Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A company that provides employee management services hired an employee in California in September 2021. At the start of her employment, she completed onboarding documents that did not mention arbitration. About five months later, she was asked to sign additional documents, including an arbitration agreement, a voluntary dispute resolution policy, and a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement (CND). The arbitration agreement required most employment-related disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration, with certain exceptions for claims related to confidential information. The CND allowed the company to bring certain claims in court and permitted the company to seek injunctive relief without posting a bond or proving actual damages. The employee later filed a lawsuit alleging various employment law violations.The Solano County Superior Court reviewed the company’s motion to compel arbitration. The company argued that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and, if any provision was found unenforceable, it should be severed. The employee opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable due to the manner in which it was presented and its one-sided terms. The trial court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, particularly because it forced the employee’s claims into arbitration while allowing the company’s likely claims to proceed in court, and because of a confidentiality provision that restricted informal discovery. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration and declined to sever the offending provisions, finding the agreement permeated by unconscionability.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement and the CND, read together, were unconscionable due to lack of mutuality and an overly broad confidentiality provision. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to sever the unconscionable terms and concluded that any error in denying a statement of decision was harmless. View "Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

Wayne Gandy, a professional football player, spent 15 years in the NFL, beginning with the Los Angeles Rams in 1994, then the St. Louis Rams, followed by the Pittsburgh Steelers, New Orleans Saints, and finally the Atlanta Falcons until his retirement in 2009. Gandy signed his initial contract in California with the LA Rams, which also covered his time with the STL Rams. Throughout his career, he played a limited number of games and practiced occasionally in California, but the majority of his employment and games were outside the state.After retiring, Gandy filed a workers’ compensation claim in California in 2015, alleging cumulative injuries from his NFL career. The claim named several teams as employers. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found that the Falcons provided workers’ compensation coverage under Georgia law, which also covered Gandy’s work in California, and determined both Gandy and the Falcons were exempt from California workers’ compensation law under Labor Code section 3600.5. The WCJ did not address the liability of other teams. Gandy petitioned for reconsideration, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) rescinded the WCJ’s decision, asserting jurisdiction over Gandy’s claim based on his initial California contract and disregarding the choice of law and forum selection clauses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the Falcons are exempt from liability under California workers’ compensation law pursuant to Labor Code sections 3600.5(c) and (d), as Gandy did not meet the statutory requirements for coverage: he worked only one season for a California-based team and spent less than 20 percent of his career in California. The WCAB’s decision was annulled, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Atlanta Falcons v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by a staffing company and assigned to work at a warehousing and logistics firm, performing duties as a materials handler and forklift operator. He filed a class action and a separate representative action alleging various wage and hour violations, including claims for unpaid minimum wages, waiting time penalties, and civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The two cases were consolidated. The plaintiff and his direct employer had entered into an arbitration agreement, which referenced the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules but did not explicitly state that the arbitrator would decide issues of arbitrability.The defendants moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claims, dismiss class allegations, and stay judicial proceedings. They argued that the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and that the AAA rules incorporated into the agreement delegated arbitrability issues to the arbitrator. The plaintiff opposed, asserting exemption from the FAA as a transportation worker and arguing that certain claims, including those under PAGA and for unpaid wages, were not arbitrable under California law. The trial court found the FAA did not apply, applied California law, and held that the agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court compelled arbitration of some claims but allowed others, including minimum wage and PAGA claims, to proceed in court.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that, in the context of a mandatory employment arbitration agreement, mere incorporation of AAA rules without explicit language in the agreement is not clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court also held that claims for waiting time penalties based on minimum wage violations and all PAGA claims were not arbitrable under California law when the FAA does not apply. View "Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee, brought a lawsuit against his employer alleging multiple claims of discrimination and harassment. The employer successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties. During the arbitration, the arbitration provider issued an invoice for fees, which the employer attempted to pay electronically on the last day of the statutory 30-day deadline. However, due to a processing delay, the payment was not received by the provider until three days after the deadline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the employer’s failure to ensure the arbitration fees were received within the 30-day period constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The court vacated its prior order compelling arbitration, returned the case to court, and awarded the plaintiff $1,750 in sanctions for expenses incurred in bringing the motion. The plaintiff then sought over $300,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1), which allows recovery of all fees and costs associated with an abandoned arbitration. The trial court granted only a reduced amount, reasoning that the plaintiff was entitled only to fees and costs for work rendered useless by the termination of arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, considered the impact of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310. Hohenshelt held that federal law preempts a strict application of section 1281.98, and that forfeiture of arbitral rights occurs only if the failure to pay fees is willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent. The appellate court determined that the employer’s late payment was not willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1). The order awarding attorney fees and costs was reversed. View "Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of nurses directly employed by the City and County of San Francisco, represented by their union, brought a class action alleging that the City failed to comply with Labor Code section 512.1, which requires public sector healthcare employers to provide meal and rest breaks and pay premiums for missed breaks. The nurses claimed that since the law’s effective date, the City had not provided the required breaks or compensation. The City and the union had previously negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that set out meal and rest break provisions and remedies for missed breaks, but the nurses argued these did not satisfy the new statutory requirements.The Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, sustained the City’s demurrer, agreeing with the City’s argument that section 512.1 did not clearly apply to charter cities like San Francisco. The court did not address the City’s alternative constitutional argument regarding home rule authority. The nurses appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory language defining “employer” in section 512.1 was ambiguous as to whether it included charter cities and counties such as San Francisco. The court found that neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor legislative findings demonstrated a clear intent by the Legislature to override charter city home rule authority or to apply section 512.1 to charter cities. The court also noted that when the Legislature intends to regulate charter cities, it does so explicitly, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that section 512.1 does not apply to the City and County of San Francisco. View "Levy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After a theft occurred at a licensed marijuana-growing facility in Adelanto, California, the employer, Kavry Management, LLC, required several employees, including Steven McDoniel, to take a polygraph test. McDoniel, who was not advised of his right to refuse the test, took and “failed” two polygraph examinations. He was subsequently terminated from his position, with evidence indicating the termination was due to the polygraph results. McDoniel experienced significant emotional distress and concern for his reputation in the industry following his discharge.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed McDoniel’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, and violations of Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5. The court granted summary adjudication for the employer on the defamation and PAGA claims, and on punitive damages, but allowed the wrongful termination and Labor Code claims to proceed. At trial, the jury found Kavry liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for violating Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5, awarding McDoniel $100,000 in noneconomic damages. The court also imposed a penalty for the personnel records violation and awarded McDoniel attorney fees under section 432.6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that an employer’s violation of Labor Code section 432.2—requiring or demanding an employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continued employment—supports a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court affirmed the jury’s award of noneconomic damages. However, it reversed the attorney fee award, finding that section 432.6 did not apply retroactively to McDoniel’s employment, which ended before the statute’s effective date. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute and found McDoniel forfeited his claim for fees under PAGA. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "McDoniel v. Kavry Management" on Justia Law

A woman diagnosed with fibromyalgia sued her former employer, a state agency, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, failure to engage in an interactive process, disability discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination. The agency resisted early settlement and engaged in extensive, contentious litigation, including opposing amendments to the complaint, filing demurrers and summary adjudication motions, and engaging in protracted discovery. The case proceeded to a six-week jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on all counts and awarded her over $3.3 million in damages, significantly exceeding her earlier settlement offer.Following the verdict, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the agency’s post-trial motions and awarded the plaintiff statutory attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. The plaintiff’s counsel sought fees based on a lodestar calculation, supported by detailed timesheets and expert declarations regarding prevailing market rates. The court accepted most of the plaintiff’s evidence, applied a 1.75 multiplier to pre-verdict fees and a 1.25 multiplier to post-verdict fees, and awarded a total of $4,889,786.03. The court found the agency’s challenges to the number of hours and hourly rates unpersuasive, noting the agency had not meaningfully disputed the hours or provided its own billing records.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the agency’s appeal. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining reasonable hourly rates, accepting the number of hours billed, or applying multipliers to account for contingency risk and preclusion of other employment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Bronshteyn v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law