Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Five Petitioners argued the Board’s grant-for-study procedure is an unauthorized way to extend the 60-day deadline. A statute requires the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) to make a reasoned decision when granting reconsideration.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioners, the Board, and Amicus Curiae’s requests for judicial notice of items relating to the legislative and statutory history of the Board’s reconsideration procedure and to the Board’s records. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Board to end its practice of granting petitions for reconsideration solely for purposes of further study and to comply with section 5908.5 when granting petitions for reconsideration, including the requirement that the Board “state the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for its decision.” The court also held that the Board is not required to issue a final ruling on the merits within 60 days. Statutory language negates the Petitioners’ argument to the contrary. View "Earley v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs’ petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The court held the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law.the voters of Los Angeles County (County) amended the County charter by enacting Measure J. The charter amendment adopted by Measure J requires the County Board of Supervisors (Board) to annually allocate at least 10 percent of the County’s locally generated unrestricted revenues in the general fund to direct community investment (such as youth programs, job training, rental assistance, and affordable housing) and alternatives to incarceration (including health, mental health, and substance use disorder programs). The charter amendment also specifically prohibits Measure J funds from being allocated to any carceral system or law enforcement agency. Immediately after Measure J’s enactment, a coalition of County employee unions and two individuals filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor (auditor), and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The trial court granted the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court wrote that because the charter amendment enacted by Measure J defines a “power of the County’s “governing bod[y]” (the Board)—and because it concerns “[t]he performance of functions required by statute” (adopting a budget)—it is a permissible exercise of the County’s authority to amend its charter. Further, contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law. Measure J thus is enforceable, and the court, therefore, reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Coalition of County Unions v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Nicole Woodworth was a registered nurse at Loma Linda University Medical Center (the medical center) from December 2011 to June 2014. In June 2014, she filed this putative class action against the medical center, alleging a host of wage and hour claims on behalf of herself and other employees. She later amended her complaint to add a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After several years of litigation, only her individual claim for failure to provide rest periods remained. The trial court had granted four motions for summary judgment in favor of the medical center, denied Woodworth’s motion for class certification, and denied her motion to strike putative class members’ declarations. Woodworth appealed those orders, which disposed of the putative class members’ claims, the PAGA claims, and all of her individual claims (apart from her claim about rest periods). The medical center moved to dismiss most of Woodworth’s appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied the motion, affirming the orders in large part. Specifically, the Court reversed in part the order denying class certification: the court erred with respect to Woodworth’s proposed wage statement class, which consisted of employees who received allegedly inaccurate wage statements. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider certification of that class. View "Woodworth v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

This case was the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit against HSBC Card Services, Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together, HSBC) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleged HSBC intentionally recorded confidential calls without her consent. She also alleged HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her cellular and cordless phones without her consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to record the calls. The trial court ultimately entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of consent. Rojas appealed that judgment, contending the trial court made several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and that the evidence did not support its findings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded. Although the Court determined the record did not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and her daughter, that determination did not require reversal. "What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal calls may not mitigate that risk." View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Alki David Productions, Inc. (ADP) appealed from the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff after a jury found ADP liable for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 232.5, which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who discloses information about the employer’s working conditions, and section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who refuses to participate in an activity that would violate the law or who discloses information the employee reasonably believes would disclose a violation of the law. The jury awarded Plaintiff $7,068,717 in damages (consisting of $368,717 in economic damages, $700,000 in non-economic damages, and $6 million in punitive damages). The jury further found that ADP terminated Plaintiff’s employment with malice, oppression, or fraud. The trial court denied ADP’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record contains substantial evidence of multiple other municipal code violations in the correction notice issued by a city inspector on September 25, 2017. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Plaintiff’s continued work at the theater would have violated the law, and the trial court’s finding in this regard was not legally erroneous. Further, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Plaintiff’s disclosure was a substantial motivating reason for his termination. View "Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2018, Anaheim voters approved a Living Wage Ordinance (LWO). The LWO applied to hospitality employers in the Anaheim or Disneyland Resort areas that benefited from a “City Subsidy.” In 2019, Kathleen Grace and other plaintiffs (“Employees”) filed a class action complaint against the Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. (“Disney”) and Sodexo, Inc., and Sodexomagic, LLC (“Sodexo”) alleging a violation of the LWO (Sodexo operated restaurants in Disney’s theme parks). Disney moved for summary judgment and Sodexo joined. It was undisputed the Employees were not being paid the required minimum hourly wage under the LWO. However, Disney argued it was not covered under the LWO as a matter of law because it was not benefitting from a “City Subsidy.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed: “A ‘City Subsidy’ is any agreement with the city pursuant to which a person other than the city has a right to receive a rebate of transient occupancy tax, sales tax, entertainment tax, property tax or other taxes, presently or in the future, matured or unmatured.” The Court determined that through a "reimbursement agreement," Disney had the right to a rebate on transient occupancy taxes (paid by hotel guests), sales taxes (paid by consumers), and property taxes (paid by Disney), in any years when the City’s tax revenues were sufficient to meet certain bond obligations. Consequently, the Court found Disney received a “City Subsidy” within the meaning of the LWO and was therefore obligated to pay its employees the designated minimum wages. View "Grace v. The Walt Disney Company" on Justia Law

Thai was an IBM employee. To accomplish his duties, he required, among other things, internet access, telephone service, a telephone headset, and a computer and accessories. On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom signed the COVID-19 “stay home” order. IBM directed Thai and thousands of his coworkers to continue performing their regular job duties from home. Thai and his coworkers personally paid for the services and equipment necessary to do their jobs while working from home. IBM never reimbursed its employees for these expenses.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a complaint under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Labor Code 2699). Section 2802(a)) requires an employer to reimburse an employee “for all necessary expenditures . . . incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” The trial court’s conclusion that the Governor’s order was an intervening cause of the work-from-home expenses that absolved IBM of liability under section 2802 is inconsistent with the statutory language. The work-from-home expenses were inherent to IBM’s business and the work performed was for the benefit of IBM. View "Thai v. International Business Machines Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Steve Ahn was a sales executive for a title insurer who claimed his sales figures were adversely affected when his employer barred him from using a particular sales pitch to solicit customers from a competitor who was also a proposed corporate merger partner. Ahn’s pitch told prospective clients that after the proposed merger was finalized, they would have no choice but to comply with his company’s higher-cost, less flexible underwriting standards. He attempted to use this pitch to convince these clients to abandon the competitor before the merger. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' consideration was whether Ahn had standing under the California antitrust statute, known as the Cartwright Act, to assert a cause of action. To this, the Court found that Ahn did not claim injury from the alleged anticompetitive aspects of the proposed merging entities' agreement, but rather from conduct that emphasized their competitive differences. "A complaint that he could not lure customers with a pitch about their restricted postmerger options does not constitute an antitrust injury, meaning Ahn lacks standing to sue under the Cartwright Act." The Court's conclusion that Ahn could not demonstrate an antitrust violation affected his derivative economic relations tort claims, both of which required independently wrongful conduct. Concluding the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment, the appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co." on Justia Law