Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendants require their employees to comply with various confidentiality policies. Current and former employees sued under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, 2698), alleging the employers’ confidentiality policies restricted their employees’ speech in violation of California law. The claims fall into three subcategories; restraints of competition, whistleblowing, and freedom of speech. The trial court dismissed, concluding the claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. In a settlement in a separate NLRB proceeding, defendant Google agreed to post a notice informing employees that they had the right “to discuss wages, hours, and working conditions,” and that “Google would “NOT prohibit [employees] from discussing or sharing information relating to [their] performance, salaries, benefits, discipline, training, or any other terms and conditions of employment.”The court of appeal reversed. Although many of the’ claims relate to conduct that is arguably within the scope of the NLRA, the claims fall within the local interest exception to preemption. The complaint does not mention union organizing or other concerted activity; it alleges violations of state law that can be proven without considering whether the actions violated the NLRA. The statutes protecting competition, whistleblowing, and free speech fit comfortably within California’s historic police powers and address conduct affecting individual employees, as distinct from the NLRA’s focus on concerted activity. This state-court action poses no threat to the NLRA’s exercise of its own jurisdiction. View "Doe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Five laborers filed suit against their former employer, Miguel Martinez, alleging violations of various labor laws. The Court of Appeal previously heard plaintiffs' claims; in its initial review, the Court considered plaintiffs’ appeal of a judgment that rejected all their claims against Martinez. Although the judgment was affirmed for the most part, the Court reversed to allow plaintiffs to proceed on two of their claims, one of which concerned Martinez’s failure to pay plaintiffs for rest periods, and another of which was derivative of their rest-period claim. As was explained, Martinez was obligated to pay his employees for the time they spent on authorized rest periods. However, the Court found nothing in the evidence to show he had ever paid his employees for this time. The case was thus remanded to allow the trial court to determine appropriate damages and penalties based on this failure. Following the remand, the parties raised various challenges to the trial court’s calculation of damages and penalties. Plaintiffs contended the trial court undervalued their damages and wrongly rejected several of their claims for penalties. Martinez, in turn, claimed that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s calculation of damages and penalties. Because the Court of Appeal find none of the parties’ several claims warranted reversal, it affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Sanchez v. Martinez" on Justia Law

For more than 10 years, Land worked as a field service specialist for DISH Network. After a customer complaint in 2015, Land’s supervisor filled out an “Employee Consultation” form that stated it was a “Final written notice” issued “due to policy violation: Falsification of Company records.” On the day before Land signed the consultation form, Dish received another customer complaint. Land admitted, “going to the customer’s home off the clock and taking his daughters.” The second consultation form indicated that it was a termination notice. Land applied for unemployment benefitsAn ALJ determined Land was ineligible for benefits because he had been discharged for breaking “a reasonable employer rule.” Land maintained he was unaware of any Dish policy forbidding employees from giving out their personal contact information to customers and from performing work during off-hours. He claimed he had gone back to the customer’s house to prevent a trouble call and to save the company money. The Appeals Board adopted the ALJ’s findings.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Land’s petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The Appeals Board prejudicially abused its discretion in refusing to consider additional evidence proffered by Land. While the Board has considerable discretion in allowing or refusing to consider new evidence, the evidence was a customer’s declaration that would have “effectively refuted” the chronology of events set forth by the ALJ and adopted by the Board. View "Land v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The court of appeal previously concluded that San Francisco’s procedural approach to punishing Morgado for misconduct violated the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act by not providing a valid avenue for administrative appeal of his 2011 termination from his police employment and affirmed a 2014 injunction directing the city to vacate Morgado’s termination and reinstate him pending administrative appeal. Morgado was reinstated but was suspended without pay retroactive to his 2011 termination. In 2018 he obtained an order holding San Francisco in contempt for failure to comply with the injunction and requiring the city to vacate “unconditionally” Morgado’s termination and suspension, compensate him with front pay and benefits lost, and “refrain from ... any other action” against Morgado.San Francisco offset the payment owed to him based on his post-termination earnings from side income as a mortgage broker, a deduction of $181,402. Morgado obtained a second order of contempt, directing the city to pay Morgado the amount deducted and to re-assign him to administrative duties. The court of appeal vacated that order as not resting upon a “clear, intentional violation of a specific, narrowly drawn order.” The trial court again found the deduction inapplicable and ordered the city to pay the amount deducted. The court of appeal reversed, citing precedent that entitles the city to deductions for Morgado’s side income, and remanded for recalculation of the amount. View "Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the employee demonstrated his assent to the arbitration clause by signing the acknowledgment, and the employer had no duty to call the arbitration agreement to the employee's attention. The court found that provisions in the arbitration clause concerning arbitrator's fees and costs and attorney fees are unenforceable, but they may be severed, and the rest of the agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to sever the offending provisions concerning arbitration fees and costs and attorney fees from the agreement and otherwise grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Conyer v. Hula Media Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), an employee aggrieved by his or her employer's Labor Code violations may be authorized to act as an agent of the LWDA to recover such penalties in a civil action. In the cases underlying these consolidated appeals, Plaintiffs Starks and Herrera, each acting as the LWDA's agent, separately filed substantially identical PAGA actions against their former employer, Vortex. Starks eventually settled with Vortex and Herrera moved to vacate the judgment and intervene in the Starks action.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Herrera's motion to intervene in the Starks action was untimely. The court also held that, because the LWDA accepted the proceeds from the judgment in the Starks action, Herrera, as the LWDA's agent, cannot attack that judgment. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Herrera action, because Herrera's PAGA claim, in substance, is encompassed within the Starks judgment, and thus its maintenance is barred by the LWDA's acceptance of the benefits of the Starks judgment. View "Starks v. Vortex Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Davis filed sued individual Red Bull executives for age and sexual harassment and hostile work environment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Davis was 56 years old, had been employed by Red Bull for 15 years, and was in a mid-level managerial sales position until he was terminated.Red Bull filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. The individual defendants moved to compel Davis to submit his claims to arbitration. Davis filed a separate lawsuit against Red Bull seeking a declaratory judgment that his claims were not subject to the arbitration agreement. That agreement specifies it is “intended to cover all civil claims which involve or relate in any way to [Davis’s] employment (or termination of employment) with Red Bull, including, but not limited to, claims of employment discrimination or harassment on the basis of . . . sex, age, . . . claims for wrongful discharge, [and] claims for emotional distress.”The trial court concluded and the court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The court noted the "adhesion" nature of the agreement, which is not mutual and the arbitral discovery process does not guarantee adequate discovery. View "Davis v. Kozak" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of four massage parlors, received three citations from the Department for violations of California's wage and hour laws. The hearing officer issued findings and an order affirming all three citations, including a total of $198,576 in unpaid wages and liquidated damages for citation no. WA-102321. Plaintiff's subsequent petition for writ of mandate challenging the Commissioner's decision affirming the assessments in citation no. WA-102321 was dismissed by the superior court after his request that it waive the bond requirement under Labor Code section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3) was denied and he failed to post a bond.The Court of Appeal affirmed and explained that, although section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), now requires employers to post a bond as a condition to filing a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Labor Commissioner's citations, employers' substantive, preenactment obligations toward their employees under the Labor Code have not changed. All that changed is the addition of the procedural requirement that plaintiff post a bond to secure payment of the assessed amounts. Therefore, application of that requirement to a proceeding that had not yet been initiated prior to the effective date of section 1197.1, subdivision (c)(3), does not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to waive the bond requirement. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that he was not indigent was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fushan Li v. Department of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Jarboe was hired by DKD. Shortly after he began working, Jarboe was transferred to Leehan. Following his termination at Leehan, Jarboe brought this wage and hour action individually and on behalf of a putative class against the Hanlees Auto Group, its 12 affiliated dealerships (each us a separate corporate entity), including DKD and Leehan, and three individuals. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between Jarboe and DKD. The trial court granted the motion as to 11 of the 12 causes of action against DKD but denied the motion as to the other defendants. The trial court allowed Jarboe’s claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code section 2698, to proceed in court against all defendants. The trial court refused to stay the litigation pending arbitration of Jarboe’s claims against DKD. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the other defendants are entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement between Jarboe and DKD as third party beneficiaries of Jarboe’s employment agreement or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. View "Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-respondent Dignity Health (Dignity) and other individually named defendants. Arnold was employed as a medical assistant. She alleged defendants engaged in discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on her age and her association with her African-American coworkers, including by terminating her employment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). On summary judgment, the trial court concluded defendants provided evidence of legitimate reasons for plaintiff’s termination and, in rebuttal, plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that defendants’ actions were discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's findings and affirmed summary judgment. View "Arnold v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law