Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law

Father M.M. and mother J.M. pled no contest to a dependency petition regarding their minor children, J. and M. (along with their now-adult sibling Mi.), based on the parents engaging in repeated conflicts in the children’s presence. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and removed them from both parents’ custody, finding that the ongoing conflict caused a substantial risk of harm to the children, including serious mental health issues for J. The court returned the children to mother and father in October 2020 but maintained jurisdiction. In May 2021, the court terminated jurisdiction at a section 364 status review hearing with an exit order granting shared legal custody of J. and M. to mother and father, but sole physical custody to mother. Father appeals from that exit order, arguing that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction and applied the wrong standard to remove the children from his custody.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that awarding sole physical custody to mother was in the children’s best interest, as recommended by DCFS and requested by mother and the children, and where J. stated she was not comfortable visiting or living with father at all. The court’s order was further supported by the evidence that father had failed to comply with on-demand drug testing, failed to meet with the CSW for assessment for months, blamed mother for his relationship issues with J., blamed DCFS and mother for his lack of conjoint counseling, and was frequently absent. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Over the objection of 12-year-old M.M.’s mother (“mother”), the juvenile court authorized the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or the congregate care facility where M.M. was placed to vaccinate the child against the SARS-CoV-2 virus once his pediatrician approved. Several weeks later mother asked the court to rescind its order, explaining in greater detail her religious objection to M.M. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding insufficient evidence it was in the child’s best interest not to be vaccinated.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record at the section 388 hearing amply justified the court’s conclusion it would not be in M.M.’s best interest to revoke the vaccination order despite mother’s unsupported concerns about possible adverse side effects. As established by the Department’s response to mother’s petition, COVID-19 was one of the ten leading causes of death for children as of October 2021, COVID-19 infections were then increasing, M.M. was in contact with multiple individuals at his placement and his school, the Pfizer vaccine had been found safe for children his age and M.M.’s pediatrician had determined there were no known contraindications to M.M. receiving the vaccine. Moreover, as discussed, M.M. was not averse to receiving the vaccination, leaving it to the court to decide. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude its authorization to vaccinate M.M. should stand. View "In re Matthew M." on Justia Law

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleges that about 10 years ago, while he was a minor, Petitioner committed a lewd act upon a child. This matter came to the attention of law enforcement only because Petitioner voluntarily admitted to the police that he committed the lewd act. He now seeks relief from the juvenile court’s order granting deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Petitioner contends that the order must be vacated and the juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated because “he [is] well beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.”   The Second Appellate District agreed and granted the petition. The court construed section 607, subdivision (h)(2) as applying to the discharge from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction after the court has retained jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to subdivisions (a) through (c). Pursuant to section 607, subdivision (a), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner because he was over the age of 21 years. The court wrote that common sense compels the conclusion that Petitioner is just too old to be “treated” as a “minor” and the section 602 petition must be dismissed. View "M.E. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In these dependency proceedings, T.M. (Father) appealed from a juvenile court exit order awarding sole physical custody of minors N.M. and S.M. to E.S. (Mother), contending no substantial evidence supported the order.   The Second Appellate District agreed and therefore reversed the order insofar as it grants sole physical custody to Mother. The court explained that here, the juvenile court made no express finding that granting sole physical custody to Mother would be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the court stated, “It’s not appropriate to reward a parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going to make it joint legal.” The court thus granted Mother sole custody to avoid rewarding Father, who had refused to participate meaningfully in the case plan. This was an abuse of discretion because an exit order must serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or another for failing to comply with the case plan.   The court explained that while it does not condone ignoring the court’s orders, there has been no express finding that these factors impacted the children’s interests, and no grounds appear for an implied finding. Father has never been deemed an offending parent, and no evidence suggested that his drug use, lack of a parenting class, or visitation practices impacted the children in any way. View "In re N.M." on Justia Law

The Bureau filed a dependency petition with respect to L.B., Welfare and Institutions Code 300, due to Mother’s failure to protect L.B. from ongoing domestic violence between Mother and her long-term partner, T.Y., and her inability to provide support for L.B. due to her hospitalization for leukemia and consumption of high doses of pain medication. Mother had a history of arrests and had attempted suicide. Despite many reports to the contrary, Mother denied domestic violence, claimed she had no mental health issues, and denied using nonprescribed drugs. L.B.’s school attendance had been poor. L.B. was detained with Father.At the dispositional hearing, Mother testified about her intervening arrest for assault with a deadly weapon and denied telling a social worker that L.B. had seen domestic violence between her and T.Y. The juvenile court found Mother unable to protect the child from ongoing domestic violence and that Mother presented an ongoing risk to L.B. given her domestic violence history, her propensity to engage in violent acts, and her failure to take any preventative steps to allay the court’s concerns. The court granted sole physical custody of L.B. to Father, joint legal custody to both parents, and supervised visitation for Mother. The court of appeal affirmed. There was substantial evidence that L.B. would otherwise be at substantial risk of serious harm. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

In 2016, Hunter W. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, as well as allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon. Shortly after, he was charged with driving without a license and driving under the influence of drugs. After he admitted to the assault with a deadly weapon and driving under the influence charges, the juvenile court granted Hunter conditional probation. In 2018, after multiple reports of probation violations, the juvenile court revoked probation and committed Hunter to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of seven years. Hunter appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dispositional order and issued the remittitur on August 15, 2019. After the passage of California Senate Bill No. 823, on December 2, 2021, Hunter petitioned to modify the commitment order to the middle term of six years—the maximum confinement permitted under the new law. The District Attorney opposed the petition on the grounds that the new law did not apply to Hunter’s final judgment. The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution and denied Hunter’s petition. Appealing that order, Hunter again argued his juvenile disposition was not a final judgment and because the new law was ameliorative, he was eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the case was final for purposes of retroactivity of the new law, and affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification. View "In re Hunter W." on Justia Law

Mother S.G. appealed after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to her son. She raised two challenges. First, she faults the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for failing to exercise due diligence in locating her son’s father (Father). Mother argued this failure to locate Father, which included ignoring information she provided on how to locate him, invalidated the notice the court deemed proper for Father. Second, she contends DCFS did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2,1 subdivision (b) when it failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members about Indian ancestry within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and directed the juvenile court to order DCFS to complete its duty of due diligence to discover the whereabouts of Father and complete its initial inquiry of available maternal and paternal relatives into familial Indian ancestry. The court explained that this dependency proceeding lasted over two years. In that time, DCFS made two attempts to locate Father, and it did so using database search resources only. It made no attempt to inquire about Indian ancestry after obtaining Mother’s denial of such ancestry. The court found that DCFS did not exercise reasonable due diligence in its attempts to locate Father. The court also found that  DCFS erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without inquiring about available family members for whom it had contact information. View "In re Jayden G." on Justia Law

K.V. (Mother) and David V. (Father) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to daughter M.V. They contend the court erred when it declined to order a supplemental bonding study and did not conduct a proper analysis of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.   The Second Appellate District reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the matter to juvenile court. The court explained that by failing to determine whether M.V. had a substantial, positive attachment to her parents, and by relying on improper factors in assessing detriment, the juvenile court failed to perform the appropriate analysis when determining if the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. View "In re M.V. CA2/" on Justia Law