Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

In May 2022, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer defendant minor T.A. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. T.A. argued the Court of Appeal should remand so the juvenile court could reconsider its ruling in light of recent ameliorative changes to the law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The State conceded that the changes applied retroactively to a minor, like T.A., whose case was not final when they took effect. Nevertheless, the State argued, no remand was necessary here because there was no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the amended law. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing for family reunification review and disposition from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871 petition on November 15, 2021. The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered the department to provide additional reunification services to L.V. (mother) for her dependent children Damian L. and Jesse A. (collectively “the children”).   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the juvenile court’s order continuing mother’s reunification services. The court remanded to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order continuing mother’s family reunification services. The court explained that the juvenile court erred in failing to consider the entire time period since the children’s initial removal when it calculated the 18-month statutory limit on reunification services. By the time the juvenile court ordered mother’s reunification services to continue in November 2021, mother had received approximately 26 months of services, which was well over the 18-month limit. View "In re Damian L." on Justia Law

Minor S.S. (minor) appealed an order transferring him from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1. Minor contended: (1) the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) subsequent legislation applies retroactively and requires reversal because the juvenile court did not comply with new requirements for transfer hearings. The State conceded the second argument. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the new law applied retroactively and therefore reversal and remand was appropriate for an amenability hearing in compliance with the new law. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Almost 15 months elapsed from the time the juvenile court found Petitioner K.R. incompetent to stand trial and referred him for remediation until the court determined that he had been restored to competency and reinstated the proceedings. K.R. remained in juvenile hall for that entire period. He filed a writ petition arguing that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make a final ruling on his competency by the one-year deadline for remediation services and was required to dismiss the case at that point. In the alternative, he argues the court erred by allowing the prosecution to employ its own expert to examine him and asks us to order the juvenile court to strike the expert’s testimony.   The Second Appellate District disagreed and denied the petition. The court held that although section 709 establishes a maximum period of one year of remediation, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues for a reasonable period afterward for the court to resolve any dispute still existing at the end of that period over whether the minor has attained competency. Even if this was not the case, section 709 permits a court to keep juveniles accused of certain serious offenses (including several with which K.R. was charged) in secure confinement past the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings. The court also found that section 709 does not preclude the parties from seeking the appointment of their own expert(s) after the initial competency hearing. View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law

Father M.M. and mother J.M. pled no contest to a dependency petition regarding their minor children, J. and M. (along with their now-adult sibling Mi.), based on the parents engaging in repeated conflicts in the children’s presence. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and removed them from both parents’ custody, finding that the ongoing conflict caused a substantial risk of harm to the children, including serious mental health issues for J. The court returned the children to mother and father in October 2020 but maintained jurisdiction. In May 2021, the court terminated jurisdiction at a section 364 status review hearing with an exit order granting shared legal custody of J. and M. to mother and father, but sole physical custody to mother. Father appeals from that exit order, arguing that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction and applied the wrong standard to remove the children from his custody.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that awarding sole physical custody to mother was in the children’s best interest, as recommended by DCFS and requested by mother and the children, and where J. stated she was not comfortable visiting or living with father at all. The court’s order was further supported by the evidence that father had failed to comply with on-demand drug testing, failed to meet with the CSW for assessment for months, blamed mother for his relationship issues with J., blamed DCFS and mother for his lack of conjoint counseling, and was frequently absent. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Over the objection of 12-year-old M.M.’s mother (“mother”), the juvenile court authorized the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or the congregate care facility where M.M. was placed to vaccinate the child against the SARS-CoV-2 virus once his pediatrician approved. Several weeks later mother asked the court to rescind its order, explaining in greater detail her religious objection to M.M. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding insufficient evidence it was in the child’s best interest not to be vaccinated.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record at the section 388 hearing amply justified the court’s conclusion it would not be in M.M.’s best interest to revoke the vaccination order despite mother’s unsupported concerns about possible adverse side effects. As established by the Department’s response to mother’s petition, COVID-19 was one of the ten leading causes of death for children as of October 2021, COVID-19 infections were then increasing, M.M. was in contact with multiple individuals at his placement and his school, the Pfizer vaccine had been found safe for children his age and M.M.’s pediatrician had determined there were no known contraindications to M.M. receiving the vaccine. Moreover, as discussed, M.M. was not averse to receiving the vaccination, leaving it to the court to decide. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude its authorization to vaccinate M.M. should stand. View "In re Matthew M." on Justia Law