Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of employment, Gonzalez signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. He later filed a lawsuit against all ten LLCs, alleging various Labor Code violations and claiming they were joint employers. The non-Santa Monica entities moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica, but Gonzalez opposed, arguing they were not parties to the agreement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory defendants were intertwined with the arbitration agreement. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with the employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employment theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained the arbitration clause. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such acts, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices timely for over a year. However, JMM paid one invoice late, leading Trujillo to file a motion to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, despite acknowledging that the delay did not prejudice Trujillo. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties had entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), since the stipulation was primarily drafted by Trujillo. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Antonio Juarez, Jose Hinojosa, Jose Espinosa, and Maria Morfin filed a lawsuit against the San Bernardino City Unified School District following an incident involving Officer Alejandro Brown, a District employee. In February 2018, Juarez found a cell phone and later, Officer Brown, tracking his phone, confronted the plaintiffs, identifying himself as a District police officer. Brown, armed and displaying his badge, demanded compliance, struck Juarez with his firearm, and threatened the others. Brown later pled guilty to assault and battery and threatening the plaintiffs under color of law.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained the District’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found the complaint insufficient to establish that Officer Brown was acting within the scope of his employment with the District and dismissed the claims of negligence, battery, assault, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court held that the scope of employment is a factual issue that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on demurrer. The court found that Officer Brown’s off-duty misconduct, while investigating a suspected theft and wielding his authority as a peace officer, could be regarded as an outgrowth of his employment. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer, enter a new order overruling the demurrer, and conduct further proceedings. The appellate court also rejected the District’s arguments regarding the Bane Act and found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. View "Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. In July 2017, Slone was informed by the Center that he had until July 2020 to become board-certified. Subsequently, he resigned from IVMSMG and began working full-time for IPA. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a fourth amended complaint in February 2021, alleging that the Center retaliated against him in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial solely on this cause of action. The Superior Court of Imperial County found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that Slone did not carry his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a career as a medical administrator and did not suffer any economic or noneconomic damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, mandate law enforcement agencies to prohibit participation in law enforcement gangs and cooperate with investigations into such gangs. The OIG sent letters to 35 deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about their knowledge of and involvement in law enforcement gangs, and to display and provide photographs of gang-associated tattoos.The Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) had previously ruled that the County violated the Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO) by not negotiating the effects of a new ordinance with ALADS. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim with ERCOM and sought injunctive relief from the trial court to enjoin the OIG from proceeding with the interviews without first meeting and conferring with ALADS under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the ERO.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the interview directive triggered the duty to meet and confer with ALADS under the MMBA. The court found that the interviews had significant and adverse effects on working conditions, particularly concerning potential disciplinary actions, and that the County failed to demonstrate a compelling need for immediate investigation without prior negotiation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court agreed that the OIG's decision to conduct interviews was a managerial decision but that the effects of this decision, including potential discipline and the manner of implementation, were subject to bargaining under the MMBA. The court found no error in the trial court's balancing of the interim harm, noting the lack of evidence suggesting that effects bargaining could not be performed expeditiously. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one, respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to a statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process, which he argued was illegal.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach, similar to that used in discrimination cases, and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the standard approach to civil litigation applies, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court declined to adopt a burden-shifting approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision, including Quesada's mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court concluded that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Julian Rodriguez, a former employee of Lawrence Equipment, Inc., filed a lawsuit alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code. Rodriguez claimed that Lawrence failed to pay for all hours worked, including overtime, did not provide adequate meal and rest breaks, issued inaccurate wage statements, and did not pay all due wages upon termination. He also sought civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Rodriguez had signed an arbitration agreement with Lawrence, which led to the arbitration of his non-PAGA claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ordered arbitration for Rodriguez’s wage-and-hour claims and stayed the PAGA claim. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Lawrence, finding that Rodriguez failed to prove any of the alleged Labor Code violations. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment for Lawrence. Subsequently, Lawrence moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the arbitration award precluded Rodriguez from pursuing his PAGA claim due to lack of standing as an aggrieved employee. The trial court granted this motion and dismissed the PAGA claim.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the arbitration award, which found no Labor Code violations, precluded Rodriguez from establishing standing under PAGA. The court applied the doctrine of issue preclusion, determining that the issues litigated in arbitration were identical to those required to establish PAGA standing. Since Rodriguez could not prove any Labor Code violations, he lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. View "Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former officers of the City of Perris Police Department or their surviving spouses, claimed that the closure of the Perris PD and their subsequent hiring by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department resulted in a merger of the two departments under Government Code section 20508. They argued that this merger required Riverside County and the Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) to credit their service with the Perris PD as service with the Sheriff’s Department, entitling them to a more generous pension.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court concluded that no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any of the City’s municipal functions. Consequently, the service pensions for the Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated and paid out by CalPERS under separate contracts with the City and County, respectively. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, Riverside County and CalPERS.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of the contracting agencies’ CalPERS contracts before the succeeding agency assumes any statutory obligations. The court found that the County did not assume the City’s municipal obligations but merely contracted to provide law enforcement services. Therefore, the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former police officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. View "Petree v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a notice enforcing the mandate. Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges and awarded her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by giving her insufficient time to respond. The court awarded her back pay.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Bedard argued that her termination was improper because it was based on her refusal to sign an allegedly illegal contract, was too harsh a penalty, and violated her due process rights under Skelly v. State Personnel Board. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate justified her termination. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Bedard’s termination was not solely based on her refusal to sign the notice but also on her refusal to comply with the vaccination requirement. The court also held that the appropriate remedy for the due process violation was back pay, not reinstatement. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Eva Osborne sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct including discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wage violations. Osborne, who worked as Slap’s executive assistant, claimed Slap required her to perform personal tasks without proper compensation. In response, Slap filed a cross-complaint against Osborne in August 2022, alleging libel, slander, and other claims based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that Osborne’s statements were protected activity made in anticipation of litigation and were privileged under Civil Code section 47. The court found that Slap could not show his claims had minimal merit because the statements were privileged and he failed to demonstrate malice.The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Osborne’s statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims. The court found that Osborne’s HR letter was sent in good faith contemplation of litigation, supported by her retention of counsel and subsequent legal actions. The court did not need to address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding conditional privilege and malice, as the litigation privilege alone was sufficient to affirm the trial court’s ruling. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law