Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed an order denying certification of a class of persons who worked without pay for American Film Institute (AFI). The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that common issues would not predominate over individual ones. In this case, the putative class members who expected no compensation were not employees under California law; the class that plaintiff moved to certify is broad enough to include persons who expected to be paid; and thus, if the case were to proceed as a class action, the trier of fact would need to decide whether each class member expected to be paid or was in fact a volunteer. View "Woods v. American Film Institute" on Justia Law

Defendants Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (Pinnacle) and Jennifer Stewart (Stewart) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion because it determined the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As to the former, the court noted the agreement was unconscionable because plaintiff Anthony De Leon was required to sign the arbitration agreement as a precondition to his employment. As to the latter, the court found the agreement was substantively unconscionable because of its limits on discovery and because it shortened the statute of limitations to one year on all claims. On appeal, defendants contended the arbitration agreement had low procedural unconscionability and contained only one substantively unconscionable provision: the statute of limitations provision. They alternatively claimed the court erred by failing to sever any unconscionable provisions. After careful consideration of the agreement at issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court’s unconscionability findings. Further, the Court held the trial court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever any portion of the arbitration agreement. View "De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively, "Gunther") in this case were flight attendants who alleged their employer, Alaska Airlines, Inc. (Alaska), failed to provide California Labor Code section 226(a)-compliant wage statements. They sought penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that section 226(a) applied to the flight attendants because their employment was based in California and Alaska’s wage statements did not comply with section 226(a). The court found Alaska liable for over $25 million in heightened penalties under section 226.3 of PAGA. In a postjudgment order, the court awarded Gunther attorney’s fees. Notwithstanding the implications of Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal.5th 732 (2020, "Ward I"), Alaska contended that section 226(a) could not be applied to the flight attendants because it was preempted by federal law. Alaska also raised multiple challenges to PAGA penalties, including that the trial court erred in awarding heightened penalties under section 226.3 of PAGA. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Alaska’s argument that application of section 226 was preempted by federal law and affirmed the trial court’s determination that the flight attendants in this case were entitled to section 226(a)-compliant wage statements. The Court also concluded, however, that the trial court erred in awarding heightened penalties under section 226.3 because the plain language of the statute provided that heightened penalties applied only where the employer failed to provide wage statements or failed to keep required records, which was not the situation here. The Court found reversal of the penalty award did not require vacation of the attorney’s fees award. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Alaska’s defenses to the application of section 226(a). View "Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Chavez-Cortez filed a representative cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code 2698), seeking civil penalties for wage-and-hour violations. The suit was dismissed for failure to satisfy the requirement of notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Relying on precedent (Khan), the defendants argued that the notice provided did not inform the LWDA “of the claims of any other alleged similarly situated but unidentified individuals” or that Chavez-Cortez “intended to pursue this matter on behalf of these unnamed individuals.”The court of appeal reversed. The notice at issue in Khan differs substantially from plaintiffs’ notice; here, the plaintiffs’ notice alerted the agency and defendants to ongoing Labor Code violations that were not by nature isolated or unique to plaintiffs. The notice was not deficient for failing to reference other aggrieved employees implicated by the representative action. Plaintiffs’ letter provided fair notice to the agency of representative claims for meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime violations. View "Santos v. El Guapos Tacos, LLC" on Justia Law

Moniz managed a staffing firm's (Adecco’s) relationship with Google. Correa was assigned to work at Google. Moniz and Correa sued Adecco to recover civil penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code. Under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by alleged Labor Code violations may act as an agent of the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (LWDA) to bring an action to recover civil penalties. If an aggrieved employee settles such an action, the court must review and approve the settlement; civil penalties are distributed 75 percent to the LWDA and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.Moniz settled her case first. The court approved the settlement. Correa challenged the settlement process and approval, including the manner in which the court treated Correa's and LWDA's objections to the settlement, the standard used by the court to approve the settlement, numerous alleged legal deficiencies, and the trial court’s ruling denying her attorney fees and an incentive payment. The court of appeal reversed. While the court applied an appropriate standard of review by inquiring whether the settlement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable” as well as meaningful and consistent with the purposes of PAGA, it is not possible to infer from the record that the trial court assessed the fairness of the settlement’s allocation of civil penalties between the affected aggrieved employees or whether such allocation comports with PAGA. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA" on Justia Law

The Clinic hired Gamboa, who signed several onboarding documents. Weeks later, Gamboa sustained an injury to her hand that affected her work. After Gamboa requested medical accommodations, the Clinic terminated her employment. Gamboa sued for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The Clinic moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Gamboa had signed an arbitration agreement as part of her required onboarding documents.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of that motion. The Clinic failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence after Gamboa produced evidence disputing an agreement. The Clinic may have met its burden on the first step by attaching to Lopez’s (the Clinic’s director of human resources) declaration a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear Gamboa’s signature but Gamboa met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it. Lopez did not explain how she knew Gamboa had seen, much less signed, the arbitration agreement. View "Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic" on Justia Law

Elation sued Fenn and Shi for breach of a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) (against Shi only) entered during the course of Shi’s prior employment with Elation and breach of a confidential settlement agreement and mutual release (Settlement Agreement) (against both defendants) entered to resolve a prior action between the parties. The defendants filed a cross-complaint, alleging Elation’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. Elation admitted to liability and stipulated to $10,000 in liquidated damages on the cross-claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. A jury found that Shi had breached the NDA and harmed Elation, and awarded Elation $10,000 in damages. The court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), denied Elation’s motion for injunctive relief, and awarded defendants $700,000 in attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court should have awarded Elation nominal damages on its NDA claim, as defendants’ JNOV motion did not challenge the jury’s finding that Shi breached the NDA. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding in Elation’s favor on its Settlement Agreement claim. The court affirmed the order granting JNOV as to Elation’s Settlement Agreement claim and vacated the award of attorney fees. View "Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC" on Justia Law

The Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (the Hospital) terminated the employment of registered nurse Kimberly Wilkin (Wilkin) after discovering she had violated the Hospital’s policies governing the handling and documentation of patient medications. Wilkin sued the Hospital, alleging her discharge constituted disability discrimination, retaliation, and otherwise violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); resulted in the unlawful denial of medical leave and retaliation in violation of the Moore- Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA); and constituted a wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Over a year after Wilkin filed her complaint, the Hospital moved for summary judgment, producing undisputed evidence, including Wilkin’s deposition testimony, showing she had violated policies governing the handling of medication, and, for over a year before she was discharged, had been regularly counseled for her chronic absenteeism and other issues. The trial court concluded the Hospital carried its burden of producing evidence showing its decision was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. After Wilkin did not produce any evidence showing the Hospital’s reasons were fabricated or otherwise pretextual, the trial court concluded a reasonable trier of fact could not find in favor of Wilkin on any of her claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. To this, the Court of Appeal affirmed. "As all of Wilkin’s claims depended on there being a triable issue of fact regarding the lawfulness of her discharge, and our record does not show such a triable issue of fact exists, summary judgment was properly granted." View "Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

Zamora sued his former employer, SIS, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code 12900) for employment discrimination based on physical disability, failure to make a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation, wrongful termination, and other claims after SIS laid him off while he was recovering from an industrial injury. The trial court granted summary adjudication of all but two causes of action. The parties later stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims, and the court entered judgment for SIS.The court of appeal reversed the summary adjudication of the disability discrimination, wrongful termination in violation of FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims. Zamora suffered from a qualifying disability under the FEHA based on his workplace knee injury. FEHA requires employers to make reasonable accommodation for the known disabilities of employees and applicants to enable them to perform the essential functions of a position unless doing so would produce undue hardship to the employer’s operation. The evidence here raises triable issues of fact as to whether Zamora could have worked in another position at SIS with his restrictions and whether he was discharged because of his disability. Zamora presented substantial evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent. View "Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they own an apartment complex and that their tenant purchased a washing machine from Best Buy, which was negligently installed. A resulting water leak resulted in significant damage to the property, rendering several units uninhabitable.Best Buy argued that its subsidiary had a contract with Penn Ridge, under which Penn Ridge “shall provide services . . . as a duly licensed broker of property by the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration … utilizing the services of independent motor carriers to effectuate the pick-up, delivery, and in-home installation of Merchandise” from Best Buy. Carriers are defined under the Agreement as “any independently owned and operated motor carrier under contract with [Penn Ridge] who may also provide Installation Services.” The carriers’ trucks did not display the Best Buy name or logo. Delivery teams did not wear any Best Buy branded clothing. The equipment used by the delivery teams varied among carriers. Penn Ridge alone determined if the carriers were qualified to provide necessary delivery and installation services. The contracts stated the carriers were providing services as independent contractors, Best Buy gave Penn Ridge access to its routing system and required that contractors comply with certain Best Buy policies and procedures.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Best Buy. There is no material dispute that the washing machine was installed by an independent contractor. View "Bacoka v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law