Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dignity Health, operating as French Hospital Medical Center, filed a complaint against orthopedic surgeon Troy I. Mounts, M.D., and his corporation to recover an advance paid under their Physician Recruitment Agreement. Mounts filed a cross-complaint alleging retaliation for his complaints about patient care quality, interference with his economic opportunities, and unlawful business practices. Dignity responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court initially denied. The appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the case for further consideration.Upon remand, the trial court concluded that Mounts had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court found that Dignity's actions were protected by the litigation privilege, the common interest privilege, and were barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the court granted Dignity's motion to strike the cross-complaint and ordered Mounts to pay Dignity's attorney fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that all of Mounts' claims were based on conduct protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (b)) and the common interest privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (c)). The court also found that Dignity's actions were immune under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 11137) and that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court upheld the trial court's orders granting the motion to strike and awarding attorney fees to Dignity. View "Dignity Health v. Mounts" on Justia Law

American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

Four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla's Fremont plant. Despite the requests, Tesla did not provide the requested records, citing a stay in the Vaughn case due to an ongoing appeal. The plaintiffs then filed a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against Tesla for failing to comply with the Labor Code.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion, which argued that the PAGA claims arose from protected petitioning activity related to the Vaughn case. The court found that the plaintiffs' requests for personnel records were independent of the Vaughn litigation and were merely an exercise of their statutory rights under the Labor Code.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Tesla's refusal to provide the requested records did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs' PAGA claims did not rely on any "written or oral statement or writing" by Tesla. The court also found that Tesla's conduct did not meet the criteria for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute's "catchall" provision, as it did not contribute to any public issue or debate. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Taylor v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing employment discrimination dispute between a well-known columnist, T.J. Simers, and his former employer, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC. Simers was demoted in 2013 and subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging constructive termination and age and disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The litigation spanned nine years and included three jury trials. The first trial resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding significant economic and noneconomic damages. However, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the constructive termination claim and ordered a new trial on noneconomic damages. Both parties appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, necessitating a second trial.In the second trial, the jury awarded Simers $15.4 million in noneconomic damages, but the trial court granted a new trial due to misconduct by Simers's counsel during closing arguments and the excessive nature of the damages awarded. The third trial focused solely on the amount of noneconomic damages, resulting in a $1.25 million award, which matched a pre-trial settlement offer made by the defendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded Simers $3,264,906 in attorney fees and $210,882.55 in costs, but excluded fees and costs incurred after the defendant's settlement offer. The defendant appealed, arguing that fees for the second trial and the unsuccessful appeal should not be awarded due to counsel's misconduct and the unrelated nature of the work. The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking recovery of appellate fees despite the trial court's ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in awarding fees for the second trial and the appeal, noting that the trial court had considered the misconduct and the overall reasonableness of the fees. The court also upheld the exclusion of post-offer fees and costs, in line with statutory requirements under section 998. View "Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC" on Justia Law

Joseph Mayor, a worker injured in December 2013 while employed by Ross Valley Sanitation District, was awarded total permanent disability by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on March 2, 2023. Ross Valley filed a petition for reconsideration with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) on March 23, 2023. The Board did not act on the petition within the 60-day period mandated by former section 5909 of the Labor Code, which stated that a petition for reconsideration is deemed denied if not acted upon within 60 days of filing.The Board issued an order granting Ross Valley’s petition for reconsideration on August 14, 2023, 144 days after the petition was filed. Mayor requested a hearing to enforce the WCJ’s award and subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the Board lost jurisdiction over the matter 60 days after the petition was filed. The Board issued a revised order on February 2, 2024, rescinding the WCJ’s award and returning the matter to the trial level for further proceedings, citing an administrative irregularity that delayed the Board’s receipt of the petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Mayor and the recent decision in Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2023) that the Board’s action after 60 days exceeded its jurisdiction. The court held that former section 5909 was mandatory and that the Board’s failure to act within the 60-day period resulted in the petition being denied by operation of law. Consequently, the court granted Mayor’s petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the Board to rescind its orders granting reconsideration and to reinstate the WCJ’s award of permanent disability. View "Mayor v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Nancy Vargas, a bus driver for the Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District, injured her foot at work in March 2018. She settled her workers' compensation claim with the district in December 2020, agreeing that the injury caused a 26 percent permanent disability. Vargas also applied for subsequent injury benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund (Fund), listing pre-existing disabilities and disclosing that she was receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments.The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) joined the Fund as a defendant in Vargas’s case. The Fund acknowledged Vargas’s eligibility for benefits but sought a credit for a portion of her SSDI payments, arguing that these payments were for her pre-existing disabilities. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) found that the Fund had not proven its entitlement to the credit. The Board upheld this decision, stating that the Fund failed to show that the SSDI payments were awarded for Vargas’s pre-existing disabilities.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the Fund bears the burden of proving its entitlement to a credit for SSDI payments under Labor Code section 4753. The court found that the Fund did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Vargas’s SSDI payments were for her pre-existing disabilities. The court emphasized that the Fund must prove the extent to which SSDI payments are attributable to pre-existing disabilities to reduce subsequent injury benefits. The court also noted that the Fund had ample opportunity to gather evidence but failed to do so. The Board’s order denying the Fund’s petition for reconsideration was affirmed. View "Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla through their counsel, Bryan Schwarz Law (BSL), under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla's Fremont factory. During the Vaughn litigation, BSL sent Tesla privacy waivers and statutory personnel records requests on behalf of numerous employees, including the plaintiffs. Tesla did not respond to these requests, citing a stay in the Vaughn proceedings due to an appeal.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike the plaintiffs' PAGA complaint. The court found that Tesla failed to show that the plaintiffs' claims arose from protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court ruled that the plaintiffs were exercising their statutory rights to inspect and copy personnel records, independent of the Vaughn litigation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Tesla's refusal to provide the requested personnel records did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs' claims did not involve any "written or oral statement or writing" by Tesla. The court also found that Tesla's conduct did not further any public issue or contribute to public debate, as required under the anti-SLAPP statute's catchall provision. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the denial of Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Taylor v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

Nancy Vargas, a bus driver for the Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District, injured her foot at work in March 2018. She settled her claim against the district in December 2020, with a stipulated permanent disability of 26 percent. Vargas applied for subsequent injury benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund (Fund), listing pre-existing disabilities and disclosing that she was receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments. The Fund acknowledged her eligibility but sought to reduce her benefits by the amount of her SSDI payments, claiming these were for her pre-existing disabilities.The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) determined that the Fund was not entitled to this reduction, as the Fund had not proven that Vargas’s SSDI payments were awarded for her pre-existing disabilities. The Board found that the evidence provided, including an award letter from the Social Security Administration, did not specify the basis of the SSDI benefits. The Fund’s petition for reconsideration was denied by the Board, which maintained that the Fund needed to show the SSDI payments were for pre-existing disabilities to claim a reduction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the Fund bears the burden of proving its entitlement to a reduction in benefits under section 4753 of the Labor Code. The court found that the Fund did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Vargas’s SSDI payments were for her pre-existing disabilities. The court emphasized that the Fund must meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and that the stipulated disability rating in Vargas’s settlement with her employer did not automatically entitle the Fund to a reduction in benefits. The Board’s order denying the Fund’s petition for reconsideration was affirmed. View "Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund v. Workers Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

The case involves Susan George, a teacher who had worked for the Susanville Elementary School District for several years before resigning to teach at another school district. She later returned to the District. Upon her return, the District did not credit her for the years of experience she gained at the other school district following her resignation. George filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing the District violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code section 45028 and the restoration requirement of section 44931 when placing her on the salary schedule without accounting for the years of experience she gained while outside the District after her resignation.The trial court found that the District complied with the Education Code. It ruled that the collective bargaining agreement prevented George from acquiring credit for the two years she worked for another school district. The trial court further found the uniformity requirement did not afford George relief and the District complied with the restoration requirement by restoring George to her prior position. Consequently, the trial court denied George’s petition for writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the District violated the uniformity requirement by failing to place George at step 15 of the District’s salary schedule. The court disagreed with the District's argument that the uniformity requirement is inapplicable to George’s placement on the salary schedule because the restoration requirement controls the placement of teachers rehired within 39 months. The court found that the District must credit George with up to 12 years of out-of-district experience. The court remanded the case with directions to issue a writ compelling the District to place George on its salary schedule in compliance with Education Code section 45028 as construed herein, with appropriate back pay and benefits. The District was ordered to pay costs on appeal. View "George v. Susanville Elementary School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Erika Paleny, who sued her employer, Fireplace Products U.S., Inc., and her manager, Sabah Salah, alleging harassment, discrimination, and retaliation after she informed them of her plans to undergo oocyte (egg) retrieval procedures for donation and future personal use. Paleny claimed that her manager disapproved of the procedures and subsequently harassed her for needing time off for the procedures, which eventually led to her termination.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the egg retrieval and freezing procedures did not qualify as a pregnancy-related medical condition or disability and were therefore not protected by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Paleny appealed this decision, arguing that the lower court's ruling erroneously interpreted the relevant statutes and denied her protection under the FEHA.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Paleny was not pregnant nor disabled by pregnancy during her employment, and thus could not claim entitlement to the protections afforded under section 12940 et seq. of the FEHA. The court also found that Paleny was not suffering from a medical condition related to pregnancy. The court concluded that the egg retrieval procedure did not constitute a medical condition related to pregnancy under the FEHA, as Paleny was undergoing an elective medical procedure without an underlying medical condition related to pregnancy. Therefore, Paleny did not have a protected characteristic under the FEHA. View "Paleny v. Fireplace Products U.S., Inc." on Justia Law