Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A.T. was born in May 2024 and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, as did her mother, M.T. The mother admitted to drug addiction and using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) was notified, and A.T. was placed with a relative caregiver, Gloria T. The father, W.M., had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse issues, and had previously been involved in dependency proceedings for his other children, Y.M. and J.G.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that A.T. was a dependent child under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and ordered her removal from her mother's custody. The court also found that placing A.T. with her father would be detrimental to her well-being, citing his history of domestic violence, ongoing relationship with the mother, and lack of cooperation with the Agency.The father appealed, arguing that section 361, subdivision (d) should apply, which requires a higher standard of proof for removal, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of detriment. The Agency argued that section 361.2, subdivision (a) applied because the father did not have physical custody of A.T. at the time of disposition and sought to assume custody.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that section 361.2 applied because the father was the noncustodial parent seeking custody. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that placing A.T. with the father would be detrimental to her safety and well-being. The court affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order, maintaining A.T.'s placement with the relative caregiver and granting the father liberal unsupervised visitation. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

L.H. pled no contest to first-degree murder and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility by the juvenile court. The court set his maximum term of confinement to 25 years to life or until he turns 25, whichever comes first, and applied 734 days of precommitment credits to this term. L.H. appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 in setting his maximum term of confinement beyond his 25th birthday and erred in applying his precommitment credits against a theoretical maximum term of 25 years. He also claimed that equal protection principles require his precommitment credits to be applied against a term that does not exceed his 25th birthday.The juvenile court adjudged L.H. a ward of the court and committed him to Briones Youth Academy, Secure Pathway. The court determined that L.H.'s remaining custody time was 22 years and 361 days after applying the precommitment credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court correctly applied section 875 in setting the maximum term of confinement. The court interpreted section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) as providing a separate cap on the length of a ward’s physical confinement, independent of the maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court. The court also held that the juvenile court did not err in applying L.H.'s precommitment credits against the maximum term of confinement of 25 years, as required by section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C). The court found no equal protection violation, as the application of precommitment credits was consistent with the statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s disposition order. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

Ramiro Munoz, a member of a criminal street gang, was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with firearm and gang allegations found true. Munoz, who was 15 years old at the time of the crime, was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. In 2023, Munoz filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, making him eligible for relief under the statute.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Munoz's petition, stating that he would be eligible for parole under section 3051 in 2029, when he would be 39 years old. Munoz appealed the decision, and the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven.The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that Munoz's sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. The court concluded that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), applies only to juvenile offenders explicitly sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and does not extend to those with lengthy sentences that may be considered de facto life without parole. The court also noted that Munoz would have a realistic opportunity to obtain release from prison during his expected lifetime, distinguishing his case from others with significantly longer sentences. View "People v. Munoz" on Justia Law

In March 2023, J.D. was involved in two separate incidents at the Pacific View Mall. In the first incident, J.D. stole a cell phone from Mia M. while she was sitting with friends. Later that day, J.D. and three others attacked Priscilla E., taking her cell phone and assaulting her. Both incidents were captured on mall surveillance, and the victims identified J.D. as the perpetrator.The Ventura County District Attorney's office filed a juvenile petition in July 2023, charging J.D. with the theft of Mia's cell phone. J.D. admitted to the theft in February 2024 and was placed on probation. In March 2024, a subsequent petition was filed, charging J.D. with felony assault for the attack on Priscilla. J.D. filed a motion to dismiss the felony assault charge, arguing that the prosecution should have been aware of both offenses and that they should have been prosecuted together.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the two incidents were separate and distinct, occurring at different times and locations. The court determined that the evidence needed to prove the assault on Priscilla did not overlap significantly with the evidence needed to prove the theft from Mia.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the offenses were not part of a singular transaction and that the prosecution was not required to join the charges in a single proceeding. The court found no significant overlap in the evidence and concluded that the Kellett rule did not apply, as the incidents were distinct in time, location, and nature. The judgment denying the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

In this case, the Alameda County Social Services Agency removed an eight-year-old girl, L., from her mother, L.W., after the mother was hospitalized due to a mental health crisis. L. had been living with her mother, stepfather, maternal grandmother, and siblings. The family had recently moved to a homeless shelter. When the mother left the shelter and did not return, the shelter called the police, and L. was taken into protective custody. The mother later contacted the Agency, explaining she had a mental health breakdown and was hospitalized. She had bipolar disorder and schizophrenia but had resumed taking her medication and was receiving psychiatric care.The juvenile court found that the mother’s mental health issues and the lack of a safe caregiver justified dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The court ordered L. to be placed with her biological father and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The mother appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the court’s findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found no evidence that L. was left without a safe caregiver, as she was with her grandmother at the shelter. The court also found that the mother’s mental health was stable, and she was receiving treatment. There was no substantial evidence that the mother’s mental illness or purported substance abuse placed L. at substantial risk of physical harm or illness. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g).The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and vacated the disposition order and all subsequent orders as moot. View "In re L.W." on Justia Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) became involved with a family after law enforcement discovered child pornography in the parents' home. Both parents admitted to possessing child pornography, and the mother admitted to posting inappropriate images of their daughter, M.V., online. M.V. was subsequently placed with her paternal grandparents, and the juvenile court sustained allegations of sexual exploitation against both parents, declaring M.V. a dependent child and removing her from her parents' custody. The parents received reunification services until November 2020, and in December 2021, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights. However, this order was vacated on appeal, and the case was remanded for a supplemental bonding study and a new permanency planning hearing.On remand, a new expert conducted a bonding study, and the permanency planning hearing took place in June 2024. The court reviewed extensive documentary evidence, including reports on M.V.'s well-being, her relationship with her parents and grandparents, and her expressed wishes to be adopted by her grandparents. The expert, Dr. Gonzalez, concluded that M.V. had a secure attachment to both parents and that terminating the parental relationship could be detrimental to her. However, the court found that the parents had not proven the beneficial parental relationship exception, noting that the expert's opinions were based more on general psychological principles than on the specific facts of the case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the expert's opinions and that the evidence did not compel a finding in favor of the parents. The court also addressed and dismissed allegations of judicial bias and due process violations raised by the parents. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

D.F. (father) appealed the juvenile court's orders appointing a guardian for his son, J.F., and terminating jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He argued that the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to meet their initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes (Cal-ICWA).The juvenile court had appointed a guardian for J.F. and terminated its jurisdiction. Father sought a conditional reversal of the guardianship order and a remand to ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. No respondent's brief was filed, but father, the child's counsel, and the Department filed a joint stipulation for conditional affirmance of the guardianship, limited reversal of the termination of jurisdiction, and remand for further inquiry.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found that the Department failed to contact maternal relatives to inquire about the child's potential Indian ancestry, constituting reversible error. However, the court disagreed with the need to contact the paternal great-aunt, as she is not considered an "extended family member" under ICWA.The court conditionally affirmed the guardianship order but conditionally reversed the order terminating dependency jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to order the Department to interview the maternal grandmother and aunt about the child's Indian ancestry and report the findings. If no further inquiry or notice to tribes is necessary, the termination order will be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is required, the court must ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

J.B. (Minor) was placed with A.R. (De Facto Parent) for nearly two years after being removed from B.B. (Mother) and J.S. (Father). Parents filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking additional reunification services and increased visitation. The trial court granted these petitions but did not remove Minor from De Facto Parent's care. De Facto Parent appealed, arguing that the juvenile court should not have granted additional reunification services as Parents failed to show changed circumstances and that it was not in Minor’s best interest.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted the section 388 petitions, providing Parents with six months of reunification services and increased visitation. The court noted that Minor would remain with De Facto Parent for the time being, with the goal of eventually returning Minor to Parents. The section 366.26 hearing, which would address the termination of parental rights and adoption, was vacated.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services that De Facto Parent did not have standing to appeal the grant of the section 388 petitions. The court noted that as a de facto parent, A.R. did not have the right to reunification services, visitation, custody, or placement of Minor. The appeal was dismissed for lack of standing. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law

G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with her alleged father, R.R. In 2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services became involved when the mother failed to secure necessary mental health services for G.R. The mother did not have contact information for R.R. The juvenile court initially found R.R. to be G.R.'s alleged father, later amending the order to reflect this accurately. R.R. was incarcerated for domestic violence and had an extensive criminal history. The court denied services to R.R. and ordered no visits until he contacted the Department.In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her mother's custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In November 2020, R.R. expressed a desire to have a relationship with G.R., but did not follow through with setting up visits. In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition, which the juvenile court denied. By June 2023, G.R. had spoken with R.R. by phone but was not ready for in-person visits. In September 2023, the juvenile court appointed G.R.'s caregiver as her legal guardian, ordered monitored visits for R.R., and terminated its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court dismissed R.R.'s appeal of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visits, stating that as an alleged father, R.R. could not show he was aggrieved by the order. The court emphasized that an alleged father has no rights to custody, reunification services, or visits unless he establishes paternity and achieves presumed father status. R.R. did not establish paternity, and thus had no standing to appeal the visitation order. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law