Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

Brandon H. was the subject of three juvenile wardship petitions. He sought to have the first and third petitions dismissed and sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The juvenile court denied his request, reasoning that the sustained allegations in the second petition precluded the dismissal and sealing of any of the petitions. The court failed to consider each petition individually.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially adjudged Brandon a ward of the court and placed him on probation following the first petition, which alleged felony grand theft. While on probation, a second petition was filed, alleging second-degree robbery and other offenses, which was sustained, and Brandon was committed to a treatment program. A third petition, filed in San Francisco County, alleged felony grand theft and misdemeanor battery. Brandon admitted to these charges, and the case was transferred back to Contra Costa County, where his wardship continued. Upon completing probation, Brandon requested the dismissal and sealing of the first and third petitions, which the court denied, treating the petitions as a single entity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court erred by not considering each petition individually for dismissal and sealing under section 786. The appellate court found that the third petition must be dismissed and sealed as Brandon met the criteria for satisfactory completion of probation for that petition. However, the first petition could not be dismissed and sealed because Brandon did not meet the criteria due to new findings of wardship for felony offenses during the probation period for the first petition. The appellate court remanded the case to dismiss and seal the third petition but affirmed the decision regarding the first petition. View "In re Brandon H." on Justia Law

Mother, Lidia P., appealed the juvenile court's denial of her request for a restraining order against Father, Luis M., despite findings of domestic violence. The court found that Father had committed multiple acts of domestic violence against Mother and one of her children but declined to issue a restraining order, reasoning it was unnecessary since the parents no longer lived together. Instead, the court orally ordered both parents to stay away from each other.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, alleging that the children, A.P. and D.P., were at substantial risk of harm due to domestic violence between the parents, Mother's mental and emotional problems, Father's severe epilepsy, improper use of child safety restraints, marijuana use, and physical abuse of A.P. The juvenile court sustained some of these allegations, including those related to domestic violence and physical abuse, and removed the children from both parents. Mother then sought a restraining order, which the court initially granted temporarily but later denied permanently, opting instead for a mutual stay-away order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in denying the restraining order based on the parents' physical separation and the issuance of a non-CLETS stay-away order. The appellate court held that physical separation and non-CLETS orders are not adequate substitutes for the protections provided by a restraining order, which is enforceable by law enforcement. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing on Mother's restraining order request, emphasizing that the juvenile court must use the correct legal standard in its determination. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

In 2015, J.M., then 17, broke into a 72-year-old woman's home, assaulted her with intent to commit rape, and stole $900. The People filed charges directly in adult criminal court under former section 707. A jury found J.M. guilty of assault with intent to commit rape during a burglary, attempted rape, and first-degree robbery, with an elder abuse enhancement. He was sentenced to 14 years to life.J.M. appealed, arguing that Proposition 57, which eliminated direct charging of juveniles in adult court, should apply retroactively. The California Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court (Lara) agreed, holding that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed J.M.'s judgment and remanded for a juvenile transfer hearing. The juvenile court, after a hearing, transferred J.M. to adult court, reinstating his sentence. J.M.'s appeal of this order was dismissed, but he later successfully petitioned for habeas corpus, leading to the reentry of the transfer order and this appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that recent amendments to section 707, which raised the prosecution's burden of proof and required specific findings regarding a minor's amenability to rehabilitation, apply retroactively to J.M.'s case. The court conditionally reversed the transfer order and remanded for a new transfer/amenability hearing under the amended law. If the juvenile court again transfers J.M. to adult court, the criminal court must conduct a new sentencing hearing considering recent ameliorative changes in sentencing laws. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The case involves Santiago Gonzalo Canales, who was convicted for lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children. Canales sexually abused his stepdaughter and niece for over a decade, both of whom were under the age of 14 during the abuse. He was charged with four counts, including lewd acts on his niece and continuous sexual abuse of his niece and stepdaughter. The trial lasted eight days, and the jury convicted Canales on all counts, sentencing him to 60 years to life in prison.Canales appealed his convictions, challenging two different jury instructions. He argued that the first instruction did not identify the correct mental states for the offense of continuous sexual abuse. The court upheld the instruction, stating that it was in line with the presumption of mandatory culpability. Canales's second challenge was to another instruction, which the court assumed was given in error, but held that the error was harmless. Canales also forfeited a third challenge. However, on his fourth point, the court agreed with both parties that Canales must be resentenced.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, D.R., who appealed jurisdiction and disposition orders related to her six children, all of whom were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. D.R. argued that the dependency petitions were deficient, some of the sustained jurisdictional allegations lacked substantial evidence, and her constitutional rights were violated by depriving her of her right to present additional evidence at the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing for two of the children, and by what she characterized as a violation of her due process right to a speedy contested jurisdictional hearing.The children's fathers were not parties in this appeal. The children were born to three different fathers, referred to as father M., father V., and father H. The mother had been married to father H., but they separated after an incident of domestic violence. Father H. had a history of alcohol abuse and criminal offenses, mostly related to driving under the influence. The mother had sole legal and physical custody of the two children she had with father H., G.H. and B.H.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that some of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings lacked the support of substantial evidence, requiring reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for four of the children. The court otherwise affirmed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Brittany B., who appealed from juvenile court orders that found her two children, B.D. and C.D., to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and placed them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court sustained a petition based on allegations that C.D. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates, and that the mother’s substance abuse placed both children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The mother contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously reversed the orders. The mother had tested positive for opiates during her pregnancy and at the time of C.D.'s birth. However, C.D. did not display any symptoms of withdrawal, and the mother was attentive to both children. The DCFS did not seek to detain the children, but it did open a case and seek court supervision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three agreed with the mother's contention and reversed the juvenile court's orders. The court found that while the mother had used prescription drugs during her pregnancy, there was no substantial evidence that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the mother's substance abuse. The court also found that the mother's refusal to voluntarily submit to drug testing did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). View "In re B.D." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old student, K.M., was found in possession of a folding knife on school grounds. The incident occurred when a campus supervisor took K.M. to the principal's office after a report of him vaping in the school bathroom. K.M. consented to a search of his backpack, which revealed two vape pens and a folding knife with two rusted blades. Later, the principal received a report that K.M. had threatened another student with the knife earlier in the day. Consequently, a police officer issued K.M. a citation for brandishing a knife and for possession of a knife on school grounds.The prosecution filed a wardship petition alleging that K.M. brought a weapon onto school property and brandished the knife. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing, where the principal and the police officer testified. The court found K.M. guilty of the first count, designating the offense a felony, and dismissed the second count due to insufficient evidence. The court did not check the box indicating that it had found clear proof that K.M. knew his action was wrong. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, K.M.'s counsel argued that K.M. did not know he was breaking any rules when he had the knife at school because his father told him the knife was legal. The court declared K.M. a ward of the court and placed him on probation for six months.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, K.M. argued that the prosecution did not prove, and the evidence does not support an implied finding, that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the incident. The court agreed with K.M., stating that there was no clear and convincing evidence that K.M. understood the wrongfulness of possessing a knife on school grounds. The court found insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's implied finding that K.M. understood the wrongfulness of bringing a knife onto school property at the time of the incident. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, A.M., who was convicted as an adult for a murder committed when he was 14 years old. A.M. was a member of a local gang and was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member, S.S. The jury found that A.M. had used a deadly weapon and committed the crime for the benefit of his gang. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison.Years later, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court law. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment. A.M. contended that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, found that A.M.'s case was nonfinal when the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment. Therefore, Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391, which bars a juvenile court from transferring a 14- or 15-year-old to adult criminal court, applied. The court also agreed with A.M.'s contention that Assembly Bill 333 required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court and vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance. The court remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new order denying the district attorney’s motion and to hold a dispositional hearing treating A.M.’s murder conviction as a juvenile adjudication. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, Jose R., who was declared a ward of the court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. This followed his admission, as part of a plea deal, that he had committed an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The case arose from a shooting incident in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, resulting in a victim's death. Initially, Jose was charged with first-degree murder, but the charge was later amended to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, which Jose admitted to.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Jose's motion to apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term, instead applying the 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term. Jose appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err in applying Jose's precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement. The court based its decision on the clear statutory language in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement. The court also rejected Jose's argument that the legislative scheme violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not violate equal protection principles, even if they resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits. View "In re Jose R." on Justia Law