Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A county office established to oversee the sheriff’s department received a whistleblower complaint and, in conducting its investigation, issued subpoenas to certain sheriff’s employees seeking documents and testimony. The sheriff’s employees refused to comply, and both the sheriff’s office and the deputy sheriffs’ union asserted that the oversight office did not have authority to issue subpoenas related to whistleblower investigations. The oversight office then petitioned the Sonoma County Superior Court for an order enforcing the subpoenas and initiating contempt proceedings against the noncompliant parties.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the oversight office’s request, finding that it did not have the authority to issue the subpoenas under the relevant laws and local ordinances. The oversight office appealed this denial, arguing that state law granted it subpoena power and that no labor agreement or local ordinance eliminated this authority.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. It first determined that the trial court’s order was appealable as a final judgment. On the merits, the appellate court held that section 25303.7 of the Government Code directly grants subpoena power to sheriff oversight entities created under that statute, and that the oversight office in question qualified as such an entity—even though it was not named “inspector general.” The court further held that the existence of a labor agreement between the county and the union did not eliminate the statutory subpoena authority and that any contrary provisions in the agreement could not override state law. The court also rejected arguments that the oversight office lacked authority to investigate the sheriff individually, and found that newly enacted law clarified that such entities have access to peace officer personnel records. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to enforce the subpoenas. View "Independent Office of Law v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Two married tenured professors at California State University, Chico alleged that they were subjected to harassment and discrimination by their department chair, with one professor experiencing conduct targeted at her gender and Korean ancestry. Despite their reports to university administration, the university did not intervene. As a result, one professor suffered serious mental health consequences, leading their doctor to recommend that she not work in the same environment as the chair. The university’s lack of response allegedly forced both professors to resign and accept positions at another university. After their resignation, the university initiated an investigation into one professor for an alleged violation of student privacy laws and communicated these allegations to the new employer, which the professors claimed was intended to sabotage their new employment. There were also alleged delays in transferring their lab equipment.The professors filed suit in the Superior Court of Butte County, asserting, among other claims, retaliation and whistleblower retaliation under California law. The university filed a special motion to strike these two causes of action under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the claims were based in part on communications protected by the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding the university’s actions involved an official proceeding but also concluding that the professors demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on their claims.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court held that the university failed to carry its burden to show that all actions underlying the challenged causes of action were protected activity. The court clarified that the presence of some protected communications within the allegations does not mean the entire cause of action arises from protected activity. The judgment denying the anti-SLAPP motion was therefore affirmed. View "Pechkis v. Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

Several former executives and employees of a storage company were terminated or allegedly constructively terminated and subsequently brought claims against the company and its principals for wrongful termination, retaliation, harassment, and related causes of action. The company, in turn, sued two of the former executives, alleging breach of contract and misuse of confidential information, including forwarding company emails to personal accounts. The emails at issue contained communications from the company’s legal counsel and were allegedly attorney-client privileged. After their terminations, the former employees provided these emails to their attorney for use in their lawsuits against the company.The Superior Court of Orange County considered the company’s motions to disqualify the law firm representing the former employees, based on the firm’s possession and use of the disputed emails. The court found the emails were privileged and that the company held the privilege. However, it denied the motions, reasoning that the employees had been intended recipients of the emails, that privileged content would not be used to the company’s disadvantage, and that the emails were central to both parties’ claims.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court determined that the proper analytical framework for attorney disqualification, as set forth in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., should apply not only to inadvertently disclosed privileged material but also to situations where an attorney receives material that was impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization. The appellate court found the trial court erred in its legal analysis, failed to properly apply the relevant standard regarding future prejudice, and made unsupported findings. The court reversed the trial court’s orders and remanded for reconsideration of the disqualification motions under the correct legal standards. View "Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson" on Justia Law

A former employee brought a class action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging violations of California wage and hour laws and other employment-related statutes. After the complaint was filed, the employer entered into approximately 954 individual settlement agreements with other employees, providing cash payments in exchange for releases of claims. The plaintiff did not sign such an agreement but moved for class certification and later sought to invalidate the individual settlements on the grounds of fraud and coercion, arguing the employer misrepresented the litigation’s status and the scope of the settlements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County partially granted the motion, ruling that the individual settlement agreements were voidable due to fraud or duress and ordered that a curative notice be sent to affected employees. The court’s notice advised that employees could rescind their agreements and join the class action, but did not require immediate repayment of settlement funds to the employer. The employer objected, arguing the notice should have informed employees that they might be required to return the settlement money if they rescinded and the employer ultimately prevailed in the litigation. The trial court declined to include this language, instead following certain federal cases that allowed offsetting the settlement amount against any recovery but did not require repayment before judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on a writ. The court held that under California Civil Code sections 1689, 1691, and 1693, employees who rescind their settlement agreements may be required to repay the consideration they received, but repayment can be delayed until final judgment unless the employer shows substantial prejudice from delay. The court also found the trial court retains equitable authority to adjust repayment at judgment under section 1692. The appellate court directed the trial court to reconsider the curative notice in accordance with these principles. Each side was ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A former employee brought suit against his prior employer, alleging that the employer’s compensation plan for commissions violated several provisions of the California Labor Code. The employee claimed that the employer’s use of a “windfall” provision, which limited commission payments when revenue goals were substantially exceeded, resulted in retroactive reductions to earned commissions. The employer invoked this provision after the employee and others exceeded their sales goals, causing the employee’s final commission payment to be lower than anticipated. The employee resigned and later sought civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), as well as damages for alleged unpaid wages and other Labor Code violations.The Superior Court of Alameda County compelled arbitration of the employee’s individual claims but allowed the PAGA claims to proceed in court. During arbitration, the arbitrator found in favor of the employer on all individual claims, concluding that the compensation plan’s “windfall” provision did not violate the Labor Code sections at issue. The arbitrator determined that the commissions in question were not subject to the statutory requirements argued by the employee, and that the plan did not involve unlawful wage recapture or secret underpayment. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award, denied the employee’s motion for summary adjudication on the PAGA claim, and subsequently granted the employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the arbitration resolved the issue of whether the employee was an “aggrieved employee” with standing under PAGA.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration agreement was not illusory, that the arbitrator’s findings precluded the employee from maintaining PAGA standing, and that the employer’s commission plan did not violate the cited Labor Code provisions. The judgment in favor of the employer was affirmed. View "Sorokunov v. NetApp, Inc." on Justia Law

A former participant in a Zen Buddhist center’s residential training programs asserted wage-and-hour claims against the center and two of its leaders, arguing he was owed various wages and penalties for work performed during his time in the center’s programs. The center operates multiple facilities, offers residential programs, and generates income from guest activities and commercial events. The plaintiff undertook tasks such as guesthouse cleaning, kitchen work, gardening, and guest cooking, receiving modest stipends and room and board. After leaving the center, he filed his claims, alleging unpaid minimum and overtime wages and other statutory violations.The Labor Commissioner held in favor of the plaintiff and found the center, as well as the two individual leaders, liable for significant amounts. The center and the individuals appealed to the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the individual appeals on the ground that only the center, not the individuals, was required to post an appeal bond. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the “ministerial exception” of the First Amendment barred the plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims due to the religious nature of the organization and the plaintiff’s role as a minister.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the summary judgment. The court held that the ministerial exception does not categorically bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers against religious organizations in the absence of evidence that adjudicating the claims would require resolving ecclesiastical questions or interfere with religious autonomy. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the individual appeals, holding that only the employer (the center) was required to post the statutory undertaking, not the individual leaders. The judgment was thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Ehrenkranz v. S.F. Zen Center" on Justia Law

An employee working as a prep cook at a restaurant was injured during a physical altercation with a co-worker. The altercation arose out of a workplace argument that escalated, resulting in the co-worker striking the employee and causing significant injury. The injured employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, while the employer and its insurer denied liability, asserting the “initial physical aggressor” defense under California Labor Code section 3600(a)(7), arguing that the employee was the initial physical aggressor and thus barred from recovery.The matter was tried before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ), who heard testimony from all involved and found that the employee was the initial physical aggressor, based largely on the credibility of eyewitnesses. The WCJ denied the employee’s claim for compensation. The employee timely filed a petition for reconsideration with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Although the petition was filed and transmitted within the statutory 60-day period, the WCAB did not review it until after the deadline. The WCAB ultimately granted reconsideration, rescinded the WCJ’s denial, and found that the “initial physical aggressor” defense had not been proven, thus allowing the employee’s claim.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the WCAB’s order. The court held that under former section 5909 of the Labor Code, the WCAB lost jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconsideration after the 60-day statutory period elapsed, unless grounds for equitable tolling were present. The court concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted here because there was no evidence of reasonable diligence or special circumstances justifying such relief. Therefore, the court reversed the WCAB’s order and decision after reconsideration. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose after a public university system in California revised its student vaccination policy, reducing the number of mandatory immunizations required for incoming students as of fall 2023. The faculty union, representing teaching and academic staff, believed this policy change could negatively affect the health and safety of faculty members, especially those who are immunocompromised. Upon learning of the change shortly after its adoption, the union formally demanded bargaining over the policy’s effects. The university responded that the policy did not pertain to employment terms but was willing to meet and discuss the union’s concerns. The union declined this offer and instead filed an unfair practice charge, alleging the university failed to bargain in good faith.An administrative law judge for the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) heard the case and found that, while the vaccination policy itself was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, its foreseeable effects on faculty health required effects bargaining. The judge concluded the university violated its statutory duty by implementing the policy without bargaining and ordered remedies including rescinding the policy and compensating affected employees. The university contested these findings, asserting it neither implemented the policy before the charge was filed nor refused to bargain, and that accommodations for affected faculty were already available under disability laws.On review, PERB largely upheld the administrative law judge’s findings, holding the university had a duty to bargain over the effects of the policy and had begun implementing it without sufficient notice and opportunity for bargaining. However, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, found that while substantial evidence supported PERB’s conclusion that the policy had reasonably foreseeable effects on faculty health and thus required effects bargaining, there was no substantial evidence the university had implemented the policy or definitively refused to bargain prior to the union’s charge. Therefore, the court affirmed PERB’s ruling on the duty to bargain effects, but vacated the finding of a statutory violation and the associated remedies, remanding the matter for the parties to engage in effects bargaining. View "Trustees of the Cal. State Univ. v. Public Emp. Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of California State University, Chico, filed suit against her prior employer and other parties alleging employment discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and wrongful termination. She initiated the lawsuit on April 19, 2019. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310, as extended by Judicial Council emergency rule 10 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, she was required to bring her case to trial by October 19, 2024. However, at a case management conference in March 2024, the trial court scheduled the trial for February 3, 2025, a date beyond the statutory deadline.After the trial date was set, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to bring it to trial within the statutory period. They argued that no exception to the deadline applied, specifically contesting the existence of any oral agreement to extend the deadline. The plaintiff opposed dismissal, asserting that both parties had verbally agreed in open court to the February 2025 trial date, and that this agreement was recorded in the minute order. However, the minute order only documented the setting of the trial and related conferences, and contained no indication of any oral stipulation or agreement. The Superior Court of Butte County found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a valid oral agreement to extend the deadline under section 583.330, subdivision (b), and granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard, and interpreted the statute de novo. The appellate court held that an oral agreement to extend the statutory trial deadline under section 583.330, subdivision (b), must be reflected in the court’s minutes or a transcript. Because the record did not include any such evidence, the exception did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal and awarded costs to the defendants. View "Randolph v. Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

Several individuals who were employed by the City and County of San Francisco and were at least 40 years old when hired brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the City’s method for calculating disability retirement benefits under its retirement system discriminated against employees based on age. The system employs two formulas; Formula 1 is used if it yields a benefit exceeding a percentage threshold, while Formula 2 is used if the threshold is not met. Plaintiffs argued that Formula 2, which imputes years of service until age 60, resulted in lower benefits for those who entered the retirement system at age 40 or older, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).After initial proceedings in the San Francisco City and County Superior Court—including a demurrer sustained on statute of limitations grounds and subsequent reversal by the Court of Appeal—the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting FEHA claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact, as well as claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and equal protection violations. The trial court certified a class and denied summary judgment due to triable issues of fact. A bench trial followed, where both parties presented expert testimony on whether Formula 2 disparately impacted older employees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s findings. It affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiffs failed to prove intentional age discrimination or disparate impact under FEHA. The court found that Formula 2 was motivated by pension status and credited years of service, not by age, and that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient as it was based on hypothetical calculations rather than actual data. The trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint after trial was also upheld, as any alleged error was not reversible on the record. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law