Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a former employee, brought a lawsuit against his employer alleging multiple claims of discrimination and harassment. The employer successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties. During the arbitration, the arbitration provider issued an invoice for fees, which the employer attempted to pay electronically on the last day of the statutory 30-day deadline. However, due to a processing delay, the payment was not received by the provider until three days after the deadline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the employer’s failure to ensure the arbitration fees were received within the 30-day period constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The court vacated its prior order compelling arbitration, returned the case to court, and awarded the plaintiff $1,750 in sanctions for expenses incurred in bringing the motion. The plaintiff then sought over $300,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1), which allows recovery of all fees and costs associated with an abandoned arbitration. The trial court granted only a reduced amount, reasoning that the plaintiff was entitled only to fees and costs for work rendered useless by the termination of arbitration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, considered the impact of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310. Hohenshelt held that federal law preempts a strict application of section 1281.98, and that forfeiture of arbitral rights occurs only if the failure to pay fees is willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent. The appellate court determined that the employer’s late payment was not willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1281.98, subdivision (c)(1). The order awarding attorney fees and costs was reversed. View "Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of nurses directly employed by the City and County of San Francisco, represented by their union, brought a class action alleging that the City failed to comply with Labor Code section 512.1, which requires public sector healthcare employers to provide meal and rest breaks and pay premiums for missed breaks. The nurses claimed that since the law’s effective date, the City had not provided the required breaks or compensation. The City and the union had previously negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that set out meal and rest break provisions and remedies for missed breaks, but the nurses argued these did not satisfy the new statutory requirements.The Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, sustained the City’s demurrer, agreeing with the City’s argument that section 512.1 did not clearly apply to charter cities like San Francisco. The court did not address the City’s alternative constitutional argument regarding home rule authority. The nurses appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory language defining “employer” in section 512.1 was ambiguous as to whether it included charter cities and counties such as San Francisco. The court found that neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor legislative findings demonstrated a clear intent by the Legislature to override charter city home rule authority or to apply section 512.1 to charter cities. The court also noted that when the Legislature intends to regulate charter cities, it does so explicitly, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that section 512.1 does not apply to the City and County of San Francisco. View "Levy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After a theft occurred at a licensed marijuana-growing facility in Adelanto, California, the employer, Kavry Management, LLC, required several employees, including Steven McDoniel, to take a polygraph test. McDoniel, who was not advised of his right to refuse the test, took and “failed” two polygraph examinations. He was subsequently terminated from his position, with evidence indicating the termination was due to the polygraph results. McDoniel experienced significant emotional distress and concern for his reputation in the industry following his discharge.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed McDoniel’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, and violations of Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5. The court granted summary adjudication for the employer on the defamation and PAGA claims, and on punitive damages, but allowed the wrongful termination and Labor Code claims to proceed. At trial, the jury found Kavry liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for violating Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5, awarding McDoniel $100,000 in noneconomic damages. The court also imposed a penalty for the personnel records violation and awarded McDoniel attorney fees under section 432.6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that an employer’s violation of Labor Code section 432.2—requiring or demanding an employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continued employment—supports a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court affirmed the jury’s award of noneconomic damages. However, it reversed the attorney fee award, finding that section 432.6 did not apply retroactively to McDoniel’s employment, which ended before the statute’s effective date. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute and found McDoniel forfeited his claim for fees under PAGA. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "McDoniel v. Kavry Management" on Justia Law

A woman diagnosed with fibromyalgia sued her former employer, a state agency, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, failure to engage in an interactive process, disability discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination. The agency resisted early settlement and engaged in extensive, contentious litigation, including opposing amendments to the complaint, filing demurrers and summary adjudication motions, and engaging in protracted discovery. The case proceeded to a six-week jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on all counts and awarded her over $3.3 million in damages, significantly exceeding her earlier settlement offer.Following the verdict, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the agency’s post-trial motions and awarded the plaintiff statutory attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. The plaintiff’s counsel sought fees based on a lodestar calculation, supported by detailed timesheets and expert declarations regarding prevailing market rates. The court accepted most of the plaintiff’s evidence, applied a 1.75 multiplier to pre-verdict fees and a 1.25 multiplier to post-verdict fees, and awarded a total of $4,889,786.03. The court found the agency’s challenges to the number of hours and hourly rates unpersuasive, noting the agency had not meaningfully disputed the hours or provided its own billing records.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the agency’s appeal. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining reasonable hourly rates, accepting the number of hours billed, or applying multipliers to account for contingency risk and preclusion of other employment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Bronshteyn v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

Bradley Hirdman filed a complaint against his former employer, Charter Communications, LLC, alleging violations of various Labor Code sections under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Hirdman claimed that Charter improperly classified him as an "exempt employee" for calculating paid sick leave, arguing he should have been classified as a "nonexempt employee" and thus entitled to a different calculation method. Charter contended that Hirdman was correctly classified as an exempt outside salesperson, exempt from overtime compensation requirements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Charter's motion for summary adjudication, agreeing that the statutory language was unambiguous and that section 246, subdivision (l)(3) applied to exempt outside salespersons like Hirdman. The court found that Charter properly calculated and paid sick leave in the same manner as other forms of paid leave.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory language of section 246, subdivision (l)(3) was clear and unambiguous, applying to all exempt employees, including outside salespersons. The court rejected Hirdman's argument that the term "exempt employees" should be limited to those exempt under administrative, executive, or professional exemptions. The court also found that the legislative history and a Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter did not support Hirdman's interpretation. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Charter correctly calculated paid sick leave for Hirdman and other outside salespersons. View "Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Jonathan Egelston, a youth correctional officer, was dismissed from his position by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after he allegedly assaulted and harassed his girlfriend, J.G., and subsequently lied about the incident. The State Personnel Board (SPB) upheld his dismissal following an evidentiary hearing. Egelston then petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the SPB's decision, but the trial court denied his petition.The family law court had previously dismissed J.G.'s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Egelston without prejudice. Egelston argued that this dismissal should bar the findings of assault and dishonesty under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, the trial court found that the SPB's credibility determinations, which favored J.G.'s testimony over Egelston's, were entitled to great weight.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Egelston's contention regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel was forfeited because it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court found that the claim lacked merit. The family law court's dismissal of the DVRO without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits, and thus had no preclusive effect. The causes of action in the DVRO proceeding and the SPB proceedings were different, and the parties were not in privity.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding Egelston's dismissal from his position. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Egelston v. State Personnel Board" on Justia Law

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law