Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 alleged that E.G. committed four offenses. He pled no contest to battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft; the remaining charges were dismissed. The offenses E.G. pled no contest to were “wobblers,” offenses (Penal Code 17(b)(3)) that “are chargeable or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” The petition alleged them as felonies. The juvenile court placed E.G. on probation and committed him to a youth facility for nine months. The court of appeal remanded, finding the juvenile court had not exercised its discretion to declare the offenses misdemeanors or felonies as required by statute. Months later, E.G. moved to have his offenses reduced to misdemeanors under section 17(b), stating that the juvenile court had declared the offenses to be felonies. The state did not dispute this statement, although no such declaration was made on remand. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that section 17(b)(3) did not apply in juvenile proceedings. A bench officer subsequently stated he had declared the offenses to be felonies at disposition and did so again. The court then terminated E.G.’s wardship and probation. Holding that the “wobbler” provision applies in juvenile proceedings, the court of appeal remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

In 2013, in Contra Costa County Juvenile Court, defendant pleaded no contest to felony theft. The court declared him a ward of the state. A year later, a new petition alleged defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm. He pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor variant of the charge. The following year, prior to a disposition hearing on the new charge, defendant’s case was transferred to the San Francisco Juvenile Court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 750) because his family had moved. The San Francisco Juvenile Court re-declared defendant a ward, placed him with his mother, and kept intact orders of the transferor court. Days later, defendant filed a Proposition 47 petition in the San Francisco Juvenile Court to reduce his felony theft offense to misdemeanor larceny. The San Francisco court denied his petition, ruling only the Contra Costa Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to act on defendant’s petition, citing Penal Code 1170.18(a), which states that a defendant “may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.” The court of appeal reversed. Proposition 47 is not intended to undercut an important goal of the juvenile justice system, to preserve and support the family unit. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

While J.S. was a dependent of the juvenile court, a delinquency petition was filed alleging that she committed vandalism and used force and violence against another minor. The juvenile court declared her a "dual status" child, making her both a dependent and a ward of the court. On appeal, J.S. argued that: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petition and declaring her a dual status youth; (2) the court erred by detaining her in juvenile hall pending placement in a residential treatment facility; and (3) she was prejudiced by being declared a ward. The Court of Appeal rejected J.S.'s arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Carlos H. committed two counts of sexual battery against a female high school classmate. Prior to adjudication, the juvenile court issued a restraining order against Carlos prohibiting him from, among other things, contacting the victim through a third party, and directing him to stay 100 yards away from the victim. The court was unpersuaded by the premise inherent in Carlos’s argument that the Legislature intended that persons threatened by a minor should enjoy less protection than persons threatening the minor. The court held that the order form used by the juvenile court to enter the order, including the "other orders" in section 9 of the form, was a reasoned and reasonable response by the juvenile court to Carlos’s conduct and the other relevant facts of the case (e.g., the fact that Carlos and the victim no longer attend the same school). The court also concluded that the order was entirely consistent with the public policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws generally and section 213.5 specifically. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order because the juvenile court’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. View "In re Carlos H." on Justia Law

Contra Costa County Children and Family Services filed petitions concerning P.W., then 12 years old, and his sister, M.W., 11, alleging Mother caused P.W. serious physical harm during an altercation and her untreated mental condition impaired her ability to adequately parent. The children reported that they did not feel safe. Family members and close friends reported concern for the children’s well-being and had asked Mother to seek treatment, suspecting she might be bipolar. The children were placed in foster homes. Mother was granted supervised visitation. The disposition report advised that Mother had several previous dependency cases since 1994. Her parental rights to two other children had been terminated. There was an earlier dependency case involving P.W. and M.W., which concluded in reunification. Mother did not appear at a continued permanency review hearing 18 months later. The court found that returning the children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety and physical or emotional well-being, remarking this was “not even a close call.” It found Mother had been offered reasonable reunification services and declined to continue the matter, noting that the children still feared Mother and opposed visitation. The court scheduled a hearing for terminating Mother’s reunification services. The court of appeal declined Mother’s petition to set aside the order scheduling that hearing. View "N.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Calvin S. was declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed to the DJF for a maximum term of 15 years four months after he committed assault with a firearm and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense. The court concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing Calvin to the DJF rather than letting him remain in juvenile hall. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have stayed the term imposed for assault with intent to commit a sexual offense under Penal Code section 654. Accordingly, the court reversed the commitment order and remanded for a new disposition hearing. The juvenile court is directed to stay execution of any term of confinement imposed on the sustained allegation of assault with intent to commit a sexual offense. View "In re Calvin S." on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed two wardship petitions, alleging that appellant, age 17, committed misdemeanor disorderly conduct by soliciting or agreeing to engage in prostitution on two different dates. Appellant moved under to exclude all evidence that she engaged in commercial sexual acts, because she was a “victim of human trafficking,” who had been coerced into performing those acts by a pimp who was a human trafficker under Penal Code 236.1(c).. The district attorney argued that neither petition alleged she had engaged in any commercial sex act. The court heard the testimony of two undercover police officers and of an expert on human trafficking and found appellant to have committed the charged acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking,” but denied her motion to exclude evidence. The court concluded that Evidence Code 1161 did not apply to juvenile proceedings and, even if it did, would not apply to cases in which the victim of human trafficking did not actually engage in “sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is given or received by any person.” The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that section 1161 does apply in juvenile proceedings, and that acceptance of the prosecutor’s interpretation of that statute would virtually wipe out a significant protection afforded victims of human trafficking. View "In re N.C." on Justia Law

The victim and her boyfriend’s eight-year-old son exited a bus in San Leandro. The boy then informed the victim that he had seen “a male,” later identified as 16-year-old D.H., “standing behind her on the bus and exposing his penis and masturbat[ing]” and that “the male eventually ejaculated and the semen landed on the back of [the victim’s] clothing.” The victim had not noticed anything at the time but discovered “a white substance” on the back of her jacket. She eventually reported the incident. A juvenile court declared D.H. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of indecent exposure. Raising mostly constitutional claims of vagueness and overbreadth, he challenged four probation conditions that required him: not to access pornography; to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and provide passwords; to attend school regularly; and not to leave home without a parent or the probation officer’s permission. The court of appeal held that the no-pornography and electronics search conditions were vague, and remanded. The court affirmed the attendance condition and, in light of ambiguity in the record, requested clarification of whether the court intended to impose the stay-home condition. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murdering his mother and conspiracy to murder his stepfather. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he committed the crimes and was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant seeks resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama. Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. After the trial court reimposed the LWOP term, the Supreme Court issued Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that Miller announced a substantive rule of law that had retroactive application in state collateral review proceedings. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court exercised its discretion in resentencing defendant without the guidance provided by Montgomery. View "People v. Padilla" on Justia Law