Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, prohibit law enforcement gang participation and authorize revocation of peace officer certification for serious misconduct, including gang participation. On May 12, 2023, the OIG sent letters to 35 Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about law enforcement gangs and to display and provide photographs of certain tattoos. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim and sought injunctive relief, arguing that the interviews violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the OIG from conducting the interviews until the County completed its meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA or until the unfair labor practice claim was adjudicated. The court found that the interview directive had significant and adverse effects on the deputies' working conditions, thus triggering the duty to meet and confer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the OIG’s interview directive, which required deputies to disclose their own and their colleagues' gang affiliations under threat of discipline, had significant and adverse effects on working conditions. The court held that these effects necessitated bargaining under the MMBA. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the interim harm, noting the lack of compelling need for immediate investigation and the potential irreparable harm to ALADS from the County’s failure to meet and confer. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. By July 2017, Slone had not been paid by IVMSMG for several months and subsequently resigned, citing financial reasons and the Center's requirement for future board certification. He then began working full-time for IPA and did not perform any surgeries thereafter. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a lawsuit against the Center in February 2021, alleging unlawful retaliation under Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial on this cause of action. The trial court found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Slone did not meet his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a full-time administrative role with IPA and did not suffer any damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Christina Leeper entered into an independent contractor agreement with Shipt, Inc. to provide services as a Shipt shopper. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration. Leeper filed a complaint against Shipt and its parent company, Target Corporation, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging that Shipt misclassified her and other workers as independent contractors, violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Leeper sought civil penalties and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shipt and Target's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Leeper's PAGA action did not include any individual claims subject to arbitration under the parties' agreement. The court concluded that the action was solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action to compel to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim based on the unambiguous statutory language and legislative history. Consequently, the court directed the lower court to issue a new order compelling arbitration of Leeper's individual PAGA claim and staying the litigation of the representative PAGA claim portion of the lawsuit. The appellate court awarded costs on appeal to Shipt and Target. View "Leeper v. Shipt, Inc." on Justia Law

Pauline Mary Huff filed a class action and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against her former employer, Interior Specialists, Inc., alleging various wage-and-hour violations. Huff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was signed by someone else named "William" in DocuSign. The trial court found sufficient evidence that Huff consented to the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The trial court consolidated the class and PAGA actions. Interior Specialists then moved to compel Huff’s PAGA claims to arbitration. The trial court reiterated its earlier finding that Huff validly signed the agreement and, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, ordered Huff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration and dismissed her nonindividual PAGA claims without prejudice for lack of standing.Huff appealed the October 21, 2022 order, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her nonindividual PAGA claims and in finding that she signed the arbitration agreement. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, concluded that Huff timely appealed the October 21 order. On the merits, the court reversed the dismissal of Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., which rejected Viking River’s interpretation of California law on standing. The court did not address Huff’s arguments concerning the electronic signature, as the reversal based on Adolph rendered it unnecessary.The court remanded the case with directions to stay Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims pending the completion of arbitration. Huff was awarded her costs on appeal. View "Huff v. Interior Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves 11 public charter schools (the Schools) seeking to overturn a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the Schools violated section 3550 of the Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership by sending e-mails that tended to influence employees' decisions regarding union representation by United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA). The Schools argued that PERB's interpretation of section 3550 was erroneous and that the statute was unconstitutional as it violated free speech protections.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially dismissed the allegations, finding that the e-mails did not contain threats or promises and thus did not violate the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). However, PERB, applying its new interpretation from Regents I and Regents II decisions, found that the e-mails violated section 3550 because they tended to influence employee choice regarding union membership. PERB rejected the Schools' defenses, including claims of business necessity and constitutional free speech rights.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court upheld PERB's interpretation of section 3550, finding it not clearly erroneous. The court also rejected the Schools' constitutional claims, determining that section 3550 regulates only government speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment or the California Constitution. The court found that the Schools, as public employers, and their administrators and Alliance CMO, as agents, were engaged in government speech when communicating about union matters.The court concluded that substantial evidence supported PERB's findings that the Schools could be held responsible for the e-mails sent by Alliance CMO and the School administrators under theories of actual and apparent authority. The court affirmed PERB's decision and order. View "Alliance Marce & Eva Stern Math & Sci. High Sch. v. PERB" on Justia Law

Annalycia Jenkins, a former employee of Dermatology Management, LLC, filed a class action lawsuit against her employer after resigning. She alleged unfair competition, and the employer sought to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jenkins signed on her first day of work. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable due to its lack of mutuality, shortened statute of limitations, unreasonable discovery restrictions, and requirement for the parties to equally share the arbitrator’s fees and costs. Procedurally, the court noted the agreement was a contract of adhesion, pre-signed by the employer months before Jenkins was hired, and presented to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without the presence of the Chief People Officer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable due to the inequality of bargaining power and the pre-signed nature of the agreement. It also upheld the finding of substantive unconscionability, noting the lack of mutuality, the unreasonable one-year statute of limitations, the unfair cost-sharing provision, and the restrictive discovery terms. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions, as doing so would condone an illegal scheme and incentivize employers to draft one-sided agreements. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Harold Winston, an African-American male with over 30 years of service, sued his employer, the County of Los Angeles, alleging race-based discrimination, retaliation, and failure to maintain a discrimination-free environment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. While the case was pending, section 1102.5 was amended to allow courts to award reasonable attorney fees to prevailing whistleblower plaintiffs. After the jury found in Winston’s favor on his retaliation claim under section 1102.5, he filed a motion for attorney fees based on the new provision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Winston’s motion for attorney fees, ruling that the fee provision did not apply retroactively to his case, which was filed in 2019 before the amendment took effect. The court found no legislative intent supporting retroactive application and noted that Winston did not prevail on his FEHA claims, which could have provided a basis for attorney fees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that a new statute authorizing an award of attorney fees applies to actions pending on the statute’s effective date. The court cited case precedent establishing that newly enacted attorney fee provisions are procedural and apply to pending litigation. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with directions for the trial court to determine the appropriateness and reasonableness of Winston’s fee request. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Winston v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such actions, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices for over a year. However, JMM failed to pay an invoice by the due date of September 12, 2022, but paid it immediately upon being reminded on October 18, 2022. Trujillo then sought to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, which does not allow exceptions for inadvertent delays or lack of prejudice. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), which refers to the company that included a pre-dispute arbitration provision in a contract. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez later filed a class action lawsuit against all ten Nowhere entities, alleging various Labor Code violations. He claimed that all entities were his joint employers, sharing control over his employment conditions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory entities were intertwined with his claims against Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with his employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employer theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Therefore, it would be unfair for Gonzalez to claim joint employment for liability purposes while denying the arbitration agreement's applicability.The appellate court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities, concluding that all of Gonzalez's claims should be arbitrated. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law

Ashley Howell, a temporary pre-licensed psychiatric technician, was employed by the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) from January 2, 2020, to January 24, 2020. Howell was terminated after DSH discovered she was on medical leave from her previous job due to a 2017 sexual assault, which she did not disclose during her pre-employment health screening. Howell filed a lawsuit against DSH, claiming mental and physical disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Napa County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DSH on Howell’s claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process. Howell dismissed her claim for failure to prevent discrimination. The jury found in favor of Howell on her mental disability discrimination claim, awarding her $36,751.25 in lost earnings and health insurance benefits but nothing for pain and suffering. The court denied Howell’s motion for a new trial on non-economic damages and granted DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, striking the award for lost health insurance benefits. Howell was awarded $135,102 in attorney fees and costs but did not receive a ruling on her request for prejudgment interest.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decisions to deny Howell’s motion for a new trial and to grant DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate court found that Howell did not provide evidence of out-of-pocket expenses for lost health insurance benefits. The court also upheld the trial court’s award of $135,102 in attorney fees and costs, finding Howell’s request for $1.75 million to be unreasonable. However, the appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to address Howell’s request for prejudgment interest. View "Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals" on Justia Law