Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Oakland Education Association (OEA) represents certain employees of the Oakland Unified School District (District). Following a dispute over school closures approved by the District, OEA members conducted a one-day strike. OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), claiming the District committed unfair practices under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). The District filed a competing charge, claiming OEA’s strike was an unfair practice under EERA.PERB issued separate complaints for the competing charges and bifurcated the hearings. In its first decision, PERB found the District violated EERA. In its second decision, PERB held that OEA’s strike was legal because it was provoked by the District’s unfair practices and OEA had negotiated in good faith. The District did not challenge the first decision but contested the second, arguing that OEA’s strike was illegal and violated constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that public school employees may engage in unfair practice strikes under EERA. It concluded that PERB did not clearly err in finding that such strikes are allowed and that OEA’s one-day strike did not violate the rights to education, due process, or equal protection. The court also found that neither EERA nor the due process clause prohibits pre-impasse unfair practice strikes conducted before PERB determines an unfair practice has occurred. However, the court noted that PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but deemed this error harmless. The court affirmed PERB’s decision. View "Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

A Hobby Lobby manager called law enforcement because Kristopher Birtcher appeared to be suffering from a mental health crisis at the store. Birtcher, who was unarmed and had committed no crime, tried to flee when sheriff’s deputies arrived. The deputies subdued him by double-cuffing his hands behind his back, securing his ankles, tying his ankles to a cord around his waist, and applying bodyweight pressure to his back while he was lying face down. Birtcher gasped that he couldn’t breathe and called for help. He stopped moving after several minutes, and the deputies kept him in a prone position for another 50 seconds before turning him on his side, then later returned him to a prone position. Birtcher died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest within 25 minutes of the deputies’ arrival.Birtcher’s minor daughter, A.B., brought state claims in state court after unsuccessfully litigating federal claims. She asserted claims for wrongful death, battery, negligence, and negligent training, and a survival action for violation of the Bane Act. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and ruling that the restraint was “by the book.” The court also ruled that A.B. failed to identify a legal basis for her negligent training theory against Sheriff Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that there were triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim, noting that the deputies’ use of forceful prone restraint with bodyweight compression could be seen as excessive. The court also found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as A.B. had identified a statutory basis for the claim, and Sheriff Gore failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of material fact. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Joanne Allison, a former registered nurse, filed a class action lawsuit against her former employer, Dignity Health, alleging unpaid work, meal period, and rest break violations. She sought class certification for registered nurses at three Dignity hospitals since June 1, 2014. Allison's expert claimed that time records showed over 70% of shifts had noncompliant meal periods. She also argued that work-issued communication devices interrupted rest breaks, violating labor laws.The trial court initially granted partial class certification, finding common questions suitable for class treatment, including the legality of Dignity's premium request requirement and the impact of communication devices on breaks. However, Dignity later moved to decertify the class, citing post-certification discovery that revealed significant variations in nurses' experiences and practices, undermining the manageability of class-wide adjudication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering new evidence from post-certification depositions, which showed varied reasons for noncompliant meal periods, such as personal preferences and mistakes. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to disregard the Steiner survey due to methodological flaws and potential biases, which rendered it unreliable for proving class-wide liability.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decertification order, agreeing that individualized inquiries predominated over common questions, making class treatment unmanageable. The court also noted that the evidence did not support a uniform practice of requiring nurses to carry work phones during breaks, further complicating the rest break claims. Thus, the order decertifying the class was affirmed. View "Allison v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Three former or current employees of Cross Country Staffing, Inc. (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against their employer, alleging various labor law violations. Upon hiring, each plaintiff signed two agreements: an Arbitration Agreement mandating arbitration for all employment-related claims and an Employment Agreement that included provisions favoring the employer, such as non-compete clauses and the right to seek injunctive relief in court without posting a bond.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Cross Country Staffing's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Arbitration Agreement, when read together with the Employment Agreement, was unconscionable. The court determined that the agreements were procedurally unconscionable due to their adhesive nature and substantively unconscionable because they unfairly favored the employer by allowing it to litigate its likely claims in court while forcing employees to arbitrate their likely claims. The court also noted the non-mutual attorney fees provisions and the employee's mandated concessions regarding injunctive relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the two agreements should be read together under Civil Code section 1642, as they were part of the same transaction and related to the same subject matter. The court found significant substantive unconscionability in the agreements' imbalance of arbitration obligations and the employer's access to court for its claims. The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to sever the unconscionable provisions, concluding that the agreements' unconscionability permeated the entire arbitration framework and that refusing to enforce the Arbitration Agreement served the interests of justice. View "Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Deborah Hemstead filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer, United Indian Health Services, Inc. (United Indian). United Indian argued that it was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and thus not subject to the state workers' compensation system. The administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected this claim, applying the five-factor "arm of the tribe" test from People v. Miami Nation Enterprises, and found that United Indian did not qualify for sovereign immunity. The ALJ's decision was based on factors such as United Indian's creation under state law, lack of explicit tribal intent to share immunity, and the financial relationship between United Indian and the tribes.The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) denied United Indian's request for reconsideration, adopting the ALJ's findings. The Board found no abuse of discretion in the ALJ's rejection of United Indian's claim of sovereign immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the Board and ALJ erred in denying sovereign immunity to United Indian. The court found that United Indian's method of creation, purpose, tribal control, and financial relationship with the tribes all weighed in favor of granting sovereign immunity. The court noted that United Indian was created by several tribes to provide healthcare services under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which promotes tribal self-governance and self-sufficiency. The court held that United Indian is entitled to sovereign immunity and reversed the Board's decision, remanding the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United Indian Health etc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare, hired Karla Velarde as a care coordinator and required her to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. Velarde was later terminated and filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and violation of whistleblower protections. Newport Healthcare and its director of residential services, Amanda Seymour, filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court found that Velarde was pressured to sign the agreement, which she did not want to do, and that the agreement unlawfully prohibited her from seeking judicial review of an arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County ruled that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was presented as an adhesive contract buried among 31 documents that Velarde had to sign quickly while an HR manager waited. Additionally, Newport Healthcare's HR manager made false representations about the nature and terms of the agreement, which contradicted the written terms, rendering the agreement substantively unconscionable. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration based on these findings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found ample evidence of procedural unconscionability due to the pressure and misrepresentations made by Newport Healthcare. The court also found substantive unconscionability because the agreement did not conform to Velarde's reasonable expectations and placed her in a disadvantageous position. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent George Zeber filed a workers' compensation claim for cumulative injury sustained during his employment with the New York Yankees from 1968 to 1978. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found Zeber had a compensable injury but deferred any award pending further proceedings, including mandatory arbitration of the insurance coverage dispute. Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) disputed the applicability of mandatory arbitration, arguing it only applies to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, while Zeber's injury occurred no later than 1978.The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found Zeber sustained an injury during his employment but deferred findings on permanent disability and other issues. The WCJ also found the statute of limitations did not bar Zeber’s claim, as he only became aware of his right to file a claim in 2017 or 2018. The WCJ determined the New York Yankees had insurance coverage provided by Travelers and noted that disputes involving the right of contribution must be sent to arbitration. Travelers filed for reconsideration, which the WCAB partially granted, amending the WCJ’s decision to defer the insurance coverage issue to mandatory arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that section 5275, subdivision (a)(1) applies only to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1990. The WCJ had not made a finding on the date of injury for purposes of section 5275. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination of the date of injury for the purposes of mandatory arbitration. The court emphasized that the "date of injury" for cumulative injuries should be determined under section 5412, which considers when the employee first suffered disability and knew or should have known it was work-related. View "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., alleging violations of the California Labor Code. He brought five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his PAGA claim without leave to amend. The court concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties.The trial court’s decision was based on the interpretation that Osuna needed to have suffered a violation within the one-year period before filing his PAGA notice. Osuna appealed, arguing that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim because he suffered Labor Code violations during his employment with Spectrum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the standing requirements under PAGA. The appellate court held that to have standing under PAGA, an employee must have been employed by the alleged violator and suffered at least one Labor Code violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and does not affect standing.The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law