cross-complaint, found in favor of both Valley Crest and National Union on their respective claims, and awarded them the full amount of recovery sought. In this appeal, Mission Pools argued: (1) the cross-complaint was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure, section 337.1, subdivision (a); (2) the trial court erred by finding National Union could recover on its claim for equitable subrogation because, under the element of balancing the equities, National Union should have borne the loss; and (3) the trial court erred by denying Mission Pools a jury trial on Valley Crest’s claim for express indemnity. As to the first contention, the Court of Appeal concluded section 337.1(a) did not apply to claims for express indemnity, and, therefore, the first amended cross-complaint was timely. As to the second contention, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that National Union was entitled to recover based on equitable subrogation. The trial court erred, however, by denying Mission Pools a jury trial on Valley Crest’s claim for express indemnity. The Court therefore reversed on that claim and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Valley Crest Landscape v. Mission Pools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rosa Elena Munoz appealed the dismissal of her personal injury action against the City of Tracy for failure to bring the action to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 et seq. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her case because the parties had executed a written stipulation extending the time for trial to a date certain beyond the five-year deadline. After review of the stipulation, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. View "Munoz v. City of Tracy" on Justia Law

In January 2012, two vehicles collided at an intersection in Fountain Valley. The accident occurred sometime during the traffic light transitioned from green to yellow to red in the east-west lanes of Talbert Avenue. Westbound defendant Faith Ciolek began a left turn onto Bushard Street. Eastbound defendant Nathan Heacox entered the intersection, intending to proceed straight through. Following the collision, Heacox’s car veered to the southeast corner of the intersection, striking plaintiff Omar Bermudez, who was on the sidewalk astride his bicycle. At the time of the collision, Bermudez apparently had no medical insurance. In a special verdict, the jury found both defendants were “negligent” but concluded only Ciolek was “a substantial factor in causing harm” to Bermudez. Ciolek was therefore found to be responsible for 100 percent of Bermudez’s $3.7 million in damages. Ciolek appealed, arguing: (1) the verdict is inconsistent; (2) alternatively, she was entitled to a new trial on damages because there is insufficient evidence of the reasonable value of Bermudez’s medical damages in the trial court record. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the jury was entitled to conclude that Heacox slightly exceeded a reasonable speed when he entered the intersection but that his speed was not a substantial factor in causing Bermudez’s injuries; and (2) Ciolek was not entitled to a new trial, but because $46,175.41 of the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court reduced the damage award to $3,706,793.60. View "Bermudez v. Ciolek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Miriam Navarrete and her minor children Bryan, Stephanie, and Steven Navarette (collectively Navarrete) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Hayley Meyer on plaintiffs' claims for violation of Vehicle Code section 21701 and civil conspiracy arising from allegations that Meyer, as passenger in a vehicle, told the driver to drive at an unsafe speed over a road Meyer knew had unusual conditions that would cause the car to become airborne, resulting in a fatal accident. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled there was no evidence to suggest Meyer's act of telling the driver to drive faster affected his control over the vehicle, and therefore no triable issues of material fact as to either cause of action. Navarrete argued on appeal that the evidence raised triable issues for a jury as to whether to impose joint liability on Meyer for her conduct on the night in question on a theory of concert of action or conspiracy, and also as to whether she unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of a vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 21701 to support a cause of action. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navarrete v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as successor in interest to Debra Jean Sherman, together with Richard Sherman and Vicki Marlow, filed suit alleging negligence, strict liability, and loss of consortium claims against Hennessy. Plaintiffs alleged that a brake lining arcing machine made by its predecessor in interest released asbestos dust that caused Debra’s mesothelioma. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hennessy because the company was not liable for injury caused by asbestos dust from brake linings its predecessor in interest neither manufactured nor distributed. At issue was whether under O’Neil v. Crane Co., Hennessy can be liable for injuries arising from the application of the Automotive Maintenance Machinery Company (AMMCO) machine to asbestos-containing brake linings. The court concluded that Hennessy has failed to carry its initial burden on summary judgment regarding whether the brake linings were safe when not acted upon by the AMMCO machine. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Sherman v. Hennessy Indus." on Justia Law