Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this wage-and-hour class action, the plaintiffs, employees of ACE American Insurance Company (ACE), alleged that ACE misclassified them as exempt employees and failed to provide benefits required for nonexempt employees under state law. The plaintiffs also added claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) for the same alleged violations. The plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements as a condition of their employment, which required them to submit employment-related legal claims to arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted ACE's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case pending arbitration. However, neither party initiated arbitration. The plaintiffs then moved to lift the stay, arguing that ACE was required to initiate arbitration and had waived its right to arbitrate by failing to do so. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that ACE's inaction was inconsistent with its right to arbitrate and lifted the stay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs, not ACE, were required to initiate arbitration under the terms of the arbitration agreements. The agreements specified that the party wanting to start the arbitration procedure should submit a demand, and in this context, it referred to the plaintiffs who had employment-related legal claims. The court concluded that ACE did not breach the arbitration agreements or waive its right to arbitration by failing to initiate the process. Consequently, the trial court's order lifting the stay was reversed, and ACE was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Arzate v. ACE American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves Tarlochan Sandhu, who worked for various public agencies as a finance and accounting professional and was a member of CalPERS, receiving retirement benefits upon his retirement in 2011. After retiring, Sandhu was hired by Regional Government Services (RGS) in 2015, which assigned him to work for several cities. RGS considered Sandhu its employee, providing him with benefits and paying him, while the cities paid RGS for his services. CalPERS determined Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities, violating postretirement employment rules, and the trial court upheld this determination.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case, where Sandhu challenged CalPERS’s decision, arguing he was not a common law employee and that the decision was based on underground regulations. The trial court applied its independent judgment, finding the evidence supported CalPERS’s determination that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court found the cities had the right to control Sandhu’s work, which is the principal test for an employment relationship, and that several secondary factors also supported this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the common law test for employment applies and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court also found that Sandhu forfeited his argument regarding underground regulations by not properly raising it in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Sandhu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS" on Justia Law

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law

Kristin Casey, a former employee of D.R. Horton, Inc., filed a lawsuit against the company and one of its employees, Kris Hansen, alleging sexual harassment and other claims. D.R. Horton moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause governed by California law. Casey opposed the motion, citing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which allows plaintiffs to invalidate arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the EFAA was inapplicable due to the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and granted the motion to compel arbitration, accepting Hansen's joinder. The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement meant that California law, not the EFAA, applied. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the EFAA preempts state law attempts to compel arbitration in cases related to sexual harassment disputes. The court determined that the EFAA applies to the parties' transaction because it sufficiently involved interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the EFAA's rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements in sexual harassment cases preempts the state law and that parties cannot contract around the EFAA through a choice-of-law provision. Consequently, the court granted Casey's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Casey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of the State of California providing dental care to inmates, sued the state seeking compensation for time spent on pre- and post-shift safety and security activities. These activities included going through security and handling alarm devices. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that these activities were not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their wage claims were viable and that the trial court improperly decided a disputed question of fact.The trial court, Solano County Superior Court, sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the activities in question were not compensable under the FLSA. The court did not address other grounds raised by the defendants, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) precluding the claims, the inapplicability of the statutes to government employers, failure to exhaust contractual remedies, and the statute of limitations.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not accepting as true the plaintiffs' allegation that providing security is among their principal activities. The appellate court found that the MOU precludes plaintiffs from seeking additional wages under general state wage laws, thus affirming the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action. However, the court held that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of contract and that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies could not be resolved on demurrer. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' contract claim was not time-barred.The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing the breach of contract claim to proceed while dismissing the other claims. View "Bath v. State" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California for various claims, including failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. Wentworth alleged that the Regents did not accommodate his bipolar II disorder and disclosed confidential information about him.The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on Wentworth's claims for failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. The court found that the Regents had engaged in the interactive process and offered reasonable accommodations, such as stopping Wentworth's tenure clock. The court also ruled that the invasion of privacy claim failed because Wentworth did not demonstrate that the Regents disclosed any confidential information.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the interactive process and reasonable accommodations claims, finding that the Regents had acted appropriately. However, the appellate court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy claim, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents disclosed Wentworth's personal information in violation of the Information Practices Act (IPA).The appellate court also reversed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for attorney's fees and costs, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory or based on his success in obtaining his personnel file during the litigation. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his challenge by failing to object to the verdict form before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Terrence Richard, a brakeman for Union Pacific Railroad Company, fell from a train and broke his leg while working. He sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Richard claimed that the locomotive engineer’s mishandling of the train caused a surge that led to his fall. Union Pacific argued that Richard fell because he was improperly positioned on the train. The trial court excluded the testimony of Richard’s expert, Richard Hess, a retired Union Pacific engineer, who would have testified that the engineer’s actions caused the surge.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine to exclude Hess’s testimony, finding that Hess lacked the necessary qualifications. The jury returned a special verdict for Union Pacific, finding the company was not negligent. Richard appealed, arguing that the exclusion of Hess’s testimony was erroneous and prejudicial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Hess’s testimony. Hess had extensive experience relevant to the subject matter and his testimony would have been helpful to the jury. The exclusion of Hess’s testimony was prejudicial because it left Richard without a witness to testify about the locomotive engineer’s actions and their potential danger.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for Union Pacific and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Hess’s expert testimony and that the error was prejudicial to Richard’s case. View "Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law