Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that three children were at risk due to the actions of their mother, M.S., and their alleged father, P.F. The Agency claimed that the children were at risk of suffering serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.'s domestic violence towards M.S. and his substance abuse issues. The Agency also alleged that M.S. had allowed P.F. to stay in her home despite a restraining order against him. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in part, released the children to M.S., and ordered the family to participate in therapy. M.S. appealed this decision.The lower courts had previously reviewed this case and made several findings. The juvenile court found that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm due to the domestic violence perpetrated by P.F. towards M.S. The court also found that P.F. had substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children. The court denied M.S.'s request to dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered M.S. and the children to participate in family therapy.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that an alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s declaration of dependency and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not granting M.S.'s request to dismiss the case and instead ordering family therapy. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

In 2013, a minor identified as A.M. was tried as an adult and convicted for first-degree murder of a rival gang member, which he committed at the age of 14. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. In 2021, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment.A.M. appealed, arguing that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime. He also contended that Assembly Bill 333, which amended various provisions of Penal section 186.22, required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District agreed with both of A.M.’s contentions.The court held that Senate Bill 1391, which amended Proposition 57 to prohibit the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult criminal court, applied to A.M.'s case. The court reasoned that when the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.'s conviction and sentence, his case became nonfinal, and thus, Senate Bill 1391 applied. The court also held that Assembly Bill 333 applied retroactively to A.M.'s case, requiring the vacating of the jury's gang-murder special circumstance finding. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, and struck the requirement for A.M. to register as a gang offender. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case involves Amber C., the mother of a two-year-old child, Kieran S., who appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders after the court sustained a petition by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Amber's substance abuse posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Kieran. The Department received a referral in April 2019, stating that the parents used drugs in the child's presence. Amber tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine. Despite her positive test results, Amber denied using methamphetamine and claimed she did not use any drugs while with Kieran. After failing to cooperate with welfare checks and evading the Department, Amber absconded with Kieran.The juvenile court sustained counts under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Amber abused substances, failed to protect Kieran from Victor’s mental and emotional issues, and absconded with Kieran. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Kieran a dependent child of the court, removed him from his parents, ordered Amber to attend a drug treatment program, and ordered reunification services. Amber appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders, arguing that there was no evidence she was under the influence of drugs when Kieran was detained and that there was no evidence of neglect or risk of harm to Kieran in her care.The Supreme Court granted Amber’s petition for review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its prior decision and reconsider Amber’s appeal in light of In re N.R., which held that substance abuse is not prima facie evidence of a parent’s inability to provide regular care to a child of tender years. The Court of Appeal found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding Amber’s drug abuse created a substantial risk of physical harm to Kieran and affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Kieran S." on Justia Law

The case involves a father, H.A., who sought to vacate orders of the juvenile court that terminated his visitation rights and the mother’s reunification services, and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The father argued that the inquiry into the minors’ potential Indian heritage in this dependency case was insufficient and failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The San Joaquin County Human Services Agency had filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minors based on the parents’ substance abuse, domestic violence, and the mother’s untreated mental health issues. Both parents denied having any Native American ancestry.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed with the father's contention. The court found that the inquiry of relatives and family members about the minors’ potential Indian heritage was necessary to meet the requirements of the ICWA. The court noted that the Agency had contact with the maternal and paternal grandmothers and the paternal great-aunt, but did not ask them, or any other relatives, about possible Native American ancestry.The court vacated the juvenile court’s finding that the minors are not Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings to address compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of the ICWA. The court also issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the respondent juvenile court to vacate the ICWA findings and conduct further proceedings to determine whether the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been met. The court emphasized the obligations of the parents’ and minors’ counsel, the juvenile court, and the Agency under the ICWA. View "H.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Randy C., who was stopped by police for driving a car with illegally tinted windows. During the stop, the officer smelled unburnt marijuana and observed a marijuana blunt on the passenger's lap. The officer conducted a search of the vehicle, finding a handgun in the glove compartment and an AR-15 firearm in the trunk. Randy C. was subsequently charged with multiple felony offenses, including possession of an assault weapon by a minor and possession of a concealed firearm and ammunition in a vehicle by a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing there was no probable cause to search the vehicle.The juvenile court denied Randy C.'s motion to suppress the evidence. Following this ruling, Randy C. admitted to the felony offenses charged, and the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to a negotiated plea deal. The juvenile court declared wardship and committed Randy C. to juvenile hall for 274 days with 55 days of credit for time served. Randy C. appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the search and seizure conducted by police were unlawful.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the smell of unburnt marijuana and the observation of a marijuana blunt in the passenger's lap, which was considered an open container of marijuana in violation of the law. The court rejected Randy C.'s argument that the marijuana blunt was not an "open container" within the meaning of the law, concluding that the paper wrapping enclosing the marijuana presented no barrier to accessing the marijuana, thereby facilitating its consumption. View "In re Randy C." on Justia Law

The case involves Manuel Dejesus Flores, who was convicted of four counts of lewd and lascivious acts committed against two victims under 14 years old. The victims, sisters B.C. and Y.G., lived with Flores in their family apartment between 2006 and 2008. Both victims testified that Flores had touched them inappropriately multiple times. B.C. disclosed the abuse to her friends in 2016, which was reported to Child Protective Services. The trial court admitted B.C.'s disclosure statements under the "fresh complaint" doctrine, despite the significant delay in reporting the abuse.The trial court also admitted expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), which explains common behaviors and reactions of child victims of sexual abuse. Flores was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison and denied any conduct credits. Flores appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting B.C.'s disclosure statements and the CSAAS expert testimony.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the trial court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. The court found no error in the trial court's admission of victim disclosure evidence and CSAAS expert testimony. However, it agreed with Flores that he was entitled to presentence conduct credits, and remanded the matter for the trial court to calculate and award these credits. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Taylor C., who was declared a ward of the court at the age of 14. After his wardship ended, Taylor successfully moved to dismiss his wardship petitions under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. He then sought to seal his juvenile court records. However, the juvenile court denied his request, citing his prior adjudications for committing forcible lewd conduct, which made his records ineligible for sealing under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F). Taylor appealed, arguing that the dismissal of his wardship petitions erased the adjudication of his offenses as if they never existed.The lower court had granted Taylor's motion to dismiss his wardship petitions, finding that the interests of justice and Taylor's welfare warranted dismissal and that he was no longer in need of rehabilitation. However, it denied his motion to seal his juvenile court records, citing the prohibition in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781 on sealing records relating to his forcible lewd conduct offenses.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the dismissal of a juvenile petition under section 782 does not obviate the prohibition on sealing records under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F) in cases involving certain delineated offenses. The court found that Taylor's records were ineligible for sealing because section 782, subdivision (e) provides that dismissal of a petition does not alone constitute a sealing of records and section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(F), precludes sealing due to the forcible lewd conduct offenses. View "In re Taylor C." on Justia Law

A mother appealed from juvenile court orders denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The mother argued that the proceedings violated her substantive due process rights because the juvenile court was not required to consider her potential for further brain development, or her capacity to change, given her status as a teenager.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the juvenile court orders. The court rejected the mother's arguments, concluding that sections 366.26 and 388 did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the focus of the proceedings shifted to permanence and stability for the child once reunification efforts failed. This shift did not violate the mother’s rights, even though she was a teenage parent. The court reasoned that the mother’s youth did not change or lessen the child’s need for permanence and stability.The court also dismissed the mother's reliance on cases concerning juvenile offenders in the criminal context, stating that the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system. The court noted that the legislative choices to shift focus from reunification to permanency, require a parent to demonstrate changed circumstances, and prefer adoption as a permanent plan, were not intended to punish the parent, but to focus on the child's rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the protection of their interests. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

In this case, F.K. (the Mother) filed a petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. The Mother contended that the Santa Barbara County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) did not adequately consider her grief over the death of A.R.'s twin sister and did not provide reasonable reunification services. She also claimed that six months of services were insufficient.The Mother had a history of untreated alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and criminal convictions related to these issues. The juvenile court ordered her to receive reunification services after finding the dependency petition true and removing A.R. from her custody. The services aimed at addressing her substance abuse and its impact on her ability to safely parent A.R.The juvenile court decided to terminate the reunification services at the six-month review hearing after concluding that the Mother failed to make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan. The court reasoned that it did not have discretion to extend services unless the Mother showed substantial compliance with the case plan. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to return A.R. to the Mother's custody by providing reasonable services.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating the reunification services. The court noted that, at the six-month review, the juvenile court had the discretion to continue the case and forego setting a hearing to terminate parental rights even if it did not find a substantial probability of the child returning to the parent. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion because it incorrectly believed it was bound to terminate services due to the Mother's lack of substantial progress. The Court of Appeal ordered the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21 hearing. View "F.K. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law