Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Antioch police officers, responding to a call about a prowler, tried to stop a Pontiac sedan that the caller had identified. Officers in different vehicles pursued the Pontiac. At one point, an officer started to exit his vehicle with his firearm drawn. The Pontiac accelerated toward the officers, striking the driver’s door on the first vehicle so that it slammed on the officer’s ankle. The Pontiac hit the bumper on the second vehicle, causing no noticeable damage. The Pontiac sideswiped and scratched the third vehicle. After an extended chase with pursuit by a helicopter, officers apprehended the occupants of the Pontiac, including the driver (the minor).The court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) for evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful disregard of others, deadly weapon assault on a peace officer, and force-likely assault. The court of appeal reversed in part. The punishment on the reckless evasion of police count must be stayed because it is based on the same indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective as the assault counts. The juvenile court must designate counts 1 and 3 as felonies or misdemeanors. The court rejected an argument that the finding on force-likely assault must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of deadly weapon assault on a peace officer and is based on the same conduct. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed a postjudgment order denying defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his conviction of first degree murder under a theory of felony murder based on his participation in an attempted carjacking. The court agreed with defendant that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.In this case, defendant did not provide the murder weapon, instruct his confederate to shoot, or know of his confederate's propensity toward violence, and the shooting occurred quickly without defendant having a meaningful opportunity to intervene. Although defendant was aware his confederate had a gun and intended to use it in the carjacking, as a 15-year-old he may well have lacked the experience and maturity to appreciate the risk that the attempted carjacking would escalate into a shooting and death, and he was more susceptible to pressure from his fellow gang members to participate in the carjacking. The court also agreed with defendant that Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 apply to defendant's resentencing under section 1170.95 and directed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. View "People v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 2020, a juvenile wardship petition was filed charging D.C. with committing a murder in 2016, when he was 16 years old. The probation officer’s report reviewed the statutory factors relevant to a transfer out of juvenile court and recommended transfer, finding D.C. exhibited criminal sophistication, that D.C. was 20 years old and it was difficult to predict how he may mature in the next five years, that D.C.’s delinquent history included a 2014 wardship referral for battery involving a physical fight at school. D.C. also had “a pattern of delinquency” at school, D.C. admitted to abusing alcohol, marijuana, and Xanax, and that the circumstances and gravity of the alleged offenses were serious compared to other homicides.The juvenile court granted a motion to transfer him from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code 707(a)(1)). The court of appeal denied a petition challenging the transfer. The juvenile court did not err in considering D.C.’s 2017 burglary or the behavior documented in his school records. The finding that he was not likely to be rehabilitated before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence. The court also rejected challenges to expert testimony and evidentiary rulings. View "D.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A wardship petition charged Y.C., then 17 years old, with assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Y.C. allegedly shot a suspected rival gang member in the leg. Arrested, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile Assessment Center, where he met with a probation officer and invoked his Miranda rights. Y.C. agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s detention hearings.The court of appeal dismissed Y.C.’s writ petition as moot to the extent that it sought relief relating to his detention During the pendency of the proceeding, Y.C. entered a change of plea and was released from detention. The court otherwise denied the petition, rejecting arguments that the disclosure of the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court, and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as HIPAA and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. View "Y.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services in 2017, following a domestic violence incident. Mother did not work. Father was the sole financial provider for the family. They were not married but had been in a relationship for over 14 years. Father denied any domestic violence or drug use. The children denied witnessing any domestic violence. The family had prior referrals for physical abuse by mother in 2010, emotional abuse and neglect by mother and father in 2012, and a prior dependency case in 2014 based on domestic violence and mother’s substance abuse. In 2021, the court terminated father’s parental rights to the children, now 13, 10, and six years old.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion when it applied the wrong legal standard in finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply (Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i); the court did not have the benefit of new authority, In re Caden C. (2021), concerning the benefits to the children from continuing the relationship with father, or the detriment to the children of terminating the relationship. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

M.S. and J.G. argued during a high school class. J.G. hit M.S. with a small book. J.G. was suspended for two days. About a month later, J.G. accused M.S. of taking her backpack. M.S. pulled a rectangular device with protruding antennas out of her bag, turned it on, and said “[t]ry that again, I’m going to tase you.” A spark erupted from the device. J.G. thought the device was a taser and retreated. The principal learned of the incident.The school resource officer, Reed, took custody of the device, identifying it as an “over-the-counter” stun gun. He did not know the weapon’s voltage and testified that the “capability” of a stun gun depended on its voltage. He initially opined that M.S.’s stun gun probably could not immobilize a person but later noted that it could immobilize a person of smaller stature, and, depending on their size, age, and medical condition, could “in some cases even cause death.” The juvenile court found that M.S. brought a stun gun into school, sustained the Penal Code 626.10(a) allegation, reduced the offense to a misdemeanor, adjudicated M.S. a ward of the court, and placed her in her mother’s custody with probation conditions. The court of appeal reversed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the weapon was capable of temporarily immobilizing a person and, therefore, that it qualified as a stun gun under sections 626.10(a) and 244.5(a). View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) and (j)), alleging Deshawn’s and Clairessa’s history of substance abuse and current use of marijuana placed one-year-old Y.W., and one-month-old Y.G., at risk of serious physical harm. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the children. dependents of the court, removed them from parental custody, and ordered the parents to complete substance abuse and domestic violence programs and to have monitored visitation with the children. At a hearing to select a permanent plan, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights, finding that returning the children to the parents would be detrimental, that the parents had not maintained regular and consistent visitation and contact, and that the children were adoptable.Based on the parents’ allegation that the Department failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901, the court of appeal conditionally affirm the orders terminating parental rights, with directions to ensure the Department complies with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law. Deshawn and Clairessa had each completed Judicial Council form ICWA-020, Parental Notification of Indian Status. Clairessa checked: “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Deshawn checked: “I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe. View "In re Y.W." on Justia Law

In March 2020 LAPD officers responded to a call reporting “screaming, yelling, banging and slamming” at the family home. No one answered their initial requests to enter the residence. Ashley ultimately opened the door. The home was in disarray. The officers observed evidence of a domestic violence altercation. Two children in the home who were under age five were taken to the hospital. Blood and urine tests for both children were negative. Neither child had any marks or bruises that would indicate abuse or neglect. Ashley and Wesley were arrested for suspicion of injuring a child (Pen. Code 273a(a)), a charge that was not pursued. No domestic violence charges were filed.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(a) (serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally) and (b)(1) (failure to protect). At the jurisdiction hearing nine months later, the juvenile court sustained both counts, finding “there is a long history of these parents having some domestic violence issues.” The court declared the children dependents of the juvenile court and ordered continued supervision by the Department while the children remained in Ashley’s home. The court of appeal reversed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding the children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm by the time of the jurisdiction hearing. View "In re Cole L." on Justia Law

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law

In 2003, defendant-appellant Louis Montes was convicted of, among other things, the special circumstance murder of April Peake (the victim) which he committed when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), the California Supreme Court decided that juveniles sentenced to LWOP were entitled to a hearing in order to have an opportunity to present information as to juvenile characteristics and circumstances at the time the offense was committed. Defendant petitioned to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(d)(2). The superior court granted the petition, recalled defendant’s sentence, and resentenced him to LWOP. In this appeal, defendant contended the superior court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard during resentencing. He further contended the court should have sua sponte transferred this matter to the juvenile court for a transfer/fitness hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)). The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s first contention but found merit in the second: in supplemental briefing, the parties agreed, and the Court concurred, the minute order of the resentencing hearing had to be corrected, and a new abstract of judgment should issue. Accordingly, the Court conditionally reversed defendant’s sentence and remanded for defendant to receive a transfer/fitness hearing in the juvenile court. View "California v. Montes" on Justia Law